Who really governs Iran?

Emmanuel Razavi — Iranian society has been deeply scarred by the massacres of 8 and 9 January 2026. Some estimates put the death toll at tens of thousands. Is there any going back?

Clément Therme — We must first distinguish between established facts and estimates, which are still being assessed. It is now indisputable that the Iranian security forces committed massacres unprecedented in the country’s contemporary history, mainly on 8 and 9 January 2026. Human Rights Watch (1) and Amnesty International (2) report that several thousand protesters were killed. However, the figure of several tens of thousands of deaths — sometimes estimated at over 30,000, 40,000 or 50,000 — comes from hospital sources in Iran. This estimate has notably been cited by Mai Sato, the current UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran (3).

Whatever the exact scale of the carnage, one thing is certain: a historic rift has occurred between a large section of society and the state. Since 1979, the Islamic Republic had already experienced several waves of repression, but the events of January 2026 marked another decisive escalation due to their simultaneity, their geographical spread and the systematic use of weapons of war against civilians. This violence has destroyed, for many Iranians – even within the regime and on its immediate periphery – any remaining hopes of reforming the system.

The regime will therefore no longer be able to regain the legitimacy it previously enjoyed in the eyes of a section of the population. Nevertheless, the regime has managed to temporarily restore the Khomeinist ideological order through fear, arrests, executions, digital surveillance and internet blackouts, on a scale unprecedented both in terms of duration and geographical scope, covering the entire national territory. The loyalty of the militia forces within the main security apparatus enabled it to survive the January protests. But it cannot erase the memory of the massacres. This memory fuels both a desire for transitional justice, a drive for systemic political change and a profound sense of exhaustion. The question, therefore, is no longer whether trust can be restored; rather, it is how much longer a state so thoroughly delegitimised can continue to govern.

E. R. — During this crackdown, Iranian forces were reportedly supported by Lebanese, Iraqi and Afghan auxiliaries. Some sources speak of at least 5,000 foreign fighters. In what way does the deployment of these foreign forces reflect a weakness in the regime’s repressive apparatus?

C. T. — Indeed, eyewitness accounts and opposition sources have reported the presence of Arabic-speaking or Afghan fighters and the use of networks linked to Iraqi militias, the Lebanese Hezbollah and the Afghan brigades formed by Iran during the Syrian War (2012–2024) . Since the wars in Iraq and Syria, the regime has had access to transnational networks capable of supplying personnel, trainers and counter-insurgency specialists. Even if limited, such reliance carries significant political implications. It suggests that the leadership in Tehran doubts the willingness of certain national units to open fire on their compatriots on a large scale. Foreigners, isolated from the local population and materially dependent on the Iranian state apparatus, are less swayed by family, regional or professional loyalties. They can also be deployed to protect strategic sites, free up Iranian forces for other missions, or make it more difficult to identify those responsible for the violence.

This does not, however, mean that the regime's coercive apparatus has collapsed. The Revolutionary Guards, the Basij militia, the police force, the intelligence services and the judiciary have remained broadly loyal. The use of foreign auxiliaries reflects, rather, a gradual internationalisation of the regime’s security apparatus. Having organised militias beyond its borders, the Islamic Republic has thus begun to import into its own territory the tools it has developed for its regional wars.

E. R. — There is talk of an unprecedented economic crisis and shortages of food and water, particularly in Baluchistan and the province of Azerbaijan. What is the country’s actual state of affairs? How are civilians managing to make ends meet?

C. T. — Iran is going through one of the most severe economic crises in its modern history. For 2026, the IMF forecasts a contraction in gross domestic product of around 5.4 per cent and inflation of close to 69 per cent! Even before the war, the economy was weakened by sanctions, corruption, capital flight, the collapse of the currency, underinvestment and the dominance of parastatal organisations over entire sectors.

The war has exacerbated these difficulties by disrupting transport, imports, oil exports, the electricity infrastructure and the banking system. There does not appear to be widespread famine across the whole country, but rather a growing disparity in living conditions. Major cities and populations close to those connected to the regime are better supplied than rural or outlying areas. Baluchistan, certain Kurdish regions, Khuzestan and north-western territories are plagued by a combination of structural poverty, discrimination, unemployment and inadequate infrastructure.

The water crisis is particularly acute. It stems from droughts, but also from decades of mismanagement, overexploitation of groundwater, ill-conceived agricultural projects and the misappropriation of resources. More than 70 per cent of the major aquifers are believed to be overexploited, whilst reservoirs and groundwater basins have reached critical levels. The situation at Lake Urmia in particular illustrates the consequences of this crisis in the Azerbaijani region.

The population survives thanks to a highly developed informal economy: holding multiple jobs, mutual support within families, remittances from the diaspora, collective purchasing, cross-border smuggling and the rapid conversion of income into foreign currency, gold or durable goods. Subsidies on bread, petrol and certain essential goods also continue to play a vital role. The problem is less the absolute lack of food than the collapse in purchasing power, the irregularity of supplies and unequal access to essential goods.

E. R. — What support does the Iranian government still have amongst the population?

C. T. — It retains a minority social base representing around 10 to 15 per cent of the population, but this base, which is dependent on the institutions, is organised and armed. It comprises families linked to the Revolutionary Guards, the Basij, religious foundations, public administrations, certain parastatal enterprises and redistribution networks. Part of the official clergy, conservative rural populations and those benefiting from subsidies also remain loyal to the system, although this support is often driven by material rather than ideological considerations. To this must be added Iranians who do not necessarily support the Islamic Republic but fear civil war, foreign intervention, territorial fragmentation or a scenario comparable to those in Iraq, Syria or Libya.

Ali Khamenei’s funeral also benefited from the regime’s transnational clerical networks (4), which enabled it to broaden its support base. In short, this regime now governs primarily through coercion, economic dependence and fear of chaos.

E. R. — After four months of war, what is the state of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps? Are there deep divisions within it? What are its relations with Mojtaba Khamenei and the Shia clergy?

C. T. — Paradoxically, the Revolutionary Guards have emerged from the war both weakened and strengthened. They have been weakened militarily and symbolically by the assassinations of senior officers, the destruction of infrastructure, the vulnerability of Iranian territory and the inability of the air defences to prevent enemy strikes. Their founding purpose was precisely to defend the Islamic Revolution and the country’s territory, which is no longer a sanctuary. The military successes of the US and Israel have therefore undermined their strategic legitimacy and military credibility at home. Yet they have been strengthened politically because the war, the state of emergency and the weakening of civilian institutions have expanded their role. They control a considerable share of the economy, ports, transport, energy, construction and telecommunications. They also have their own intelligence services, ground forces, naval capabilities and external networks.

There are internal rivalries, particularly between commanders in favour of a protracted confrontation and those who consider it essential to secure a respite in order to rebuild military capabilities and prevent the economic collapse from worsening. The disagreements centre on the timetable, the acceptable level of risk and the allocation of resources rather than on a common objective, which remains, for both sides, the survival of the Islamic Republic. One should therefore not interpret every tactical divergence as an ideological rift.

As for Mojtaba Khamenei, he is more dependent on the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) than his father was, as he enjoys neither the same historical authority nor the same revolutionary legitimacy: his father, let us not forget, had taken part in the struggle against the former regime and had served as President of the Islamic Republic in the 1980s. Mojtaba’s long absence from the public eye reinforces this dependence and fuels speculation about his state of health and his ability to govern. It is, however, an overreach to conclude that clerical control has disappeared. The judiciary, religious foundations and the Constitutional Councils remain closely intertwined with the security apparatus. The militarisation of the regime does not necessarily replace clerical power: rather, it may constitute a new form of cooperation between the two.

E. R. — Who are the regime’s strongmen at present? Can we speak of a successful coup by the Revolutionary Guards?

C. T. — Power is now fragmented. Mojtaba Khamenei remains, in theory, at the apex of the system, but his low profile limits his ability to embody authority. The Revolutionary Guards’ command, led by Ahmad Vahidi, plays a central role in military and security decisions. President Massoud Pezeshkian retains an institutional and diplomatic role, whilst the Speaker of Parliament, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, a former commander of the Revolutionary Guards, occupies a pivotal position between the the formal institutions of the state, the military apparatus and international negotiations. Ahmad Vahidi now wields decisive influence alongside the Supreme Leader.

It is nevertheless premature to speak of a classic military coup. The Revolutionary Guards have not formally abolished the clerical or ‘elected’ institutions. They have not overthrown the Supreme Leader and continue to present their actions as a defence of the Islamic Republic. It would be more accurate to speak, as I have just indicated, of a new form of cooperation which is resulting in the accelerated militarisation of the regime and a gradual shift of the centre of gravity towards the security institutions. This development predated the war. It unfolded as the Guardians expanded their control over the economy, regional politics, repression and the processes for selecting leaders – processes that have been improperly termed ‘elections’ in Iran since 1979.

The war has accelerated this process without creating an entirely new regime. Iran is evolving towards a hybrid form of government: a security-driven theocracy in which the clergy provide institutional legitimacy and the military provides the instruments of coercion and survival.

E. R. — What is the current state of Iran’s ballistic capabilities?

C. T. — They have been seriously degraded but not eliminated. The strikes destroyed launchers, depots, radar systems, command centres and part of the production infrastructure. The elimination of specialist personnel has also disrupted decision-making chains. However, Iran has been building up its missile programme for several decades, prioritising dispersal, underground facilities, mobile units and mass production. It therefore likely retains short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, attack drones and anti-ship capabilities. Official statements claiming that the arsenal has been fully replenished should be treated with caution, but the missile launches carried out since the start of the conflict prove that a significant residual capability remains.

The main issue is not merely the number of missiles, but their accuracy, their ability to penetrate enemy defences, and the speed with which the industry can replace depleted or destroyed stocks. Iranian leaders now present their ballistic and nuclear capabilities as ‘national capital’ that they refuse to relinquish. In the short term, Iran remains capable of inflicting damage on Israel, US bases and energy infrastructure in the Gulf. But its ability to sustain an intensive campaign over several months is likely to be far lower than it was before the war.

E. R. — Can the Islamic Republic still acquire the atomic bomb? And if so, what threat would this pose to Israel and the Gulf states?

C. T. — The possibility of Iran’s nuclear programme being weaponised remains, even if earlier predictions proved to be overly alarmist. For the time being, the leadership believes that the regime’s survival is secured by its drone and missile programme, rather than by the production of nuclear weapons systems.

When it comes to building an atomic bomb, three stages must be distinguished: producing sufficient fissile material; transforming this material into an explosive device; and miniaturising the weapon so that it can be mounted on a reliable delivery system. Iran possessed a highly advanced enrichment capability, but there is no evidence to suggest that it already possessed an operational weapon. It is true that war may strengthen the position of those in favour of the bomb, who believe that only a nuclear deterrent would prevent further attacks.

For Israel, an Iranian bomb would represent a major strategic threat, even without an immediate attack. It would reduce its freedom of action and could fuel regional nuclear competition. For Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Turkey, it would raise the question of enhanced US guarantees or the development of national capabilities. But here too, predictions of regional nuclear proliferation (the ‘cascade’ theory) have failed to materialise for more than two decades.

That said, the inaccuracy of past predictions is not, as we have seen, a sure indication of the future of nuclear proliferation in the region…

E. R. — How can Donald Trump resolve the crisis caused by the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz?

C. T. — He cannot resolve this crisis in the long term through bombing alone. US forces can protect certain convoys and destroy patrol boats, coastal batteries and launchers, but they cannot guarantee normal commercial shipping at low cost in the face of mines, drones and repeated attacks. Moreover, the situation remains in a state of constant flux: Iran claims to have closed the strait, whilst Washington maintains that ships continue to pass through it. Donald Trump is therefore attempting to combine military pressure with limited negotiations. A realistic objective would be to secure a verifiable cessation of attacks on ships, a communication mechanism between US Central Command (CENTCOM) and the Iranian authorities, and a gradual resumption of shipping under international guarantees. In exchange, Washington could suspend certain strikes and grant limited exemptions on oil exports.

Pressure from the Gulf monarchies, China, India, Pakistan and the European powers is essential. These actors have a stake in freedom of navigation and can remind Tehran that the closure of the Strait of Hormuz also has consequences for Iran’s relations with its Asian and Arab neighbours. A prolonged occupation of the strait or a US ground operation would be extremely costly and would risk spreading the war throughout the region (horizontal military escalation). The choice between diplomacy and a US ground operation will depend on the Trump administration’s willingness to accept the consequences of this battle for the Strait of Hormuz for the global economy and for US consumers. The preferred option is a naval blockade of Iranian oil exports, which could take effect by the end of 2026 if rigorously implemented.

E. R. — To what extent could the war resume? Could Israel go it alone?

C. T. — In reality, the conflict has already resumed, as the truce established in the spring collapsed in July. Iranian attacks on ships and the latest US strikes show that the protocol signed in June was more of a tactical pause than a political settlement. The risk of further phases of war is therefore high. The main triggers would be a deadly Iranian attack on a US base, the prolonged closure of the Strait of Hormuz, or the rapid reconstruction of nuclear sites. The conflict could alternate between intensive strikes, negotiated pauses and indirect clashes.

Israel could act alone against specific targets, notably senior officials, missile depots or nuclear facilities. It possesses significant intelligence capabilities and long-range strike capabilities. However, a protracted campaign against a country the size of Iran would require US support in terms of supplies, missile defence, intelligence and ammunition. Going it alone would therefore be possible tactically, but far less so strategically.

E. R. — What are the main opposition forces, both within and outside the country? How are they perceived in an ethnically diverse society?

C. T. — Within the country, the opposition is primarily linked to Iranian civil society: women, students, workers, pensioners, teachers, intellectuals, families of prisoners, religious minorities and regional movements. Its strength lies in its deep social roots; its weakness in the absence of a national organisation, recognised leadership and underground structures capable of coordinating a transition. Abroad, the monarchists grouped around Reza Pahlavi enjoy high visibility but lack any political or military organisation on Iranian soil. There are also republicans, liberals, left-wing movements, feminist groups and Kurdish, Baluchi, Arab and Azerbaijani organisations. The opposition in exile remains deeply divided, and support within the country is largely linked to the Crown Prince’s popularity amongst a significant minority of the Iranian population.

We must avoid reducing Iran to a mosaic of ‘tribes’. It is an ancient state, endowed with a strong national identity, but composed of Persian-speaking, Azeri, Kurdish, Arab, Baluchi, Turkmen and other communities. Demands often centre on equality, language, economic development and an end to discrimination rather than on secession. Any credible opposition will need to reconcile national unity, democracy and the recognition of diversity. A discourse that is too centralising would alienate the peripheries; a project based exclusively on ethnic identities would raise fears of the country’s fragmentation.

E. R. — What might be the trigger, or the tipping point, that would bring about the regime’s downfall?

C. T. — Authoritarian regimes do not generally fall as a result of a single factor, but when several crises converge. The tipping point in Iran could result from a combination of sustained national mobilisation, a strike in strategic sectors, a rift at the top and the defection of part of the security forces. A prolonged strike in the oil industry, transport, the bazaars or the civil service could deprive the regime of resources and expose its inability to govern. But it would only be decisive if the protesters simultaneously managed to occupy public spaces on a sustained basis and take control of certain official buildings. The key factor would remain the neutrality or division of the repressive apparatus. As long as the Revolutionary Guards, the Basij and the intelligence services remain united and paid, the regime can survive widespread unpopularity. Conversely, a succession crisis, the Supreme Leader’s manifest incapacity, a military defeat or a conflict between commanders could transform a spontaneous protest into a revolutionary crisis. We must also consider the possibility that the regime will not collapse abruptly, but will undergo a transformation: a gradual retreat of the clergy, growing dominance of the military, a partial abandonment of revolutionary ideology and the maintenance of a security-based authoritarianism. In this scenario, the priority would be economic survival over ideological survival.

E. R. — Does the generational divide ultimately spell the end for the Islamic Republic?

C. T. — The demographic factor must be viewed in a nuanced light. Some older data suggest an average age of 32, but projections based on United Nations data now place the median age in Iran at around 34 to 35. Iran nevertheless remains a relatively young, urban, educated society that is very connected to the outside world. The generational divide is deep. The majority of young people have experienced neither the 1979 revolution nor the Iran–Iraq War. They no longer regard political Islam, anti-Americanism or the Palestinian cause as sources of legitimacy. Their expectations centre on individual freedoms, employment, social mobility, dignity and the chance to live a normal life. Women play a central role in this shift.

Be that as it may, demographics do not automatically lead to the downfall of a regime. A young population can be repressed, divided, driven into exile or absorbed into the informal economy. The generational divide is likely to spell the end of the Islamic Republic’s original ideological project: it is no longer capable of garnering majority support. However, this does not guarantee the rapid demise of the state that emerged from it. The regime may survive the death of its ideology if it retains its weapons, economic resources and the cohesion of its elites. The crucial question, therefore, is whether this cultural and generational rejection will succeed in transforming itself into political organisation, national solidarity and the capacity to defect from within the state apparatus itself.