Some writers do not shy away from political debate. Every week, Javier Cercas sets out his views in the Sunday supplement of the daily newspaper El País. He describes himself as a social democrat because, as he tells Politique internationale, no better way has yet been devised to advance the welfare state. He also champions the United States of Europe envisaged by Victor Hugo. The writer would like progressive values to turn Spain into “a southern Norway, with sunshine and tapas”. Ideally, he would round off his recipe of libertarian and anarchist values, designed to reinvigorate democracy, with greater citizen participation.
Cercas voted for Pedro Sánchez twice, but, as a free man, he nevertheless called for the prime minister to resign in an article published in El País on 1 July 2025. The paper is widely regarded as the newspaper closest to the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE). “Should President Sánchez resign? Quite unequivocally, yes,” he urged in his opening line.
After his first success with Soldiers of Salamis, his 2001 novel about the Spanish Civil War, the author won the National Prize for Narrative Literature in 2010. Awarded annually by Spain’s Ministry of Culture to a Spanish author for the best work of narrative fiction (novel, novella or short story), it recognised Anatomy of an Instant, a bestseller dissecting Lieutenant-Colonel Tejero’s failed coup attempt in 1981. A succession of awards followed, including the prestigious Planeta Prize in 2019 for Terra Alta, and the Jacques Delors European Book Prize in 2025 for The Madman of God at the End of the World, an account of his invitation to accompany Pope Francis to Mongolia in 2023. A member of the Royal Spanish Academy since 2024, and made a Chevalier of the Légion d’honneur by Emmanuel Macron during the French president’s state visit to Madrid last September, the novelist, acclaimed by readers and critics alike, has also made politics a subject of his fiction.
A passionate friend of France, which he visits regularly and where his books enjoy a wide readership, Cercas has no need to prove his affection for the country, though it never descends into uncritical admiration. The writer cannot understand young people’s fascination with violence. As he puts it, they “all want to be Enjolras on the barricades in Les Misérables”. He is also critical of the indulgence shown by some French intellectuals.
Javier Cercas agrees to meet politicians who ask to see him. He has spoken at length with President Macron on several occasions, notably at a dinner at the Élysée in 2023, attended by Mario Vargas Llosa and King Juan Carlos, now emeritus. “I feverishly wrote down every word of the conversation in my hotel room. One day I shall publish it. The title will be ‘A Dinner at the Élysée’,” he writes in his latest book, El periódico de la democracia.
At our magazine’s invitation, this man of the left reflects on what looks like the twilight of Pedro Sánchez. Yet the Socialist had forged his own destiny against all the odds.
First, against his own party: the PSOE, which had chosen him in 2014, ousted him in 2016 because he refused to back the investiture of conservative Mariano Rajoy (the People’s Party, PP). Sánchez got back into his Peugeot 407, toured the party’s regional branches and won it back in the 2017 leadership contest.
Then, against the odds: his motion of no confidence, which looked doomed from the outset, drove Rajoy from office on 1 June 2018.
Against the taboos, in 2019: he formed a government with Podemos (the radical left), having previously insisted that such a scenario would keep him awake at night. He also relied on left-wing separatists: ERC in Catalonia and EH Bildu in the Basque Country, a coalition descended from the successive political fronts of the terrorist organisation ETA.
Finally, against the polls, in 2023: having come second to Alberto Núñez Feijóo (PP), he secured investiture thanks to Junts, the right-wing separatist party of former Catalan regional president Carles Puigdemont, who has been based in Belgium since the illegal 2017 referendum. He traded his way back into the Moncloa Palace for an amnesty he had previously said was out of the question. This is the original sin Cercas holds against him, and one that has scandalised half of Spain.
Today, the man who once forged his path against the current appears to be swept away by the obstacles he sidestepped without resolving. Corruption scandals have engulfed his political and family circles. The regularisation of around 500,000 foreign nationals came a few months before the migration crisis in Ceuta (1). The eviction from her Madrid flat of Maricarmen, an 87-year-old tenant who died two weeks later, sparked unprecedented protests over housing. The absence of any budget during the parliamentary term has come back into focus following the rail disaster at Urda, the second such tragedy in nine months (2).
So when, in early October 2026, Sánchez calls an early general election for 29 November, the right and almost all political analysts are betting on his defeat. The polls put the PP, once again led by Feijóo, in the lead with around 30 per cent of the vote, and suggest it could form a majority with Vox (the far right), which is close to 20 per cent. The PSOE is fighting to overtake the PP, while also siphoning votes from the two parties to its left: Frente Amplio (6 per cent, in favour of joining the government) and Podemos (3 per cent, now opposed to Sánchez). Yet no opinion poll suggests that an alliance between the right and the far right would fall short of an absolute majority in the 350-seat Congress of Deputies.
Unless… By dissolving parliament three days after his housing decrees were rejected (3), Sánchez is betting on social issues. By accepting the resignation of his transport minister, he wants to show that he is taking responsibility. And by repeatedly sounding the alarm over the far right, he hopes to mobilise abstentionist voters, who have traditionally benefited the left. These are crude political manoeuvres, our interviewee believes, and he helps us take them apart one by one.
M. de T.
Matthieu de Taillac — We had to postpone our interview because, on the eve of the date originally scheduled, the terrible rail accident at Urda took place. Beyond the loss of life, what does the AVE, Spain’s high-speed train, mean to the country and its people?
Javier Cercas — The AVE is a symbol. It is a symbol of Spanish modernity. It was proof that we had finally become European and that Francoism really was over. Obama or Merkel could come here and exclaim: “Wow!” It worked extremely well. There was a time when, if a train was five minutes late, you got the full price of your ticket back (4). Now we have suffered two tragedies in less than a year. It is catastrophic. It is a terrible blow for the families affected, but also a profound psychological shock for the country. We find ourselves asking: what on earth is going on?
M. de T. — Should we see a connection between the two AVE accidents, the massive power cut (5) and the large-scale arrival of migrants in Ceuta? Not to suggest that Spain is a failed state, which would be absurd, but to acknowledge that basic services, some of them once pioneering, have suddenly stopped working…
J. C. — That is a lot of coincidences. I do not know whether it makes sense to lump everything together, but the fact is that a great many things have happened in a very short space of time. It is therefore natural for a sense of insecurity to take hold. I take, or used to take, the AVE almost every week, and for the past few years delays have been constant. Drivers and other staff were always complaining.
M. de T. — The Ceuta crisis is different, but it also exposes a serious failure in another of a country’s basic infrastructures: its border. Some observers believe the Moroccans had a deliberate plan; others disagree. But it seems that no analyst and no ordinary citizen believes the Moroccan government did everything in its power to prevent what happened… except, perhaps, within the Spanish government.
J. C. — Not even within the Spanish government. It is impossible that they believe it. They say it, but they do not believe it. We have all seen the footage of police officers escorting migrants towards Ceuta. Remember Groucho Marx’s question: “Who are you going to believe? What you see with your own eyes, or what I tell you?” The government is simply denying the obvious. I understand that it wants to maintain good relations with Morocco, but I do not know whether this is the best way to go about it. Morocco has often tolerated crises of this kind, at the very least, and has sometimes actively encouraged them. A judicial inquiry will tell us what happened. What we already know is why Morocco behaves in this way. History is clear: whenever it senses that the government or the country is weak, it attacks. It did so when Franco was dying (6), and on many other occasions. Its message is: “Ceuta and Melilla are ours, and they will remain ours.” This time, it is obvious that the Moroccans saw a government weakened both at home and abroad. Perhaps they did not imagine that things would reach such proportions. Eighty or ninety thousand people — that is more than the population of Ceuta! But once social media gets going, you never know where it will end.
M. de T. — Until recently, the prevailing analysis was that Pedro Sánchez had called an election because it suited him to make housing the dominant issue — a social issue that traditionally benefits the left — and to keep immigration and corruption out of the headlines. Do you think this tactic could work, or will his voters instead ask what he has actually been doing for the past eight years?
J. C. — I think we need to distinguish between two very different periods. Sánchez’s first term had a purpose. Things were done; laws were passed. There was a government that governed. And the far right was still relatively small: it had not entered government in any region and had no prospect of doing so nationally. The second parliamentary term is entirely different. Things are happening in Spain that have never happened before. For example, never in the country’s democratic history has the party that came second in an election — in this case the PSOE — gone on to govern. What is more, this government was formed with a majority that calls itself progressive but is not, in reality.
M. de T. — Is that because the parliamentary alliance that voted Sánchez into office includes regional parties that are not left-wing?
J. C. — Of course. Some are right-wing, such as the PNV (7). On a key issue such as immigration, Junts is outright far right, while it is liberal on other matters. When this majority was formed, I thought it would be impossible to govern with it because it was so heterogeneous. Time has proved me right. The government has been unable to present a budget in any financial year — yet the budget is the most important piece of legislation of the political year! In those circumstances, you either resign or call an election. That is what normally happens in Italy, France and other democratic countries. In Spain, before Sánchez, budgets were occasionally rolled over from one year to the next. But during this term, not a single budget has been presented. I find that extraordinary. I do not think it is healthy for a democracy.
M. de T. — This motley alliance led him to pass the amnesty law for Catalan separatists (8).
J. C. — The very same government, the very same party and the very same prime minister who had spent years saying that this major measure would never be adopted because it was immoral, unconstitutional and unacceptable — and who were still saying so during the election campaign — went ahead and adopted it without the slightest qualm. It was an extremely far-reaching measure, not provided for in the Constitution, and they did so without even having a large majority. I supported pardons; I wrote as much. I believe the state should be generous. But amnesty is the opposite of a pardon. In effect, this amnesty amounts to an admission that the real culprit is the state! By simply wiping the offences away, the state is acknowledging that it was in the wrong!
M. de T. — You also wrote an article calling for Pedro Sánchez to resign because of the corruption scandals surrounding him.
J. C. — Nearly a hundred people in Pedro Sánchez’s circle have been charged or convicted (9). Consider this: his right-hand man, the person who brought him to power, is in prison. The next person to hold that position was also jailed; he has now been charged and is awaiting trial on extremely serious allegations. So has that man’s own right-hand man. His brother has been convicted, his wife is awaiting trial, and there are all sorts of corruption cases surrounding him. I cannot imagine a French president remaining in office in such circumstances. Nor an Italian one. I do not think this is healthy or beneficial. Two years ago, I wrote that article to tell Sánchez that the best thing he could do was leave office and make way for someone else from the Socialist Party. Because every day he remains in government, the far right grows stronger.
M. de T. — How do you explain the emergence and rise of the far right in Spain?
J. C. — Until 2018, Spain was almost the only country in Europe, along with Portugal and Ireland, without a far right. It emerged in 2018 in response to the separatist movement in Catalonia (10). I said so at the time and was attacked for saying it, but it is obvious: when one nationalism appears on one side, another emerges on the other. And once the far right had appeared, the government realised that it stood to benefit from its growth.
M. de T. — Are you suggesting that Pedro Sánchez, through his anti-fascist rhetoric, wanted to help Vox split the right-wing vote, as François Mitterrand did with the National Front in his day?
J. C. — That too seems obvious to me, especially during his second term. The Spanish government has helped the far right to grow, and it has done so for two reasons. First, the more votes the far right gets, the fewer the PP gets. Second, the traditional right will need the far right in order to govern. The government can then lump the traditional right together with the far right and claim that they are all much of a muchness, thereby driving moderate voters away. Unfortunately, a sense of responsibility is not particularly widespread among our politicians.
M. de T. — In your view, does a politician who changes his mind as often as Sánchez display the virtue of pragmatism or the vice of cynicism?
J. C. — Politicians have to be pragmatic. But pragmatism has its limits, and it must not be confused with cynicism. Politics needs to be driven by an ethical and moral force. I do not believe in Machiavelli’s idea that the end justifies the means. I believe that the means justify the end — that wicked means make for a wicked end. What Keynes said strikes me as right: when the facts change, I change my mind. But there are limits to that! Many people try to equate Sánchez’s decision to grant amnesty with Felipe González’s change of position on NATO in 1986 (11). González did change his mind too, that is true. But the PSOE’s shift under González was a very long process. It took years to move from “no” to “yes” on NATO.
M. de T. — And he put that change of position to a referendum.
J. C. — Quite so. Sánchez, by contrast, changed his position literally overnight. And he did so because it was the easiest way to stay in power. But it was not the only way!
M. de T. — You have advocated occasional agreements between the PSOE and the PP on a few urgent issues, such as tackling corruption and access to housing. I would put two objections to you. The first is empirical: nobody believes they are capable of reaching an agreement. The second looks to the future: when the two main, or moderate, parties govern together, the only possible opposition and alternative to power come from the extremes.
J. C. — Both objections are legitimate, but they can also be refuted. I agree that, for the time being, with the leaders currently in place, an agreement is impossible — but that is because they do not want one, not because it could not be done. Remember that after Franco’s death, the Communists and the Falangists reached an agreement. Their differences were infinitely greater! Today, the gap between the PSOE and the PP is far smaller than we are led to believe. Between 70 and 80 per cent of the decisions affecting Spaniards’ daily lives come from Europe. And those decisions are taken jointly by the PP and the PSOE. There is another piece of evidence: when the government changes, neither the PP nor the PSOE brings about major upheavals or revolutions. No different model of society emerges.
M. de T. — And the second objection: does governing from the centre not encourage the extremes?
J. C. — The answer depends on the results! Of course the extremes will criticise those in power; that is their role. But if the two main parties can support each other on specific issues, without actually governing together, and deliver tangible results, voters will recognise that. The proposal is not for a permanent alliance, but for agreements on a few specific, fundamental issues. The major reforms this country needs can only be carried out through agreements between the PP and the PSOE. In my view, changing the law governing political parties is the most important task, because 90 per cent of corruption originates in political parties. That is also where the failings of democracy, and its lack of participation, come from.
M. de T. — Vox began almost as a breakaway from the PP, and some people say it is the PP’s right wing, or “the PP after a couple of drinks” (12). Do you think that is true, or would you say Vox is more like the Spanish branch of what you call the international national-populist movement?
J. C. — I think the first explanation was right at the beginning, but that the second is now much closer to the truth. Vox is increasingly becoming the Spanish branch of national-populism. And the first description was less dangerous than the second. I do not think Vox is a neo-Francoist party either — although that would reassure me, because nobody wants Francoism.
M. de T. — Do you not believe the nostalgia for Francoism highlighted in some analyses (13)?
J. C. — No. I think it is a form of provocation, and one that can be neutralised very easily. What worries me is the international far right, even though the two share certain features. Nationalism and an authoritarian streak, to begin with. Both are part of Francoism, unlike other fundamental features of national-populism, such as hostility to immigration. This key feature of the international far right did not exist in Spain until Vox seized upon it. It is now on the agenda because Vox wants to align itself with Le Pen and Meloni. What is happening in France worries me enormously — more than what is happening in Spain or Italy.
M. de T. — How different is Le Pen from Meloni or Santiago Abascal, the leader of Vox?
J. C. — In Europe, we live in a confederation that has an underlying aspiration to become a federation. I would like us to become the United States of Europe that Victor Hugo spoke of. But Europe is made by France and Germany. Italy has a far-right government, but Ms Meloni behaves reasonably well; she does not do anything particularly odd. Abascal would not do anything too strange if he came to power either. But if the far right takes power in France, things could become extraordinarily complicated. If the far right governs in Europe and the Union begins to break apart — which is the real ambition of Le Pen and Germany’s AfD — then the Spanish, Italian and other far-right movements would gain strength.
M. de T. — So what worries you most is that the European project is in danger?
J. C. — Mélenchon worries me too. Here is a man who says he will not obey instructions from Brussels if he thinks they are not good for France! I love France. Europe was built without Spain; it could be built without many countries, but it cannot be built without France. Let us not forget that it was created to ensure that France and Germany would never slaughter one another again: those two countries remain its pillars. But France’s general Euroscepticism worries me. There is a very strong, deeply rooted nationalist feeling in France. I was in England before Brexit, and I never heard intellectuals arguing in favour of Brexit. In France, by contrast, intellectuals on the left and right, and politicians on the left and right, are far from convinced by the idea of moving towards a federal Europe — or even by the idea that we need to preserve the Europe we have today. Spain, on the other hand, remains one of the most pro-European countries. So it is not the same thing for Abascal to be in government in Spain as it would be for Le Pen to be in government in France.
M. de T. — Another difference is that, if Abascal entered government, he would be the junior partner, not the senior one; that role would belong to the PP.
J. C. — Yes, and that is a blessing! I would rather have Feijóo as prime minister than Abascal! In France, by contrast, if Marine Le Pen is doing so well, it is because the cordon sanitaire between the right and the far right has failed. If it had succeeded in stopping Le Pen, I would have applauded. But not only did it fail; it made her stronger and stronger.
M. de T. — Because the far right was able to portray itself as a victim and was not worn down by the experience of being in power?
J. C. — Yes. We have seen that in some countries, Sweden for example, the far right has had a taste of power and then lost ground at the next election. Some people say that, for the far right to decline, it first has to come to power. People need to realise that its false, simplistic, populist recipes do not work, and they will stop voting for it. The best answer is a strong democracy, because that ensures that what happened in the 1930s is not repeated: the far right comes to power and never leaves. A strong democracy means that they get into power, do things we do not like, and then we vote them out.
M. de T. — Alberto Núñez Feijóo is the clear favourite in this election. The positive way of describing him is as a steady, managerial figure. The less flattering description is as a politician lacking stature and charisma. Which do you think is closer to the truth?
J. C. — I do not like charisma in politicians at all. I like charisma in rock stars! Aznar said something very clever when he came to power. At the time, people said he had no charisma, whereas Felipe González had plenty. He replied: “Give me an absolute majority and you will see how charismatic I can be!” And that is exactly what happened. During his second term he won an absolute majority and began to think he was Napoleon Bonaparte. He even ended up embroiled in that mad war in Iraq. Winning elections is what gives you charisma. Power is a very mysterious thing. One of the few things we know about power — and we have known it since Homer — is that it clouds the minds of those who wield it. Pedro Sánchez had no charisma when he came to power. Now there are people who go so far as to say he can perform magic! That is what power does. It creates sycophants and flatterers.
M. de T. — And then the people drive them out of office…
J. C. — All Spanish prime ministers have ended badly. Suárez, with a coup attempt. Felipe González, surrounded by massive corruption and a terrible case of state terrorism. Aznar, in the wake of the worst terrorist attack in Spain’s history. Zapatero, amid the worst economic and social crisis. Rajoy, surrounded by corruption and ousted by a motion of no confidence. They all left office in traumatic circumstances (14). The same thing is going to happen now. I would like to see a transition, a natural change of government, because alternation in power is the best thing about democracy. I have only understood that now that I am old.
M. de T. — Something is happening with Pedro Sánchez that I have not seen with any other head of government. At demonstrations that, on the face of it, have little to do with him, the most frequently heard slogan is “Pedro Sánchez, you son of a b****!” What do you make of such abuse? Does it reflect an atmosphere of near-civil war, as some people claim?
J. C. — I find such behaviour as repugnant as you do. But it has nothing to do with civil war. Spain has been a democracy since the Constitution was adopted in 1978. The civil war and the dictatorship are therefore over. That does not mean the past is not part of the present: without it, the present is mutilated. The same is true of the legacy of Collaboration in France. To attribute this insulting slogan, or the supposed polarisation of today, to the Civil War, as many people do, is to misunderstand reality. There is polarisation in Spain, but it is artificial and manufactured. It comes from the top down, not from the bottom up. During the investiture debate in the Congress of Deputies in November 2023, Pedro Sánchez called for a “wall” to be built against the right and the far right. Those in power have an interest in keeping this division alive because they believe it will help them electorally. And the division spreads through the media and, above all, through social media, the ultimate polarising instrument. Social media companies make billions out of polarisation!
M. de T. — Can Vox’s success among young people be explained by the rebelliousness of youth?
J. C. — Paradoxically, it is a symptom of the triumph of progressive ideas. Young people vote for Vox to annoy everyone! For exactly the same reason that, when my generation was young, we did things to annoy our parents! The difference is that, in our day, Francoism was in power, whereas now it is the left. Shouting “Pedro Sánchez, you son of a b****” follows the same logic. It is not a symptom of the way the country is living.
M. de T. — What do you regard as positive in the government’s record?
J. C. — In foreign policy, I think it has done what needed to be done. It condemns what is happening in Gaza. And even if it does so because it is electorally advantageous, I have no objection. To me, this is not even left-wing policy; it is simply the right and decent thing to do. What is happening in Israel is madness. And what Trump is doing is madness too. On defence spending, Sánchez probably got the presentation wrong, and it is understandable that his partners were angry (15).
M. de T. — Spain has the fastest-growing economy among Europe’s major economies. At the same time, however, the housing crisis is extremely worrying, and it is not clear how these macroeconomic figures translate into people’s everyday lives. How do you explain this? Is there a structural problem with social mobility?
J. C. — I do not think the social ladder has stopped working altogether. I simply think that, across Europe, we make a mistake when we tell young people that we lived through a golden age in which we went to university, got a good job and could afford to buy a car or a flat, and so on. It is a lie! Take my own case: I was a good student, yet when I left university I could not find a job. I had to go to the United States as a teaching assistant. I bought a house at the age of 40, and only because my wife inherited some money; then I struck lucky: by chance, I began earning money from my books. But when I was 30, I had a miserable salary. My wife and I could barely afford the rent. Where is the golden age in that? We are telling young people a false story, and they have believed it.
That said, the government, which is supposed to be left-wing, also bears some responsibility for the fact that the fastest-growing major economy in Europe has such basic problems. The big banks and major companies are making enormous profits, but that money is not reaching ordinary people. The housing problem is hardly a biblical curse! We have had a progressive government for eight years, and Pedro Sánchez said he was going to build goodness knows how many homes. The result? Nothing has been built.
(1) During the night of 30–31 July 2026, tens of thousands of people from Morocco crossed the border into Ceuta, a Spanish city in North Africa with a population of around 84,000. The Interior Ministry counted 72,000 arrivals; the Ceuta government put the figure at 96,058.
(2) On 18 January 2026, at Adamuz in the province of Córdoba, a high-speed train operated by the private company Iryo derailed and then collided with a train operated by the state-owned Renfe, killing 45 people. On 28 October 2026, near Urda in the province of Toledo, a Renfe AVE high-speed train struck an Iryo train that was stationary on the track from behind. This time, 69 people were killed.
(3) Two housing decree-laws approved by the Council of Ministers on 29 September 2026 were rejected by the Congress of Deputies, the lower house of parliament, on 2 October. The first provided, among other things, for existing tenancies to be extended by two years, an annual rent-increase cap of 2 per cent until the end of 2027, a suspension of evictions of vulnerable people until 2030, and restrictions on property purchases by investment funds. The second introduced renewable five- or seven-year leases, with compensation equivalent to twelve months’ rent for tenants whose leases were not renewed without good reason. On 6 October, following the dissolution of parliament, the government approved a new version of the first decree, which was endorsed on 12 November by the Permanent Deputation, the standing committee of the Congress that sits between dissolution and the election. The revised version of the second decree was rejected on the same day.
(4) The AVE was inaugurated in April 1992 on the Madrid–Seville route, shortly before the Universal Exposition. On that line, Renfe used to refund the fare if a train was five minutes late; the policy was changed in 2016. Since 1 July 2024, passengers have been refunded 50 per cent for delays of more than 60 minutes and 100 per cent for delays of more than 90 minutes.
(5) On 28 April 2025, a massive power cut plunged Spain and Portugal into darkness. A report by European experts, published in early October 2025, attributed it to a cascade of voltage surges.
(6) In November 1975, as the dictator lay dying, Morocco launched the “Green March” in an attempt to seize Western Sahara, then a Spanish colony. Franco died on 20 November.
(7) The Basque Nationalist Party, a centre-right regionalist party, whose MPs have supported PSOE as well as PP governments, but which has ruled out backing a right-wing majority that includes Vox.
(8) Finally passed by the Congress on 30 May 2024 and coming into force on 11 June 2024, the amnesty law extinguished prosecutions connected with the 2017 Catalan independence process. The Constitutional Court upheld it in June 2025. In June 2021, the government had already pardoned the nine separatist leaders convicted by the Supreme Court in 2019.
(9) In mid-June 2026, the PP launched the website latramapsoe.es. It lists 15 legal cases and 94 people linked to the PSOE, the government or Pedro Sánchez’s circle who have been charged or referred for trial. They include former minister José Luis Ábalos, sentenced by the Supreme Court on 22 June 2026 to 24 years and three months in prison, and his former aide Koldo García, sentenced to 18 years and six months; Santos Cerdán, the PSOE’s former number two, who was jailed from June to November 2025 and has been charged in several proceedings; David Sánchez, the prime minister’s brother, convicted on 14 July 2026 of abuse of office and barred from public office for nine years; and Begoña Gómez, the prime minister’s wife, who is due to stand trial before a jury on charges of influence-peddling and misappropriation of funds.
(10) Founded in 2013, Vox won its first seats in a regional parliament at the Andalusian elections on 2 December 2018, when it secured 12 MPs.
(11) In 1982, the PSOE campaigned against Spain joining NATO. Once in power, Felipe González changed his position and put continued membership of the Alliance to a referendum on 12 March 1986. The “Yes” vote won.
(12) The phrase was coined in November 2019 by Pablo Iglesias, then leader of Podemos, who attributed it to his colleague Juan Carlos Monedero. Iglesias added: “And he was not wrong, because people say what they think when they drink.”
(13) According to the October 2025 barometer of the Centre for Sociological Research (CIS, a public opinion polling institute whose surveys use very large samples), 21.3 per cent of Spaniards consider the years of dictatorship to have been “good” or “very good”, compared with 65.5 per cent who regard them as “bad” or “very bad”.
(14) Adolfo Suárez resigned on 29 January 1981; the attempted coup of 23 February took place during the investiture vote for his successor, Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo. Under Felipe González (1982–1996), the GAL scandal came to light: these groups murdered suspected ETA members during the 1980s. Former interior minister José Barrionuevo was convicted in 1998, and González lost the 1996 election. On 11 March 2004, three days before a general election that every poll suggested the PP would win comfortably, the Madrid bombings killed more than 193 people in the final days of José María Aznar’s second term. José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero then became prime minister and led Spain through the 2008 economic crisis. He introduced an austerity plan in May 2010 and called an early election in November 2011, in which the PSOE suffered a crushing defeat. Mariano Rajoy succeeded him, only to be ousted on 1 June 2018 by a motion of no confidence, a week after the National Court’s ruling in the Gürtel case convicted former PP officials of corruption.
(15) At the NATO summit in The Hague on 24–25 June 2025, allies pledged to raise security spending to 5 per cent of GDP by 2035 (3.5 per cent on defence itself and 1.5 per cent on related security expenditure). Spain, which spent around 1.28 per cent of GDP on defence in 2024, refused to go above 2.1 per cent. In a letter, NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte gave Spain “flexibility”, with a review in 2029, but publicly stated that there were no exceptions. Donald Trump criticised Spain and threatened to make it “pay double” in trade negotiations.