Ukraine: is Putin trapped?

Isabelle Lasserre — Is the tide turning in Ukraine? Can Ukraine win the war?

Xavier Tytelman — What is happening in Ukraine today is the culmination of four years of effort and technological development, which I have been fortunate enough to witness. This dogged determination has brought about a convergence of circumstances that is leading everyone to say, ‘Perhaps the Ukrainians won’t collapse after all…’ ’ As early as the summer of 2024, I was explaining that the Ukrainians were developing interceptors designed to shoot down the Shahed drones launched by Russia, and that they were the only ones who knew how to do so. Today, they are intercepting 90 per cent of them, whilst the Russians, using far more expensive missiles, can only counter 60 per cent of the Ukrainian drones. In November 2025, I warned that the Ukrainians had gained the upper hand in long-range warfare and that the situation would worsen for Mr Putin’s forces. This is exactly what is happening, and with the new equipment the Ukrainians will soon be equipped with, things will only get worse for the Russians.

I. L. — Apart from the interceptors, what has enabled the Ukrainians to reverse the balance of power?

X. T. — From February onwards, following the suspension of Starlink services for Russians, the Ukrainians gained a technological advantage in the field of drones, particularly short- and medium-range drones, which can reach anywhere in occupied Ukraine or into Russia up to 100 km deep. Since late 2024, the Russians have made the mistake of staking everything on fibre-optic drones as the sole means of circumventing Ukrainian jamming of their so-called ‘FPV’ kamikaze drones. At the time, fibre-optic technology was very promising, particularly because it could not be jammed. The Ukrainians, too, have invested in fibre optics, but they have also developed two other technologies in parallel. Firstly, resistance to electronic warfare, that is to say, the ability to withstand Russian jammers. Secondly, artificial intelligence, which enables autonomous strikes on targets. For example: the drone is piloted up to 2 km from its target, then the operator designates the target and the drone navigates autonomously to the Russian equipment, identifies it as a tank, and then circles round it to enter the gun barrel. The combination of these three technologies is producing incredible results.

Furthermore, the Ukrainians struck the Russian fibre-optic production plant last February, causing shortages. The Chinese have made up for Russia’s needs, but by tripling their prices. Conclusion: the Russians are paying a prohibitive price for the very technology in which they had invested heavily. This partly explains the Ukrainians’ dominance on the battlefield. Since the start of the war, the ratio had been two and a half Russian losses to one Ukrainian loss. But since February, the figure is reportedly eight Russian losses to one Ukrainian loss.

I. L. — Let me ask you my question again: can Ukraine win the war?

X. T. — First, we need …