Michel Taubmann — Could the fall of the mullahs’ regime in Iran mark a historic turning point in the region?
Marwan Muasher — That is not for me to decide, but for the Iranians. There, as in Syria, I have always been in favor of a pluralistic system. Iranian society is diverse. So, yes, I hope that the Iranians will turn the page on the mullahs’ system – a regime that is harmful to themselves and to the region it seeks to destabilize. With Netanyahu no longer having any reason to stir up the Iranian threat, Iran could then be integrated into a global agreement between Israel and the entire Muslim world within the framework of the OIC, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. This would be much broader than the Abraham Accords. But it is far from being a done deal. Other divisions will undoubtedly emerge, the contours of which we do not yet know. These are unpredictable obstacles, notably the Israeli- Palestinian question, which will not be automatically resolved by the fall of the Islamic Republic.
M. T. — What should we think about a possible return of Reza Pahlavi to Iran?
M. M. — I would be happy if there were a change in Iran. Now, whether it’s the Shah’s son or anyone else, it’s really not for me to say. I only met him once, in Washington, at a meeting that was too brief for me to form a definite opinion about him.
M. T. — Should we rejoice at the fall of Syrian dictator Bashar al- Assad last year?
M. M. — It is certainly a very good thing for Syria and for the Syrian people. Assad’s regime was very brutal. Today, we have discovered the reality of the prisons, the extent of the killings and torture, and the destruction of the entire country, economically, politically, and culturally. Is his fall a positive event for the region? I hope so. Provided that the new regime reconciles all the different groups in Syria: Christians, Sunnis, Alawites, Druze, and even the ancient Jewish minority, which fled the country but some of whose members should be able to return. If the new Syria adopts inclusive policies, it will create prosperity; Syrian refugees in Jordan and elsewhere will then be tempted to return home. Lifting sanctions would allow it to once again become a trade route for Jordan. Everything depends on how the regime evolves, because neither Jordan nor the region wants a monolithic Islamist system that ignores the diversity of civil society.
M. T. — With the significant weakening, even collapse, of the “axis of resistance” formed by the Islamic Republic of Iran, Israel has never been in a better strategic position. Will the absence of an existential threat promote peace with the Palestinians?
M. M. — That is obviously what we can hope for, but I am not sure. Not with the current government, in any case. On the other hand, it will be an argument for those in Israel and elsewhere who want a resolution to the conflict. One thing is clear: after two years of war, the Middle East of 2026 is nothing like it was before October 7, 2023. At that time, the region was dominated by the conflict between, on the one hand, the “axis of resistance” led by Iran and, on the other, the de facto alliance between Israel and the Sunni countries, symbolized by the Abraham Accords – an alliance that was on the verge of expanding permanently through Saudi Arabia’s recognition of Israel, but which Hamas derailed. Will we, however, pick up the thread of this brutally interrupted story? No longer having to fear the Iranian threat, will the Gulf countries still have an interest in an alliance with Israel? I don’t know. We are entering an unknown period where all the cards will be reshuffled. New players, such as Turkey and Qatar, will jostle with the older ones, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, to exert influence in the turbulent and more uncertain than ever Middle East.
M. T. — Let’s go back to the Abraham Accords. Do you consider them positive or negative?
M. M. — The Abraham Accords flouted the principle of “peace in exchange for territory” that had previously governed relations between Israel and the Arab countries. The treaty with Egypt led to the recovery of the Sinai. And in the 1990s, Syria was prepared to recognize Israel in exchange for the Golan Heights. Then, through the Saudi initiative of 2002, the Arab states proposed general recognition of Israel in exchange for the evacuation of all territories occupied in 1967. The Abraham Accords mark a break with this tradition: they are simply peace for peace; they completely sidestep the Palestinian question and deal only with bilateral issues between the signatory countries. But October 7 cruelly reminded us that the Palestinians cannot be ignored. This issue must be included in any peace agreement.
M. T. — Doesn’t the Trump plan ultimately open the door to the so- called “two-state solution”?
M. M. — The “Trump plan” does not concern peace between Palestinians and Israelis, and in fact it is not really a “plan.” For now, it has led to the release of hostages and the establishment of a fragile ceasefire in Gaza. Of course, these developments are welcome, but they do not change the substance of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Only the possibility of a “dialogue” between Israelis and Palestinians is mentioned. For a plan to succeed, it must define the ultimate goal. Talking about “dialogue” between Palestinians and Israelis is not enough; it has often been attempted in the past and has never led to a solution. The international community is willing to invest money in humanitarian needs, it is true. When it comes to reconstruction, however, this is less certain. Hundreds of billions of dollars will be needed. Who will invest it without political guarantees? I am unable to answer that question. We could adopt the Kosovo model – placed under UN supervision in the early 2000s – to administer Gaza for five, ten, or fifteen years. It’s a pretty good idea. But it assumes that Israel will agree to end the occupation and eventually establish a Palestinian state.
M. T. — Precisely, do you still believe in the possibility of this Palestinian state?
M. M. — Honestly, I no longer believe in it. The time for a two- state solution is over. And besides, who really believes in it? Who is actually working to make it happen? Certainly not the Israeli government! It is more hostile to the idea than ever: in its eyes, it would be a “reward for terrorism.” Of course, you might say, the international community is constantly supporting this solution. I would argue that it does not associate it with any credible plan for its implementation. Many say they are waiting for the right conditions to be in place! This ignores the fact that colonization is continuing and even accelerating. There are no fewer than 750,000 settlers in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, representing nearly a quarter of the population of these territories. And in five or ten years, their number will exceed one million! This demographic situation prevents any real separation of the two communities’ territories. The parameters of the Oslo Accords are completely outdated. Do I welcome this? Do I deplore it? I simply note it. The reality is that the window for a two-state solution closed long ago. We must therefore approach things differently, no longer through the division of land but through equal rights: political, national, linguistic, and cultural. And then engage in negotiations to define the framework best suited to guaranteeing these equal rights. There are many examples around the world of communities with different national aspirations, different languages, and different cultures that have nevertheless been able to come together within a federal system that respects the sovereignty of each: the Swiss Confederation, the Belgian Federation, the Benelux, and even the European Union. I think this is probably the only realistic solution for the future.
M. T. — Are there partners for this kind of solution within Israel and the Palestinian Authority?
M. M. — They are not in the majority. So it won’t happen overnight. But in my opinion, this solution will impose itself. Why? Because the number of Palestinians living in areas under Israeli control is now roughly equivalent to the number of Jews. So it is no longer a question of a Jewish majority and an Arab minority. The two communities now number more than 7 million people, and it is very difficult for either of them to deny the existence of the other. If a two-state solution is impossible, and Israel refuses equal rights, then it will become an apartheid state. Many people think it already is. Will the international community accept this indefinitely? I doubt it. Let’s be clear: Jordan remains officially in favor of the two-state solution. But in my opinion, if this solution becomes impossible, the Palestinians will have to transform their national struggle into a struggle for civil rights.
M. T. — So that means that if, tomorrow, Netanyahu decides to annex the West Bank, with the support of President Trump, you will say: OK, but there must be equal rights for all?
M. M. — I repeat: if Netanyahu decided to annex the territories, forgetting that they are populated by Palestinians, it would create a situation of apartheid. Any solution must involve equal rights as a starting point. But if the West Bank is annexed with a status of broad autonomy, like Catalonia for example, I have no problem with that. Israeli citizenship should also be granted to Palestinians in East Jerusalem.
M. T. — And this large state would be called Israel?
M. M. — The Palestinians would not accept the state being called Israel because that would imply the dilution of their national identity. For the same reasons, it would not be called Palestine either. A state that recognizes the rights of both peoples must have a consensual name.
M. T. — Inside Israel, signs are in Hebrew and Arabic on buses, administrative buildings, hospitals, etc. As for the Palestinians, they can vote and are represented in Parliament. Yet they do not contest the name of the country...
M. M. — It’s true, Palestinians in Israel have rights but not complete equality. The Nation-State Law passed in 2018 deprives them of the right to self-determination. For now, they represent only a minority in Israel. Ultimately, if all the occupied territories were annexed, Jews would become a minority or a very small majority, and the State of Israel would disappear. That is why I am talking about a binational state or a federal arrangement in which the rights of the Jewish and Arab communities would be equal, regardless of their demographic weight. This is a solution that most Israelis cannot imagine today. But if we exclude this solution and also exclude the two-state solution, what remains? War until one side is exterminated?
M. T. — Jordan, which was invited along with other countries to the Sharm El-Sheikh conference last October, is not one of the three signatories of the “Declaration for Lasting Peace and Prosperity”: Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey. How do you explain this marginalization of your country, historically the most involved in relations with the Israelis and Palestinians?
M. M. — Jordan’s absence from this triumvirate highlights the main problem: this is a plan limited to Gaza, not a comprehensive plan to end the Arab-Israeli conflict. Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey have been involved in the hope that they could participate in a “peacekeeping” force in Gaza, which would potentially place these countries in a situation of confrontation with the Palestinians. Jordan has already expressed its opposition to any participation in such a force, clearly stating the need instead for a security force under Palestinian control. Furthermore, Trump’s plan does not even address the issue of the West Bank and only mentions the end of the Arab-Israeli conflict in passing.
M. T. — Last September, the Trump administration refused Mahmoud Abbas entry into the United States to attend the UN General Assembly. Yet he was invited to the Sharm el-Sheikh summit. How can this return to favor be explained?
M. M. — I wouldn’t call it a return to favor. The United States and Arab countries want to deal with Abbas as the leader of the Palestinian Authority because they see no alternative emerging at this stage. Trump’s plan calls for a “reformed” Palestinian Authority, and Abbas has promised legislative and presidential elections within the year. The hope remains that these elections will indeed be held and that they will be fair and credible.
M. T. — In contrast to the presence of Mahmoud Abbas, neither Benyamin Netanyahu nor any other Israeli representative was invited to Sharm el-Sheikh. Since then, the Americans have taken charge of managing Gaza. They have even established a base in the Negev from which they are supervising reconstruction operations. Can we talk about the Israeli government being sidelined? And about Israel being placed under American tutelage?
M. M. — The Israeli government is not interested in ending the war or rebuilding Gaza. It has spent two years ensuring that the Gaza Strip is destroyed. It will not participate in its reconstruction. It must be understood that Israel’s real intention is to retain the occupied territories and prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state. Israel has only paid lip service to Trump’s plan in order to avoid being seen as opposing the US president, but all its actions show that its real goal is to continue the war.
M. T. — Among Netanyahu’s possible successors in Israel, Naftali Bennett is often mentioned, as he is riding high in the polls. Do you think he could revive the peace process?
M. M. — Even if Netanyahu leaves the scene, I don’t see an Israeli prime minister willing to end the occupation and promote the creation of a Palestinian state. The divide in Israel today is not between the peace camp and the war camp, but between pro- and anti-Netanyahu factions.
M. T. — How do you imagine the Middle East in twenty years? In your wildest dreams?
M. M. — I see three positive developments. First, demographics. They are not favorable to Israel. And they will push for an agreement. Next, generational renewal on a global scale. These young people who support Palestinian rights, including among American Jews, will then be in power in their countries. Finally, international law will gradually prevail, and not only against Israel. I would remind you that the International Criminal Court did not just prosecute Netanyahu; it also issued arrest warrants for three Hamas leaders, who have since been killed by Israel. These three factors could contribute to the conclusion of an agreement within twenty years.
M. T. — And in your worst nightmares?
M. M. — My worst-case scenario is that Israel succeeds in transferring large numbers of Palestinians from Gaza to Egypt and from the West Bank to Jordan, and then seizes all the territories.
M. T. — Do you see a positive future for the Middle East between China, Russia, India, and the United States?
M. M. — Yes, on two conditions. First, the Arab states must improve their governance. Second, we must move towards greater economic integration. We must develop trade between our countries. The European Union, as I said, provides us with an excellent example, not of a single state, because that is not possible, but of a union of states that share the same ideas and accept certain common characteristics. Our region must understand that the oil era is coming to an end. The Arab world has long depended on hydrocarbons rather than labor and merit. When money was literally coming out of the ground, there was no need to worry about productivity! But the current economic situation may at least have one advantage: it is forcing us to consider different paths by making us aware of the obsolescence of our economic model.
