Enjeux de défense et contrôle parlementaire

Politique Internationale — A little education goes a long way. How do your respective commissions function? What are their roles and responsibilities?

Thomas Gassilloud — The National Assembly’s Committee of National Defense and Armed Forces comprises 72 deputies who reflect the political balance of the hemicycle, and meet every week to work on and debate defense issues. Contrary to popular belief, the committee’s “portfolio” is broad. It is not limited to “following” the Ministry of the Armed Forces. Its remit includes the gendarmerie and the defense economy, as well as national defense - the only public policy mentioned in the Constitution, which also concerns all ministers and administrations.

Our mission is clear: to pass laws, to monitor government action, to nurture democratic debate so that France makes the right choices to defend itself, and so that citizens understand the directions taken, because “in a democracy there can be no effective defense without the consent of the citizens”; but, above all, we are accountable to the French people for the proper use of their money.

Admittedly, there is a degree of asymmetry between the executive and legislative branches when it comes to defense matters. In my opinion, this asymmetry is justified in view of the government’s responsibilities, France’s international role, the need for strategic responsiveness and the secrecy required for territorial defense. In particular, this is reflected in the fact that control is most often exercised a posteriori, and in the low volume of legislative texts to be examined - culminating in the examination of the Military Programming Law (LPM), which is normally five-yearly. This institutional peculiarity dates back to well before the start of the Fifth Republic, but has evolved over time, as demonstrated by the recent creation, by the latest LPM, of a parliamentary commission to evaluate the government’s war materiel export policy.

Nevertheless, the committee’s workload remains considerable. Each year, it examines an average of 5 legislative texts, produces 8 budgetary opinions, carries out 10 fact-finding missions resulting in numerous proposals, organizes 70 hearings and makes 40 trips in France and abroad: 90% of these activities result in public documents - written or video - which enlighten the debate on defense issues. Cédric Perrin — The Foreign Affairs, Defense and Armed Forces Committee is one of the Senate’s 7 standing committees. It plays an essential role in drafting legislation, monitoring the government and evaluating public policy. Our committee produces legislative, information and budgetary reports. It also examines bills for the ratification of international treaties and agreements. Last but not least, it carries out an important monitoring function through its committee hearings with members of the government - who report on their policies and provide parliamentarians with information - or with other stakeholders, French or foreign diplomats, researchers, NGOs, etc.

P. I. — Are your two commissions complementary? Or do they overlap?

C. P. — Our two commissions are complementary. Firstly, because of the bicameral system: enshrined in our Constitution, it sees the National Assembly and the Senate as complementary chambers. For example, our two committees are responsible for examining and voting on the Military Programming Act. We also bring together members of our two committees to reach an agreement in a joint committee (1). What’s more, our areas of competence are not identical. Unlike the French National Assembly, our committee deals with foreign affairs and defense issues at the same time. In the Senate, we find it useful to look at these two fields from the same angle, as they constantly interact. On the other hand, our colleagues in the French National Assembly have the advantage of being able to devote the whole of their work to defense issues.

P. I. — Would you say that national representatives are sufficiently familiar with defense issues?

C. P. — We have a sufficient command of defense-related issues to carry out the missions entrusted to us by the nation. However, we also have our own areas of predilection, so we constantly strive to maintain our knowledge of the issues at stake. This knowledge is nurtured by our work in the Senate and in our constituencies, by our many visits to the armed forces and defense industry and, last but not least, by our missions abroad.

P. I. — What is the nature of your exchanges with major defense players? Do you have sufficient information?

C. P. — The expertise we acquire is the fruit of a dense and varied body of work. Hearings are a basic tool of parliamentary work, whether in public or behind closed doors, for the most sensitive subjects: we hear from numerous personalities from both the military and civilian worlds. This was notably the case with the Navy Chief of Staff, Admiral Nicolas Vaujour, in November 2023. We regularly meet with the Minister of the Armed Forces. Several times a year, we visit military exercises, bases and industrial sites. To give a recent example, our committee visited Mont-de-Marsan (Landes) as part of the VOLFA (2) exercise, in March 2024, as well as the GIGN at Satory (Yvelines) last April. These trips enable us to take stock of the practical implementation of the LPM. We maintain a rigorous dialogue with the executive branch, in order to obtain all the answers to our questions. Our constitutional mission is to control the government, and it’s never easy or pleasant to be controlled. But everyone must do their job, and we are determined to do so.

T. G. — My general feeling is not very different from that of Cédric Perrin. I’d like to stress two points. First of all, an MP divides his or her life between the Palais Bourbon and his or her constituency: when he or she is at the Assembly, he or she devotes only part of his or her time to the subject of the standing committee on which he or she sits, as he or she has many other obligations - public meetings, political group meetings, various organizations and so on. In this time, he is expected to be able to question the policy being pursued and to perceive what can or must be called into question. In assuming this role of overall control of defense policy, the MP must also ensure the coherence of the general policy in which it is embedded, if only to ensure the proper allocation of resources. We must not misunderstand our role as watchdogs. We are not accountants or auditors of the armed forces. Our control is political in nature, and focuses on the goals pursued, as well as the match between the objectives set and the resources allocated. The work we carry out and the information we provide are sufficient for the exercise of these powers.

To this end, I ensure that all 577 members of the French National Assembly, regardless of the committee to which they belong or their political group, have a minimum level of knowledge about defense issues and our fundamental interests, such as deterrence. But it is also Parliament’s role to ensure that all citizens are fully “on board” in understanding defense policy and the efforts it requires. I attach great importance to this fundamental role.

P. I. — In light of current tensions (Ukraine, Middle East...), is the work of your commissions even more important?

T. G. — The war in Ukraine, the crises in the Levant, the invasion of Nagorno-Karabakh and the policy of fait accompli in the China Sea are all signs of a change of era, at a time when the main instruments of collective security are dissolving. The use of violence is once again becoming a foreign policy tool for many states that reject international law as a regulator. This changes many things for those of us who believed in the deceptive promises of “perpetual peace” that the fall of the Berlin Wall seemed to bring. We’ve had a rude awakening, and our mission has become vital: our citizens must understand the strategic ruptures we are experiencing, and the conceptual, financial and capability efforts we must make to preserve our independence and freedom. Civil society is not yet sufficiently aware that the world has changed, that a soldier is not a policeman with a gun that shoots further, that he does not have the same mission, and that defense is the primary condition for the development and survival of a democratic society.

That’s why, in March 2024, the Assembly’s Defense Committee launched a wide-ranging work cycle on “global defense” to reinvigorate its promises, mobilize ministers and their administrations, and make economic agents and citizens aware of the role they could have to play in the event of a large-scale security crisis.

C. P. — The geopolitical context has been deteriorating steadily since the pandemic. Conflicts have an impact on the work of our commission, as demonstrated by the recent hearings of researcher Jean-Pierre Filiu on the situation in the Middle East, and Léo Jarry, member of the NGO Conflict Armament Research. It’s up to us to shed light on these subjects for the general public. Several of our hearings, such as the two particularly fascinating speeches I’ve just mentioned, are public and accessible on the Senate website. This helps to advance public debate on important but complex issues.

Our compatriots sometimes wonder about the level of our defense effort in relation to other public policy priorities. It’s vital that we can explain to them exactly how worrying the threats to our country are, and how absolutely necessary it is to devote sufficient resources to our defense. In this case, this means resolute support for Ukraine, because if Russia were to prevail in this conflict, it would considerably weaken our security and that of all European countries. It’s very important to make our compatriots rediscover the relevance of the Roman adage Si vis pacem, para bellum (Editor’s note: if you want peace, prepare for war). It’s precisely because we want to do everything possible to avoid war that we need to be a deterrent and able to defend ourselves.

P. I. — Generally speaking, when we talk about defense, we talk pretty quickly about the budget. Are the envelopes earmarked for defense sufficient today?

C. P. — Resources must be commensurate with ambitions, and must also be allocated over time. That’s why the last LPM, voted in the summer of 2023, represented such a major challenge for our armed forces. The French Senate fought hard for a faster ramp-up in funding, right from the start of the LPM. In the current geopolitical context, the Senate has succeeded in further accelerating the budget trajectory over the first few years of the program, as well as strengthening the means of controlling government action. Last year, along with my colleague Hélène Conway-Mouret, I was co-rapporteur for program 146, “Équipement des forces” (Equipping the Forces). I was able to see that the 2024-30 LPM unfortunately leaves many capability issues unresolved. The financial effort of the LPM is hampered by inflation, the increased cost of increasingly complex technologies, and the modernization of our deterrent capability. Crucial questions remain unanswered. Although defense budgets are on the rise, they are not enough to dispel all the uncertainties. In the summer of 2023, the Senate voted almost unanimously to validate the increase in the defense effort. It is inconceivable that the state’s current budgetary difficulties could jeopardize this trajectory.

P. I. — Because this trajectory may be called into question?

T. G. — You have to look at the big picture to get a clear view of the situation. When the majority came to power in 2017, we were emerging from twenty-seven years of continuous contraction in defense resources. Our armed forces were on the verge of collapse. The financial choices that guided the 2008 and 2013 White Papers had left our armed forces bereft. It is to the credit of the former majority, under the impetus of the President of the Republic, that it grasped, before most of our European partners, that the strategic situation required new “software”, even if France had not “let its guard down” as much as others. We have embarked on a historic rearmament effort with the 2019-25 LPM, followed by the 2024- 30 LPM, to repair and transform our armed forces in line with the threats we face.

We have €400 billion in payment credits on the table between now and 2030. The LPM has chosen to consolidate the coherence and responsiveness of the existing army model, while guaranteeing the modernization of nuclear deterrence. In this model, the “mass” effects, which I personally still find insufficient, are based on the doubling of reserves and on our alliances.

P. I. — Are the budgetary efforts for the navy living up to expectations?

C. P. — In the naval sector, the LPM 2024-30 sees the launch of major projects such as the new-generation aircraft carrier (PA- NG) and third-generation ballistic missile submarines (SNLE-3G). However, we are concerned about the financing conditions for the first tranche of work on the PA-NG. In addition, the LPM ratifies a number of renunciations and program postponements. The number of frigates and patrol boats scheduled for delivery is down, and the all-Rafale is still a long way off. Furthermore, the LPM has not reviewed the fleet format, which was set out in the 2013 White Paper. We believe that today’s world and the emerging threats are no longer those of 2013. Unfortunately, the LPM does not really draw any conclusions from this.

T. G. — For the navy, this is no mean feat: 65% of its units will be renewed; €5 billion will be spent on the new-generation aircraft carrier, even if Naval Group will be asked to pre-finance it; the design of the third generation SNLE will continue; the navy will be equipped with M51-3 missiles; the delivery of the 6 Barracuda SNAs will be completed in 2030; the renewal of mine warfare resources will be completed; action on the seabed will be organized; and the overseas presence will be modernized. This ambition comes at a cost, which is being paid for by the postponement of certain deliveries, notably of FDIs, offshore patrol vessels and force supply ships.

Is all this enough? Yes, if the strategic situation does not deteriorate significantly and if the trajectory set out in the LPM is respected, in particular under the terms of Article 4, which stipulates that certain expenditure will be financed by additional credits, such as aid to Ukraine. Between now and the end of the LPM, however, we will need to develop our strategic offer to our partners - indirect strategies - and prepare to rethink the army model, particularly for the navy, in view of what is at stake in our overseas territories, in the Mediterranean and in the North Atlantic.

Let’s not forget, however, that our defense effort between now and 2030, while significant in view of our public finance constraints, remains historically low. When we abandoned conscription, our effort was close to 2.5% of GDP, and the last time we were involved in a war in Europe - it was in Kosovo - our effort was 2.2%. At the same time, these financial efforts for our armed forces must be complemented by a remobilization of all parts of the nation - the private and public sectors, civil society, etc. - on issues of sovereignty and resilience, and by a strengthening of our alliances.

P. I. — Let’s talk about industrial sovereignty and the war economy: in this respect, is France in control of its decisions?

T. G. — Today, France has the largest “defense industry” on the continent. There are few areas of capability where we are lacking, and over 80% of our equipment is “made in France”. Our capability sovereignty is unrivalled in Europe, while our defense industrial and technological base (DITB) represents almost 14% of French industry and makes a positive contribution to our trade balance.

But our DTIB is not yet a “combat industry”. It still bears the scars of the promises of “perpetual peace”, and is not organized to absorb massive shocks, as the limits of our support for Ukraine testify. It’s the so-called “war economy” that we must collectively succeed in. This requires efforts on the part of industry, in terms of finance, organization and sales, but also on the part of the state. The latter needs to develop the regulatory framework and better anticipate the “dormant capacities” it requires from the DTIB, in order to adopt a more agile contractual approach that is better able to capture innovation, while adjusting its management of weapons programs. This will enable us to create leaner, more technology- intensive business models with shorter lead times.

I see a major axis of development for the naval industry in the successful dronization of naval combat: the use of drones must be massively developed, the DITB must “pull out all the stops”, and the navy must seize every opportunity to promote tactical innovation... taking care, however, not to repeat the impasses of the “young school” which, at the end of the 19th century, transformed innovation into dogmatism (3).

Finally, I’m convinced that the road to the powerful Europe that France needs lies in deepening our cooperation. Europe’s shipbuilding industry is too fragmented, and suffers from exacerbated competition that weakens players rather than consolidating the sector. That’s why I welcome the cooperation we’ve forged with Belgium, the Netherlands and Greece, and why I support the deepening of strategic ties with Norway. We need coherent, interoperable ocean- going fleets to protect our maritime spaces and supply routes, from the Gulf of Aden to the North Atlantic.

C. P. — Industrial sovereignty is essential to France’s strategic autonomy. Adapting our industry to the geopolitical context has been one of the main focuses of our work on the 2024-2030 LPM. The committee adopted a number of amendments aimed at supporting companies in the defense industrial and technological base. In March 2024, we once again took a step in this direction by adopting on first reading the draft bill put forward by Pascal Allizard, our committee’s rapporteur, aimed at finding a solution to the financing difficulties faced by DITB companies. The bill was also intended to reaffirm that there can be no sovereign defense without an autonomous DTIB.

P. I. — How do you view the shipbuilding industry in general? How far can cooperation go?

C. P. — The naval industry is a field in which France excels. Naval Group’s central position should not obscure the hundreds of subcontractors and other French shipbuilders who all contribute to our country’s strategic autonomy and security. In the current context, our European partners, as well as those in the rest of the world, are increasingly interested in this unique know-how. It’s a very important part of our defense policy, but also of our diplomatic action.

P. I. — Still on the subject of naval defense, what have been the main issues you’ve had to examine recently? What do you think of the capability adaptations on the horizon?

C. P. — The LPM provides for capability upgrades to modernize our forces. Set to succeed the Charles de Gaulle by 2038, the new- generation aircraft carrier is undoubtedly one of the biggest projects of the century for our naval industry. Construction is scheduled for late 2025-early 2026, with the first sea trials ten years later. The PA-NG represents a major challenge, in particular its integration into the future air combat system (SCAF), which will include the next-generation fighter (NGF). As I’ve already mentioned, we’re not convinced by the choice made to finance the first phase of the work, as it defers the burden on the armed forces’ budget to a later date. But the project itself is in a way the keystone of our navy, insofar as it structures the strategic arsenal and our doctrine. Along with nuclear submarines, this is one of the last areas in which France truly belongs to the club of the best - to the point, in some respects, of being able to claim first place. Naturally, our excellence is based on quality, not quantity...

While the renewal of the aircraft carrier and submarines is undoubtedly an essential capability development, the future also calls for other developments, with UAVs seeming to me to be one of the major points in naval innovation. Finally, I think it was a mistake not to raise the question of fleet format in the LPM. We should at least have debated it. The choice is dictated by budgetary constraints, as I’m well aware, but operational reality will soon confront us with this issue.

T. G. — I’d like to pick up on Cédric Perrin’s comments. The model of our armed forces and of our combat fleet is cut to the bone. We all know that. Our rearmament policy is carried out under constraints: our financial limits reduce our ambitions, but we won’t be sovereign if we lose control of our public accounts. Strategic volatility requires us to demonstrate our determination in Eastern Europe, but also to be able to intervene elsewhere in a context where we are often the only ones in Europe able to do so. What’s more, we have to manage a liability whose inertia continues to produce its negative effects, because if we still have to repair our armies, it’s because they have been damaged by thirty years of decline.

Faced with this situation, Parliament has a vital role to play in explaining the situation and convincing decision-makers and the general public that we need to stay on course with the LPM, but that if the assumptions underpinning it were to deteriorate, we would need to adjust it without delay to ensure that our Achilles heels don’t give way. Our surface fleet, our overseas deployments and our ammunition stocks are undoubtedly the points on which we need to be most vigilant, apart from the question of drones, which I have already touched on.

P. I. — Behind the naval defense industry, there is also a strong territorial anchorage, which the French government is well aware of. Will this industrial network be sustainable?

T. G. — Our challenge is to make the transition from a defense industry to a “combat industry”, after a long period of “lean times” that weakened our industrial fabric. Our champions are there, they are recognized; our SMEs are numerous, and are no less so. Yet our supply chains are under strain, for reasons that have to do with raw materials, components, access to financing and the availability of skills, not to mention workloads that are often too close to breakeven points.

There is no magic wand: overcoming these difficulties and achieving a successful recovery requires the commitment of everyone - manufacturers, the state, the DGA, the armed forces, local authorities, trade associations, social partners, financiers... As elected representatives, our first duty is simple: to positively promote the defense industry, its financing and its careers. To highlight its excellence in the service of our collective interests, to make desirable what makes us stronger to be freer. This is why we are present at arms fairs, and why we insist that financial institutions support the defense economy more openly.

C. P. — Senators represent local authorities. In fact, before becoming senators, we are local elected representatives, fully aware of the challenges facing our regions. In France, we are fortunate to enjoy a dense industrial network in the defense sector. This network is a real strategic asset, as it means that we are not dependent on foreign players for the vast majority of our equipment. From an economic point of view, this high value-added industry provides many jobs in France. This fundamental point has been ignored for too long: by its very nature, the DITB cannot be relocated very easily. Today, it is one of the last industrial sectors left in a country that has largely sacrificed its industry over the last thirty years. Incidentally, I believe that France’s almost conscious decision to de-industrialize was a major strategic error, and one that is now putting us in a difficult position. Just look at the impact on employment: the DITB employs no fewer than 200,000 people.

P. I. — What needs to be optimized or improved in terms of industrial production infrastructures, particularly in shipyards?

C. P. — So I’m not unaware of the challenges facing these industries. The size of the French domestic market and the state’s limited budget make it impossible to ensure the long-term viability of defense industries and to finance the development of new products in an ultra-competitive market. That’s why it’s vital to be able to export. What’s more, in a context of technological change, industries must be able to adapt to stay at the cutting edge of innovation, but also to maintain delivered equipment in operational condition. This challenge calls for constant adaptation of industrial production infrastructures. Finally, one issue that particularly mobilized us on the committee was the fate of ETIs and SMEs in this ecosystem. These companies sometimes combine too many disadvantages to enable their development, or even to ensure their long-term survival. I think there’s still a lot to be done, particularly to improve their access to financing.

P. I. — By definition, you are the face of the political world. How does the political calendar fit in with the defense agenda?

C. P. — Our committee strives to maintain a balance between the political calendar and the defense agenda, between short and long timeframes. The framework of our work is obviously that of political time, but are defense issues part of the long term? We never work for political gain or to make media noise - quite the contrary. We sometimes agree to keep our work confidential, especially when it’s in the interests of the state - as we did recently with our report on drone warfare. While a large part of our work is aimed at steering in- depth dossiers on subjects such as ammunition or the attractiveness of the arms profession - to give just a few recent examples - our agenda also covers more short-term issues such as preparations for the Olympic and Paralympic Games (JOP).

P. I. — Would you say that there is unanimity on defense issues among national representatives? Or are there divisions, just as there are on a number of societal and economic issues?

C. P. — On these issues, it seems to me that the situation is not the same in the National Assembly and the Senate. In the Senate, LPMs are generally adopted with almost 95% of the votes cast, which reflects the very strong Republican consensus on these subjects, given that the debates always give rise to very constructive exchanges. The LPM 2024-30, for example, passed the Senate with 314 votes in favor and only 17 against! As for the National Assembly, it passed by 408 votes to 87. Basically, this text is a compromise between the National Assembly and the Senate. Consequently, even in the absence of unanimity, it is indisputable that a very large proportion of the national representatives agree on defense issues. When it comes to defending our fellow citizens, there is no room for partisan logic.

T. G. — Part of politics is reconciling different timeframes. Specific tools are in place to protect defense against the vagaries of poorly managed agendas: this is the function of military programming laws and White Papers. Our parliamentary practices also contribute to this: the Defense Committee conducts major cycles of hearings to delve into subjects and identify convergences and dissensions. For example, we have organized a cycle on nuclear deterrence in January 2023 and a cycle on adapting our defense policy in Africa at the end of 2023. The results of this work are compiled in books in which the political groups are invited to explain their positions. This goes beyond the traditional information reports in which only the rapporteurs express their views. Made available to the public, these compendiums fuel public debate and serve as useful reference points for understanding developments: to take the example of deterrence, the 2023 report is the continuation of a cycle organized in 2014.

Is there a consensus on defense issues? Yes, on the most structuring issues. This is to be welcomed. But should we be content? Certainly not, as we must beware of the “poison of certainty”. That’s why debate is important, and why Parliament needs to be the place for all questions. Understanding the issues at stake and the plurality of possible viewpoints is the best way to make the right choices. Although it’s not perfect, I’m confident in the maturity of our debates. Proof of this is the five hours of discussion, in the Chamber and in committee, that we had on deterrence during the review of the 2024-30 LPM, and the success of the public meetings that the committee organizes when it travels around the country. And since Cédric Perrin mentioned the votes on the LPM 2024-30, I’d like to point out that it was adopted by a greater number of MPs than the previous one. Even in the face of strong opposition, legislators are keen to ensure that defense strategy is based on a broad consensus.

P. I. — What is your relationship with your counterparts in the parliaments of the European Union?

C.P. —Like Senate President Gérard Larcher, Iattachgreatimportance to parliamentary diplomacy. While diplomacy is often seen as the preserve of the executive, I believe that we parliamentarians have a duty to maintain relations with our counterparts in EU parliaments and, more broadly, foreign parliaments. We regularly have the opportunity to welcome interested parties or to visit them. This year, for example, we travelled to Berlin with our fellow MPs to exchange views with German MPs. Generally speaking, we systematically meet our counterparts when we carry out missions abroad. Among recent missions, I have very fond memories of our exchanges in Kiev with members of the Ukrainian Rada: we met both the president of this assembly and the defense and foreign affairs committees. When they come to France, we of course receive foreign parliamentarians. Finally, beyond the European framework, senators belonging to our committee take part every year in the NATO parliamentary assembly. This meeting brings together delegations from the 32 member countries of the Atlantic Alliance.

P. I. — Through this parliamentary diplomacy, can we speak of a strategy of influence?

T. G. — In today’s competitive world, the ability to make oneself understood and use this as a lever for action is a strategic asset. That’s why I’m delighted that the Revue nationale stratégique has made influence a strategic function. Acknowledging this inflexion in an official document means revealing its political dimension; it also means accepting its polyphony: influence is an omnichannel strategy that must be able to play on the commitment of the executive, the expertise of administrations and the coherence of scattered initiatives. Parliament has a role to play here. I’m a great believer in the contribution of international parliamentary relations to our strategic influence. Parliamentary diplomacy is a useful counterpoint to the melody of the executive: it lends it political depth, but also “longevity” by providing assurances of the constancy of our efforts, because it is always part of a multi-partisan dynamic.

Convinced of this contribution to France’s security interests, I wanted our exchanges with our foreign counterparts to form one of the three pillars - power, resilience, influence - of our commission’s strategy. We make an average of two foreign trips per month, half of which are in Europe, which represents a significant acceleration. We make a special effort to reach out to our German partners, to whom we are linked by major armaments programs: we meet two or three times a year to contribute to the convergence of views. But we’ve also built up regular relations with the UK, Spain, Italy, Belgium and Estonia, and we’re taking advantage of international forums to multiply them: we’ve invited our counterparts to the Paris Defence & Strategy Forum, combining their presence at a joint round table with a visit to ArianeGroup to discuss European issues of access to space. We have also invited some of our counterparts to visit the Paris Air Show and Eurosatory together, as we will be doing for Euronaval. These activities are essential to support politically our hopes for a powerful Europe. In the first year of this legislature, the Commission visited ten European countries, and we received at least as many European delegations. These trips are organized in concert with all members of Team France to maximize their effectiveness.