The Middle East and new trade routes

 

From the Han dynasty to the Republic of Venice, from the Indian subcontinent to the Nabataean caravans and the spice route in the Arabian Sea, logistical and commercial routes have always represented a geopolitical lever, linking East and West. For four millennia, military, economic and diplomatic manoeuvres have been part of the drive to control supplies from territories on the other side of the planet.

Launched on the sidelines of the G20 summit in New Delhi on September 9, 2023, the latest of these corridors is called IMEC (India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor). It represents one of the most ambitious infrastructure projects of our time. Signed by the United States, India, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, France, Germany, Italy and the European Union, it will reduce the time it takes to transport goods from Mumbai to Europe by 40% – or 10 to 12 days (1) – thanks to a maritime and rail network linking the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean, crossing Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Israel, and embarking from the port of Haifa to Piraeus, Trieste or Marseille (2).

Presented from the outset as the “Corridor of Peace”, IMEC is based on peace and normalization agreements between Israel and several Arab countries. But a piece of the puzzle was missing, and in late September 2023, rumors spread of an imminent rapprochement between Jerusalem and Riyadh: within a fortnight, the face of the Middle East would change.

Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed Bin Salman (MBS) is banking on normalization with Israel to roll out his Vision 2030 of prosperity and stability, new technologies and tourism.

On October 7, 2023, less than a month after the IMEC agreement was signed, the massacres perpetrated by Hamas in Israel brutally put the project on hold, leaving it stricken but not sunk.

France continued to believe in the project. At the end of 2023, it appointed a special IMEC envoy, Gérard Mestrallet, a captain of industry.

At the time of his appointment, in the post-October 7 era, peace seemed beyond everyone’s reach. However, an irreducibly optimistic NGO, the EcoPeace Foundation, was still holding out and preparing for the “Day After”, using IMEC’s providential framework to put forward an even more ambitious plan that included the Palestinians – who had been largely absent from all projects up to that point.

Based for thirty years in Tel Aviv, Ramallah and Amman, EcoPeace, nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize in 2024 and 2025, has succeeded in rallying support from Brussels to Washington around the “Triangle of Peace”, linking Israel, the Palestinian territories and Jordan within a single logistical hub, providing green energy, desalinated water and trade routes to an area that is currently unevenly served.

IMEC is one of the keys to understanding France’s unique political approach to the Middle East. On June 9, 2025, President Macron convened a summit in Marseille entitled “For a better- connected Mediterranean”, attended by heads of state and government and senior officials from Cyprus, Croatia, Greece, Italy, Malta, Morocco, Portugal, Tunisia, the Union for the Mediterranean, the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf and the European Union. On the European side, such a corridor would reduce dependence on China. In Marseille, the EU and the other countries of the Old Continent involved in the project reaffirmed their commitment to strengthening “maritime, land and digital connectivity between Europe, the Mediterranean and the Arabian Gulf” within the dual framework of the European Union’s Global Gateway strategy and the New Pact for the Mediterranean (3).

IMEC post-October 7 in a troubled Middle East

Two years of war waged on seven fronts by Israel against Iran and its allies have turned the Levant upside down. The Assad dynasty in Syria has been swallowed up by converted jihadists. Hezbollah has been considerably weakened by Israeli strikes, and the Lebanese government, backed by an international coalition, is expected to finish disarming it. The Iranian “boss” has seen his nuclear program and leadership amputated by the Israeli strikes of June 2025. In Ramallah, at France’s instigation, Mahmoud Abbas launched a series of reforms. In Gaza, the Palestinian Authority and an Arab-Western coalition are committed to managing the reconstruction of the devastated strip, where Hamas is still rampant. In Israel, with the ceasefire in effect since October 10 and the release of the last twenty hostages, society is just emerging from the active trauma phase.

Is peace and prosperity possible in this troubled Middle East, and will IMEC be the vehicle for it?

The IMEC corridor is one of the very few projects of the Biden administration not to have been buried by the new occupant of the White House. It is the watermark of all his efforts and those of his son-in-law Jared Kushner in the Middle East.

Invited to the White House on February 14, 2025, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi reaffirmed the importance of IMEC, alongside a Trump who called it “the greatest trade route in history”. Pharaonic in ambition, IMEC will require trillions in public and private investment, progressive pacification, harmonization and integration of all the areas it crosses, and all this as the region emerges from a devastating war.

In Israel, the pro-IMEC position remains unchanged. If the country is not a signatory to the September 2023 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), this is because it is difficult for the Kingdom of Saud to appear openly on Israel’s side. Both Jordan and Israel appear on the route, but are not among the eight signatories. The project is considered fundamental by Benyamin Netanyahu.

On September 22, 2023, before the General Assembly of the United Nations, he held in his hand a map showing the route of IMEC. Like a prophet using a biblical parable, he called it “The Blessing” and announced the creation of a new Middle East in which Israel would be a bridge between Asia and Europe (4). In Gaza, the screens are lit up. Lurking in a tunnel, a few men watch. It won’t be long before the world understands the nature of their response.

A year later, at the podium of the same assembly, Netanyahu brandished two cards. In his left hand, he recalls the promise made a year earlier. The corridor will bring prosperity to 2 billion people. In his right hand, he holds up the “Curse” map. In black, the countries of the “axis of terror” that Iran has imposed from the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean. This axis blocks trade routes, destroys nations from within and reduces millions of people to poverty. And if you think this dark vision only applies to Israel, you’d better take another look.

As is the case whenever IMEC is in the news, the Indian website One India News immediately picks up the excerpt and publishes it (5).

Forced reorganization of supply chains

IMEC is taking place against a backdrop of militarization of international relations, shaking of the blocs and successive blows to free trade. The supply chain crises that have followed one another since the pandemic of 2020, the Russia-Ukraine war and the Houthi attacks in the Red Sea have prompted economies to look for bypasses and new suppliers, particularly in the most strategic sectors, such as energy.

In her speech at the last Davos Forum in January 2025, President von der Leyen drew attention to the fractured world order: “This century began with great expectations. Twenty-five years ago, the era of hyper-globalization was practically at its peak. With the globalization of supply chains, hundreds of millions of people were lifted out of poverty, particularly in India and China. (...) Twenty-five years on (...), our supply chain dependencies are sometimes used as a weapon, as Russia’s blackmail of us in the energy sector has shown, or are undermined when global shocks – such as pandemics – appear without warning. As for the very interconnections that link us, such as the undersea cables used for data transmission, they have become targets, from the Baltic Sea to the Taiwan Strait.

The cooperative world order we imagined twenty-five years ago has become a dead letter. Instead, we have entered a new era of ruthless geostrategic rivalry. The world’s major economies are vying for access to raw materials, new technologies and global trade routes. From AI to clean technologies, from quantum technologies to space, from the Arctic to the South China Sea, the race is on. ”

Over the past five years, new alliances have emerged. One of these involves four countries linked by IMEC: India, Israel, the United States and the United Arab Emirates signed the I2U2 strategic partnership in 2022 to collaborate on “joint investments and new initiatives in the fields of water, energy, transport, space, health and food security” (6).

In March of the same year, the first Negev Summit was held on the edge of the Israeli desert. Then Foreign Minister Yair Lapid brought together five of his colleagues to launch a new platform for multilateral cooperation: Abdullatif bin Rashid Al Zayani (Bahrain), Sameh Shoukry (Egypt), Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan (United Arab Emirates), Antony Blinken (USA) and Nasser Bourita (Morocco). Notable absentees: the Jordanian, the Sudanese and the Palestinian Authority, all three signatories to treaties with Israel. Contrary to tradition, none of the Arab participants saw fit to include a bilateral visit by Palestinian leaders in the program. With a wave of the hand, the Emirati said: “We’ve wasted too much time since Egypt showed us the way”.

Following this first meeting, working groups were set up. Between June 2022 and January 2023, high-level delegations from the six member states met three times, notably in Bahrain and Abu Dhabi. Everyone is getting ready for the next ministerial summit, scheduled to take place in Morocco in mid-July 2023. Postponed for the first time by the Moroccan hosts due to violence in the West Bank, which resulted in 20 Palestinian deaths, October 7 will postpone it indefinitely (7).

A project moving forward, despite everything

For the moment, IMEC has neither a legal framework, nor governance, nor a concrete financial framework. But amounts are beginning to emerge, and pre-feasibility studies are attempting to quantify and prioritize investments.  

Saudi Arabia has already committed $20 billion to IMEC (8). The first phase of the project is estimated to cost around $8 billion, financed by public-private partnerships.

Investments are also being made on a smaller scale. The Jordan Gateway, the first phase of infrastructure improvements on the Jordan-Israel corridor, has been launched. This district-level project has a budget of 70 million shekels ($20 million) (9).

Since the 1994 Peace Accords, Israel has been supplying fresh water to its Jordanian neighbor. On this basis, in 2017 the NGO EcoPeace came up with the “Prosperity” project (10) under the initial name “Green-Blue Deal”. It proposes the exchange of desalinated water in Israel for solar-generated electricity on Jordan’s desert plains, creating interdependence on basic needs. Adopted by the authorities, it will be signed with great fanfare at the Dubai Expo in 2021, under the auspices of the Emirati hosts – who hope to gain from the $6 billion worth of photovoltaic fields – and John Kerry, the American climate envoy. Totally innovative, this project is now an integral part of the IMEC vision. In July 2021, the water quota sold by Israel to Jordan was increased by 50 million cubic meters for a three-year period renewed in May 2024. “Prosperity” is adding 200 million cubic meters of desalinated water. Prequalification for these tenders, which had been suspended by the war, has now been thawed.

In the summer of 2025, the Levant region experienced one of the most severe droughts in recent years: in Lebanon, inflows to Lake Qaraoun, the main reservoir on the Litani River, dropped to a record 45-50 million cubic meters between June and August 2025, compared with 230 million in 2024 (11). In Jordan, a country already severely impacted by water stress with less than 100 mm of annual rainfall, groundwater is being exploited faster than it can be recharged, with lasting damage to soil and agriculture.

Desalination is the solution adopted on a large scale by Israel, which has developed technological leadership. IMEC could serve as a framework for the development of water-related exchanges.

On the Saudi side, bilateral partnerships are multiplying. The one signed in June 2025 between the Grand Port Maritime de Marseille (GPMM) and its Saudi counterpart Mawani bears the IMEC stamp (12).

On July 20, 2025, the Saudi company ACWA Power signed several agreements to develop future renewable energy exports from the Kingdom to Europe, via the IMEC corridor (13).

The countries involved in the creation of this green sector are Saudi Arabia, Greece, France and Germany, all members of IMEC, with the participation of major companies such as TotalEnergies (France), Edison S.p.A. (Italy), EnBW (Germany), Zhero Europe (Italy), Prysmian (Italy), Siemens Energy (Germany), GE Vernova (global) and Hitachi (Japan, represented by its French subsidiary). A joint development agreement with Germany’s EnBW has also been finalized for the first phase of the Yanbu Green Hydrogen Hub, a fully integrated facility scheduled to be ready for commercial operations by 2030, which will include its own renewable power plants and desalination plants to support the production of hydrogen and ammonia for export.

Prospects for IMEC expansion: FOMO syndrome (14)?

In recent months, an increasing number of countries have expressed a desire to join IMEC.

In March 2025, Egypt’s Minister of Investment and Foreign Trade, Hassan El-Khatib, declared that his country was “keen to join the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor” (15).

More aggressively, Ankara takes a dim view of its close rival Greece taking advantage of IMEC to trade with Gulf countries through its port of Piraeus. “Without Turkey, there would be no corridor”, Erdogan is quoted as saying, even though he is busy promoting a rival project to link Asia to Europe via Iraq and his own coastline. The Emirates and Qatar have joined the project (16).

European ports are competing with each other, and are increasing their links with key players in the scheme. And as for access to the Mediterranean, while Haifa was the only port on the initial route, if Egypt joins IMEC, followed perhaps tomorrow by Syria and Lebanon, Israel will gain by relying on its partners in Delhi and Washington to maintain its position as the undisputed South Mediterranean favorite. On September 8, India and Israel signed a new bilateral agreement in New Delhi, deepening an earlier treaty dating back almost thirty years. The agreement expands cooperation in infrastructure development, digital services and financial regulation, while promoting technological exchanges and R&D collaboration (17).

Regional pacification, both precondition and consequence

Alongside the most appalling scenarios, the Peace Triangle is gaining ground in people’s minds.

Breaking with decades of endemic anti-Semitism, Syria has invited Jewish communities back to live and invest in the country. In July 2025, for the first time since the peace talks held in West Virginia under President Bill Clinton in 2000 (18), Israelis and Syrians met in Paris under the patronage of US special envoy Tom Barrack. Israel’s Minister of Strategic Affairs, Ron Dermer, and his Syrian colleague, Asaad al-Shaibani, outlined their respective priorities: a return to the 1974 ceasefire agreement, protection of the Druze population in southern Syria, smuggling, refugees and terrorism. Israel, like Egypt, is counting on Syria to control the Muslim Brotherhood on its territory (19). Normalization is still a long way off, but Damascus wants to position itself as a key player, capable of opening discussions, even behind the scenes. Israel, for its part, is seeking to reduce the recent escalation on its border and obtain clear security guarantees (20).

In Lebanon, President Aoun says he wants peace, without necessarily normalizing exchanges with Israel. “Peace is the absence of war, which is important for us in Lebanon at the moment. As for the question of normalization, it is not envisaged in current Lebanese foreign policy” (21).

Syria, Lebanon, the Palestinian Authority, Gaza and Jordan are all territories that need to be rebuilt and equipped with new infrastructures.

According to journalists Christian Chesnot and Georges Malbrunot, MBS wants to turn his kingdom into the femoral artery of international trade, halfway between Asia and Europe. “MBS is obsessed with logistics and supply chains, the new sacred pathways of trade flows since the Covid 19 pandemic” (22). He makes no secret of his interest in IMEC and knows that he needs to appease all neighboring conflict zones.

Arabia needs its neighbor Oman, which has three ports opposite India: Sohar for freight, Salalah for cargo transshipment, and Duqm for minerals and fuels. MBS is counting on these ports to connect. He has formalized a rapprochement as early as 2021, opening a first land passage and announcing 745 kilometers of road to link the two countries.

China should not be forgotten, as IMEC is intended to act as a counterweight to the New Silk Roads. Nevertheless, some of the contracts in IMEC signatory countries continue to be won by the Chinese. Already, multiple Chinese companies are building segments of the Etihad Rail network, freight terminals, tracks and other civil engineering elements for the national rail network of the United Arab Emirates.

Conclusion: the challenge of integration

IMEC is the most radical and positive economic manifestation of the promise of the Abraham Accords, building on a potential strategic axis of US-India-Israel-Saudi Arabia.

This project is a blessing for all the countries it passes through, some of which are still embroiled in violent war.

It’s an opportunity to rebuild, to combine interests to meet the challenges of a region marked by both strong demographic growth and rapid climate change.

Beyond the huge investment that requires confidence and stability, the deployment of the IMEC corridor relies on the prerequisites and practices of regulatory harmonization between countries, continuity of IT processing, and consistency in costs and taxes levied.

All these corridors must be politically and physically secure. In this respect, Israel’s cyber talents, sensors and surveillance systems will be critical assets. A source of hope, the unprecedented military and intelligence coordination seen at work during the Israel- Iran confrontation brought together several IMEC stakeholders around Israel and the United States, such as Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the Emirates and France. Together they intercepted Iranian missiles, while coordinating to secure the Red Sea against Houthi attacks.

As for other players such as Egypt, the new Lebanon, the new Syria and the Palestine of the Day After, they could ensure transit to their Mediterranean shores in addition to Israel. IMEC is not a zero-sum equation. It’s a win-win bet.

An incomparable lung of solar and wind energy, the Levant has the potential to re-light its way to the very edge of Europe.

The Triangle of Peace will restore the small Kingdom of Jordan as a commercial hub of Nabataean times, supplying the Palestinian territories, Gaza and modern Israel. It will also enable the reconstruction of Gaza.

However, IMEC runs the risk of expanding without deepening. As each country currently works on a decentralized basis, such a project needs a common organization and secretariat. And IMEC needs a driving force. Behind the Marshall Plan stood the United States. Behind the Silk Roads is China. But who is the real driving force behind IMEC among all the forces at play? Is it Trump and Kushner’s United States? Modi’s India? Saudi Arabia’s Neom vision?

After two years of war in the Middle East, Israel-Saudi normalization and IMEC are among the world’s best responses to terror.

 

APPENDIX

The “Triangle of Peace”

Presented as a complementary offshoot of IMEC, the “Triangle of Peace” aims to develop Jordan as a hub serving Israel, the Palestinian Authority and Gaza. It would promote regional political stability; offer new investment opportunities and more routes to diversify sources of supply; reduce vulnerability at sea crossings; strengthen economic relations and accelerate the transition to low-carbon energy. IMEC, coupled with the Triangle of Peace, enables the development of mutually beneficial links of interdependence. For EcoPeace, prosperity will be shared or it won’t be.

The Triangle of Peace proposes three flagship projects to catalyze a new type of sustainable and equitable trade relations around IMEC: the exchange of desalinated water by Israel for solar energy produced in Jordan (the “Prosperity” project); a logistics corridor; and an export chain of renewable energies from the Middle East to Jordan, Israel, the Palestinian territories and then Europe.

By implementing these projects, the initiative aims not only to generate economic benefits, but also to promote geopolitical and security advances for all parties.

This vision is reflected in the “Imagine Gaza” report, presented to the French President by his advisor Ofer Bronstein. “Gaza can become the laboratory for a new model of regional economic peace, in which Europe, the Arab world and Israel work together to build security based on interdependence and shared prosperity. This approach, inspired by the Franco-German model of post-war reconciliation, restores meaning and credibility to contemporary multilateralism”.

The report places reconstruction and infrastructure projects within the framework of a partnership and an Israel-Palestine-Jordan logistics corridor, all under EU supervision.

Several phases are envisaged. The period 2030-2035 should see the completion of the port and airport, the exploitation of the Gaza Marine gas field and the energy and logistics interconnection between Egypt, Jordan and Israel.

The report uses the figures in the Cairo plan drawn up by the Arab countries, for an estimated total of $53 billion over ten years. The port, for example, would cost $2.5 billion.

By October 2025, three-fifths of the budget had already been secured thanks to contributions from the European Union (6 billion over 5 years), the Gulf Cooperation Council (12 billion), the United States (3 billion in civilian support for the Cairo plan), France (2 billion in bilateral aid and guarantees) and various multilateral institutions (8 billion).

Part of the financing could also come from the Gaza Marine gas field (33 billion m³), whose exploitation, within the framework of an Egypt-Jordan-Palestine partnership, should generate 6 billion dollars over ten years.

On the energy front, EcoPeace and the German Konrad Adenauer Stiftung have commissioned Qamar Energy, a Dubai-based consulting firm, to carry out a study on the geopolitical, economic and environmental viability of a renewable energy corridor linking the Middle East to Europe.

Initial findings are very encouraging. The “Levant region”, covering north- eastern Egypt, Jordan and north-western Saudi Arabia, is one of the most suitable for the combined production of solar and wind power. In a typical area of this region, 1 kilowatt (kW) of installed solar panels produces an average of 5.1 to 5.6 kilowatt- hours (kWh) per day over the year, with sustained performance even in winter. This compares with around 4.3 kWh in Greece, 4.2 kWh in southern Italy and 3.2 kWh in southern Germany. Wind resources are equally remarkable, with load factors exceeding 50% at the best sites and remaining stable throughout the year, compared with around 21% in Italy, 22% in Germany and 25-30% in Greece, where seasonal variability is much more marked.

According to the study, conditions would be sufficiently favorable to envisage viable large-scale electricity and hydrogen exports – by undersea cable for electricity, and by pipeline or sea transport for hydrogen. Exports of renewable energy from the Levant could cover up to 30% of demand in South-East and Central Europe. Development could be structured in 18 phases of 10 gigawatts each, implemented progressively over a period of around 25 years.

National hydrogen strategies in the Levant region are in full swing. Egypt and Jordan are now seeking to create value for investors beyond production and export, by developing intermediate segments such as logistics, transport, storage and distribution. These areas, which are central to IMEC, could considerably strengthen the renewable energy corridor if partner countries such as Saudi Arabia and Israel also chose to become involved.