Ukraine: is Putin trapped?

Isabelle Lasserre — Is the tide turning in Ukraine? Can Ukraine win the war?

Xavier Tytelman — What is happening in Ukraine today is the culmination of four years of effort and technological development, which I have been fortunate enough to witness. This dogged determination has brought about a convergence of circumstances that is leading everyone to say, ‘Perhaps the Ukrainians won’t collapse after all…’ ’ As early as the summer of 2024, I was explaining that the Ukrainians were developing interceptors designed to shoot down the Shahed drones launched by Russia, and that they were the only ones who knew how to do so. Today, they are intercepting 90 per cent of them, whilst the Russians, using far more expensive missiles, can only counter 60 per cent of the Ukrainian drones. In November 2025, I warned that the Ukrainians had gained the upper hand in long-range warfare and that the situation would worsen for Mr Putin’s forces. This is exactly what is happening, and with the new equipment the Ukrainians will soon be equipped with, things will only get worse for the Russians.

I. L. — Apart from the interceptors, what has enabled the Ukrainians to reverse the balance of power?

X. T. — From February onwards, following the suspension of Starlink services for Russians, the Ukrainians gained a technological advantage in the field of drones, particularly short- and medium-range drones, which can reach anywhere in occupied Ukraine or into Russia up to 100 km deep. Since late 2024, the Russians have made the mistake of staking everything on fibre-optic drones as the sole means of circumventing Ukrainian jamming of their so-called ‘FPV’ kamikaze drones. At the time, fibre-optic technology was very promising, particularly because it could not be jammed. The Ukrainians, too, have invested in fibre optics, but they have also developed two other technologies in parallel. Firstly, resistance to electronic warfare, that is to say, the ability to withstand Russian jammers. Secondly, artificial intelligence, which enables autonomous strikes on targets. For example: the drone is piloted up to 2 km from its target, then the operator designates the target and the drone navigates autonomously to the Russian equipment, identifies it as a tank, and then circles round it to enter the gun barrel. The combination of these three technologies is producing incredible results.

Furthermore, the Ukrainians struck the Russian fibre-optic production plant last February, causing shortages. The Chinese have made up for Russia’s needs, but by tripling their prices. Conclusion: the Russians are paying a prohibitive price for the very technology in which they had invested heavily. This partly explains the Ukrainians’ dominance on the battlefield. Since the start of the war, the ratio had been two and a half Russian losses to one Ukrainian loss. But since February, the figure is reportedly eight Russian losses to one Ukrainian loss.

I. L. — Let me ask you my question again: can Ukraine win the war?

X. T. — First, we need to define what we mean by ‘victory’. I am among those who believe that Ukraine will not succeed in liberating all of its occupied territories, and I regret that. Why? Because, despite their dominance, recapturing all the occupied territories would entail the loss of 100,000 to 200,000 men. These are numbers that neither public opinion nor Ukrainian leaders – who prioritise human lives over occupied square metres – are prepared to sacrifice. But victory does not necessarily mean regaining the occupied territories straight away. In the long term – perhaps in thirty years’ time – the Ukrainians hope that these territories will be returned to them, just as East Germany eventually returned to West Germany. Furthermore, a collapse of the Russian army similar to that of the German army in 1918 seems to me highly unlikely.

The Ukrainians, on the other hand, can win the war by forcing Russia to agree to negotiations which it will enter from a position of weakness. The person holding the upper hand at the negotiating table will be Ukraine’s representative, and that is what constitutes victory. The Ukrainian military has given its diplomats the opportunity to negotiate under favourable conditions. The Russians will no longer be able to oppose European security guarantees. For the more time passes, the more economically vulnerable and militarily on the back foot they will become. To the point where they will no doubt be forced to make some concessions.

I. L. — Do you not think the Ukrainians could, for example, cut off the annexed Crimea from Russia by destroying the Kerch Bridge? Or even recapture part of the peninsula?

X. T. — Ukraine is now capable of completely cutting off Crimea, where there are shortages of rice, pasta and petrol. But it cannot liberate it, as there are still 100 km of trenches, barbed wire and areas that are difficult to capture. The Ukrainians can, as they have proven, carry out raids. In 2024, they even managed to come in on zodiacs to destroy radar installations. But to recapture Crimea, a Second World War-style amphibious landing would be required. That is impossible. On the other hand, the Ukrainian forces’ sporadic operations are forcing the Russians to deploy enormous resources, which will be wasted because Crimea is now deprived of air defences and its infrastructure is regularly targeted by the Ukrainians. To put it in a nutshell, the Russians are no longer capable of defending Crimea: more than two-thirds of the munitions launched by the Ukrainians hit their targets.

The attacks are having repercussions within Russia itself, where public opinion sees what it regards as the jewel in the crown slipping from its grasp. The strikes are driving the Russians who had come to colonise Crimea since 2014 to leave the peninsula. Destroy the bridge? That would be a massive political coup. But that would require considerable resources, and ultimately the Ukrainians are achieving the same result by encouraging Russians to leave Crimea and by having destroyed the railway line linking Crimea to mainland Ukraine. Furthermore, the destruction of the Crimean Bridge could trigger a further escalation on Putin’s part. Ukrainian officials assured me last autumn that they would wait for negotiations with Russia to fail before taking such action, so as not to give Putin an excuse to break off the talks. The Ukrainians do not want to be accused of being the ones who sabotage the negotiations.

I. L. — You say that the Russian army cannot collapse, despite the proliferation of fronts and the lack of motivation among soldiers sent to their deaths. Why is that?

X. T. — Because it is still entrenched in its infrastructure, in its trenches and in minefields. Because even if Russian defences are weaker than Ukrainian ones, they do exist. Because the Russians are still managing to produce 6,000 drones a day to defend themselves. Because their soldiers are in such a state of subjugation that they will remain in their trenches to hold their positions despite heavy losses. They would rather endure Ukrainian attacks than risk being shot by their own side if they retreat.

I. L. — Who are Russia and Ukraine’s main external supporters? Who is supplying what to whom?

X. T. — Russia’s only true ally — as it is not afraid of sanctions — is North Korea. But it exacts a high price for its support and artillery shells: MiG-29s and technology relating to intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of reaching the United States. Next comes China, which regards Russia as a captive customer and is bleeding it dry by negotiating reductions in the price of oil. The Chinese are raising their prices to sell equipment to Russia whilst it is under sanctions. They are selling their services and systems at exorbitant prices. Finally, there are countries that until now had turned a blind eye to Putin’s war: the United Arab Emirates, Turkey and Kazakhstan have helped him circumvent sanctions. But the Emirates did not appreciate having Iranian Shahed drones, supplied from Russia, flying over their heads.

Some countries that theoretically fall within Russia’s sphere of influence, such as Egypt, Serbia and Iraq, have chosen to arm Ukraine. I have also seen many South Americans fighting alongside the Ukrainians – Colombians and Mexicans who said they were fighting to prevent Russia from once again becoming a destabilising force in Latin America. What, however, remains of Russia’s traditional allies? Syria is throwing a spanner in the works. Iran is weakened and has stopped supplying ballistic missiles and Shahed drones to the Kremlin, which did not help it when it needed it. Venezuela is emerging from a political crisis. As for India, which claims to be neutral, it resells at market price the oil it buys from Russia at a knock-down price…

I. L. — And who are Ukraine’s allies?

X. T. — The Ukrainians keep repeating that the whole world, not just the West and Europe, is on their side. They mention Sudan, Morocco, Egypt, Azerbaijan, and of course the United States, Canada, Japan, South Korea, Iraq and Jordan. But the Ukrainians are becoming less and less dependent on foreign aid. The flow of equipment that enabled them to hold out in 2022–2023 is now essential only in the field of air defence. In all other sectors, they are doing better than us at a lower cost. Of course, they are happy to receive armoured vehicles. But they now produce them locally in significant quantities. They are manufacturing ground robots on an industrial scale and to a higher standard than we do, at a much lower cost. They are manufacturing aerial drones on a scale that no one could have imagined so quickly, using technologies that we do not possess. They are producing radar systems for drones at €400, whilst ours cost €50,000! In the field of electronic warfare, the Ukrainians have overtaken everyone else.

To sum up, international support remains strong. Neutral countries have sided with Ukraine. But Ukraine now prefers financial support to equipment, as it is more cost-effective to produce ten armoured vehicles or ten guns locally than to purchase a Caesar or an armoured vehicle costing one million euros. To put it plainly, I repeat, they have learnt to do things much better and much more cheaply than we do.

I. L. — As part of his strategy of escalation, could Vladimir Putin one day use a tactical nuclear bomb?

X. T. — I don’t think so, if only because China has sent very clear messages to the Kremlin on the subject. If Russia were to breach this taboo, it would give Taiwan – which had begun developing a nuclear weapon in the 1970s before abandoning the programme – the green light to resume its programme. Technologically, the Taiwanese have everything they need to do so, as they are what is known as a ‘threshold state’ and possess the necessary expertise. For China, this would be a red line. I believe the Russians will not cross it, even if their army were to collapse tomorrow.

I. L. — Can the memorandum of understanding signed between Trump and Iran be described as an American capitulation, and in what way?

X. T. — The most optimistic analysis concludes that Iran has emerged stronger from the war that began on 28 February than it was before. The United States has achieved none of what it wanted. It has merely ‘mowed the lawn’. Admittedly, they have undermined Iran’s ability to pursue its nuclear programme and produce ballistic missiles. But in two or three years’ time, another strike will be necessary, because the technologies acquired by the Iranians in the nuclear and ballistic fields will not be forgotten. And because those same Iranians will rebuild their steelworks and their propellant production capabilities.

The United States has merely bought itself some time. It has achieved none of its strategic objectives: regime change, curbing the ballistic programme and neutralising the proxies. They remain active and are operating further and further afield, as we have seen with the Polisario Front, which has carried out attacks in Morocco! Iran is in the process of internationalising its proxies to enable them to operate anywhere in the world. Unable to defend their allies – particularly in terms of air defence – the United States has emerged from the war weakened. What a thrashing for the Americans! It was the Ukrainians who helped the Gulf states intercept Iranian drones and defend American bases!

Whilst the Americans have lost influence in the region, Iran, for its part, has emerged diplomatically stronger for having been able to stand up to them. Its international standing has grown, particularly following the crisis in the Strait of Hormuz. So, of course, some European countries continue to buy American equipment, even though it is clear that this no longer guarantees protection. But the Taiwanese have realised that it is in their best interests to build up their own military capabilities independently. And the international order, based on the assumption that the Americans are there to defend us, has completely collapsed. In my view, the American war in Iran is therefore a failure from start to finish. None of the ongoing negotiations will lead to a return to an agreement as good as the one secured by Obama in 2015, nor to the pacification of the Strait of Hormuz, which will henceforth live under the threat from Iran.

I. L. — How do you explain the fact that the United States has so grossly underestimated both the Iranian regime’s capacity for resistance and its capacity to retaliate?

X. T. — I don’t think the US intelligence services were that remiss, but I do think Trump made an irrational decision because he believes he is in a Hollywood film: he thinks his will alone is enough to get what he wants.

I. L. — What military action would have been required to bring about the regime’s downfall?

X. T. — We should have been prepared to intervene on the day the Iranians took to the streets. If the United States had actually been ready at that moment to support the Iranian opposition on the ground and prevent the Revolutionary Guards from quelling this rebellion, if they had helped the Azeri and Kurdish opposition groups, it might have been possible to bring about regime change. But after saying ‘we’re on our way’, Donald Trump allowed tens of thousands of demonstrators and students to be massacred. No air operation, whatever form it might have taken, could have brought about the regime’s downfall. All the more so because, very quickly, time began to work in Iran’s favour. Whatever anyone may say, the US treasury was losing a billion dollars a day due to the war. And, every week, the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz cost 0.1 percentage points of global growth. It was therefore the United States and its allies, as well as the global economy, that were the first to be put in a stranglehold.

I. L. — What is the scale of Iran’s military capabilities today? What exactly do they have left?

X. T. — Iran’s conventional army has all but ceased to exist. But as the Americans do not want to send a million troops on the ground to bring about a change of regime, it will be rebuilt. The Iranian regime survives not thanks to conventional forces, but thanks to the political police, the Islamists on the streets, and the Revolutionary Guards who run the country. It is they, for example, who control communications and non-conventional assets, such as long-range drones, and proxies capable of attacking air bases in Saudi Arabia and Iraq. The Iranian regime’s capacity to cause harm, via its ballistic missiles, drones and proxies, may have been weakened, but the United States’ ability to counter it has been weakened even further.

I. L. — How can we explain why the Israelis and the Americans did not strike the electricity grids and television networks at the start of the war?

X. T. — I’d heard that the Americans had hacked into the television broadcasts to air their own messages in the event of the regime’s collapse. Striking the electricity infrastructure, on the other hand, would have caused them to lose the support of the civilian population. And besides, it is, after all, a war crime. It would be stooping to the Russians’ level...

I. L. — Is it possible to go and retrieve the Iranians’ stockpile of enriched uranium?

X. T. — I don’t think so. It must be buried underground. It would require a military operation involving thousands of troops, lasting days on end, to gain access to it. It would be a highly risky military operation from a logistical standpoint, with a high probability of failure. Unless the Iranians are willing to abandon what represents years and years of effort, that uranium will end up where the regime wants it to be, and it will certainly not be in American hands.

I. L. — Could the IDF succeed in eradicating Hezbollah once and for all? Is it possible to neutralise it? Can it be disarmed whilst the Iranian regime remains in power?

X. T. — That is a wish shared by the whole world, starting with the majority of the Lebanese people! The only way to disarm Hezbollah – which has benefited from Russian expertise and been trained in drone warfare – is to have an open and full partnership with the Lebanese state, involving the Lebanese army, with the support of the international community and that of Israel. But for the time being, the Lebanese army lacks the means to do so. And I do not get the impression that the Israelis are making themselves sufficiently popular to secure such a partnership.

I. L. — Do you think China will attempt to take over Taiwan? If so, how and when? And how would the United States react?

X. T. — In theory, the United States has a treaty obliging it to support Taiwan, but Donald Trump has repeatedly cast doubt on his intentions in the event of a Chinese attack. Furthermore, the United States will inevitably lose its naval dominance in the Pacific to China one day. The Taiwanese therefore have a knife to their throats; they realise they have a duty to prepare for a possible war in which they would be on their own. Alone, with perhaps Japan and South Korea. They are in the process of acquiring the methods that enabled Ukraine to win the battle for the Black Sea. They are building naval drones, underwater drones and aerial drones. It is also said that they are developing hypersonic missiles to strengthen their deterrent. The aim is to be able to respond in an unconventional manner to any Chinese attempt to launch an offensive against their coastline. It is also to be able to destroy the Three Gorges Dam. No need for an atomic bomb! The twenty-metre- -wave that would then sweep across this densely populated region of China would cause enormous loss of life. We can therefore see that, even on its own, Taiwan has the means to defend itself.

I. L. — Do you think we are moving towards a genuine decoupling between Europe and the United States?

X. T. — I have been hoping for this for a very long time, and I get the impression that a number of countries are beginning to see the light. But most of them are not yet taking action because they believe that Trump is merely a rough patch to get through and that, once he’s gone, the United States will backtrack and resume its role as the protector of its European allies. In other words, they refuse to see themselves as a power on the pretext that they want to remain under American protection. This is a monumental strategic error. Even Germany, despite all the statements made by its leaders (1), continues to rely on the United States for 53 per cent of its military expenditure (2). To summarise: we are buying equipment that is more expensive, of poorer quality, and which we are not sure we will be able to use, as there are always restrictions attached to American weapons. All this whilst banking on the Americans perhaps still being there in a few years’ time, should we need them. But what on earth is this madness?

I. L. — Are you referring to all European countries?

X. T. — No, there are two exceptions: France and Ukraine. France, apart from the catapults on its aircraft carrier, is fully sovereign from A to Z, both at national and European level. Ukraine, for its part, is trying to wean itself off anything non-European, particularly Chinese and American components. Elsewhere, we see that even when the United States makes military threats against Greenland, certain countries – Denmark, for example – give in to American pressure and buy F-35s. The Rafale won the tender in South Korea, Singapore and the Netherlands (3), and on each occasion the Americans subsequently exerted pressure to impose their inferior and more expensive systems. This is a form of subjugation. Will Europe finally agree to be sovereign?

I was still in the military at the time when Defence Minister Hervé Morin proposed setting up a command centre for European operations that would not be answerable to NATO and therefore not to the United States. His suggestion provoked an outcry from the Poles and the Germans, who argued that there was no point in creating a duplicate structure. But the problem is that, to cite just one example, data links – more specifically Link 16, NATO’s communication system (4) – rely entirely on American encryption keys, which are supplied by the CIA. In other words, when a French aircraft wants to communicate with a British refuelling aircraft or a German tank, it can only do so if it has a key supplied by the Americans. This is why Europe must establish autonomous military headquarters that do not rely on NATO infrastructure and are not dependent on US tactical data links. And here again, only France has equipped itself, through Radio Contact (5), with the means to communicate without using the American link. If, in the future, we need to defend Greenland or the Baltic states and we have an American president with close ties to Russia, only France knows how to do so. That is why we must, as of now, set ourselves a political goal to build a common European defence infrastructure that is entirely independent of the Americans and which can include all Europeans, including Ukraine and the United Kingdom – in other words, one that is not linked to the European Union. Because today, if the Russians were to attack the Baltic states, I would be more inclined to seek help from the Ukrainians than from the Americans.

I. L. — So, precisely, what are the real risks of a Russian attack on a country in the European Union and NATO, and which countries are most at risk?

X. T. — In the very short term, I think the risks are very low. But once there is a ceasefire in Ukraine – which I believe is very realistic before the end of the year – and the sanctions against Russia are eventually lifted, that risk will become a reality.

The US attack on Iran has had a very positive knock-on effect for Russia. Thanks to the rise in oil prices, its coffers have been filled and it now has the financial capacity to continue the war for at least six months longer than anticipated. A ceasefire – or a peace agreement, I’m not sure what to call it – between Russia and Ukraine would lead to the lifting of sanctions against Russia, which could then replenish its stocks and purchase the components it lacks from abroad. Russia could replenish its coffers and start a new conflict in less than a year. It is often said that the Russians do not have the same technical capabilities as the Ukrainians, particularly when it comes to drones, but the reality is that we are still far behind Russia. If the Ukrainians are holding out, it is because they are capable of producing 10,000 drones a day, because they have the right equipment, the right techniques, jammers – everything they need. Not the French, not the Europeans. They are holding out because they have the capacity to launch 300 long-range missiles or drones a day. If we were producing even 1 per cent of that, I’d be happy! The Russians, for their part, know that the Europeans do not have the same means of defence as the Ukrainians and that they are actually a long way behind. Admittedly, we have some fine fighter jets in France and we could overwhelm the Russians in terms of naval and air power. But in the long term, we don’t have the resilience to cope. The Russians are firing 250 Shahed drones a day; we wouldn’t be able to absorb that.

I. L. — Which areas are most at risk?

X. T. — We don’t need to look very far. The Russians could, for example, take Narva in Estonia, or claim that there is an independent separatist republic of poor, persecuted Russian-speakers in eastern Latvia or Lithuania and come to their aid. If NATO failed to react, it would spell its demise. Not just ‘in theory’, but in practice. At very little political cost, Putin could bring about the collapse of the European security architecture. And if it proved more difficult than expected, the Russians – who are losing 1,000 men a day in Ukraine – might decide it is worth risking the lives of 50,000 or 100,000 Russians to capture Narva, a strategic objective infinitely more significant than the conquest of Kostiantynivka in the Donbas. In any case, if I were them, I would do it. Ukraine is currently giving us a respite. But we are not using this respite to ramp up our efforts to the level required. Warning: danger ahead!