Who really governs Iran?

Emmanuel Razavi — Iranian society has been deeply scarred by the massacres of 8 and 9 January 2026. Some estimates put the death toll at tens of thousands. Is there any going back?

Clément Therme — We must first distinguish between established facts and estimates, which are still being assessed. It is now indisputable that the Iranian security forces committed massacres unprecedented in the country’s contemporary history, mainly on 8 and 9 January 2026. Human Rights Watch (1) and Amnesty International (2) report that several thousand protesters were killed. However, the figure of several tens of thousands of deaths — sometimes estimated at over 30,000, 40,000 or 50,000 — comes from hospital sources in Iran. This estimate has notably been cited by Mai Sato, the current UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran (3).

Whatever the exact scale of the carnage, one thing is certain: a historic rift has occurred between a large section of society and the state. Since 1979, the Islamic Republic had already experienced several waves of repression, but the events of January 2026 marked another decisive escalation due to their simultaneity, their geographical spread and the systematic use of weapons of war against civilians. This violence has destroyed, for many Iranians – even within the regime and on its immediate periphery – any remaining hopes of reforming the system.

The regime will therefore no longer be able to regain the legitimacy it previously enjoyed in the eyes of a section of the population. Nevertheless, the regime has managed to temporarily restore the Khomeinist ideological order through fear, arrests, executions, digital surveillance and internet blackouts, on a scale unprecedented both in terms of duration and geographical scope, covering the entire national territory. The loyalty of the militia forces within the main security apparatus enabled it to survive the January protests. But it cannot erase the memory of the massacres. This memory fuels both a desire for transitional justice, a drive for systemic political change and a profound sense of exhaustion. The question, therefore, is no longer whether trust can be restored; rather, it is how much longer a state so thoroughly delegitimised can continue to govern.

E. R. — During this crackdown, Iranian forces were reportedly supported by Lebanese, Iraqi and Afghan auxiliaries. Some sources speak of at least 5,000 foreign fighters. In what way does the deployment of these foreign forces reflect a weakness in the regime’s repressive apparatus?

C. T. — Indeed, eyewitness accounts and opposition sources have reported the presence of Arabic-speaking or Afghan fighters and the use of networks linked to Iraqi militias, the Lebanese Hezbollah and the Afghan brigades formed by Iran during the Syrian War (2012–2024) . Since the wars in Iraq and Syria, the regime has had access to transnational networks capable of supplying personnel, trainers and counter-insurgency specialists. Even if limited, such reliance carries significant political implications. It suggests that the leadership in Tehran doubts the willingness of certain national units …