Is Israel stronger than it was before 7 October?

Isabelle Lasserre — What has changed for Israel and the region since October 7, 2023?

Joshua Zakka — Everything. First of all, in Israel, where the population has experienced unprecedented trauma. It must be said that after these three terrible years of war, around a quarter of Israelis are now suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder. But in the aftermath of October 7 and the atrocities committed by Hamas, the prospect of Israelis and Palestinians living in peace has been pushed back by several generations. The chasm that opened up between us after the October 7 attacks and the Israeli military response cannot be bridged in the foreseeable future. An enormous amount of work will be needed to recreate an atmosphere conducive to dialogue.

At the regional level, our neighbours have clearly understood that we are prepared to make them pay a considerable price for their cruelty. Our enemies now know that we have no intention of letting ourselves be attacked without responding. This has undoubtedly come as a surprise to some, who were betting on Israel's weakness. More broadly, however, we are witnessing a general weakening of the destabilising forces in the region. I am thinking of Iran, the great puppet master behind disorder in the Middle East, and its terrorist proxies.

I. L. — Would you say that Israel is safer today than it was before October 7?

J. Z. — Yes. On October 6, Israel was facing three existential threats: Iran's proxies, its ballistic missile programme and its military nuclear programme. Today, although these three threats remain, they are no longer existential. This is a fundamental change. We were also concerned that the Arab countries with which we have close relations, particularly those involved in the Abraham Accords, might sever their ties with Israel, as happened during the Second Intifada, when they closed their representative offices. But exactly the opposite happened: relations not only held firm, they grew stronger. As a result of the war, they have become strategic.

I. L. — Including with Saudi Arabia? Where does the rapprochement process within the Abraham Accords stand?

J. Z. — When the Saudis decided to move closer to Israel, they did not do so simply for the pleasure of having relations with the Israelis, but because they were seeking help in securing the US Congress's green light for their planned free-trade, defence and advanced-technology agreements with the United States. A peace agreement with Israel was the price Saudi Arabia was prepared to pay to secure congressional support. Fundamentally, however, unlike the United Arab Emirates and Morocco, it was not particularly committed to the Abraham Accords. I do not think that has fundamentally changed: Saudi Arabia does not want to make peace with Israel for the sake of peace, but to secure benefits. I think we will make peace with Lebanon well before that.

I. L. — You say the threat to Israel is receding. But the impression is rather that it is spreading… After the Strait of Hormuz, Iran has extended the conflict to Bab el-Mandeb, bringing the Houthis into the fray. It now has ambitions to extend the destabilisation as far as the Indian Ocean…

J. Z. — Yes, but this expansion does not directly threaten Israel; it is more of an international problem. The fact that the international community failed to stand in solidarity with the United States, even politically, in order to compel the Iranians to stop their provocations partly explains why they have extended the conflict. The Houthi issue is different. The Houthis have never been completely aligned with Iran. Of all the proxies, they are the most independent of the regime. In my view, their entry into the conflict is more closely linked to their desire to be respected at the regional level. For them, it is a way to acquire status and be recognised as an independent power, whether by the Saudis or by other regional players, particularly in East Africa. The situation in Bab el-Mandeb should not be viewed solely as an Iranian-driven event.

As for the rest, I repeat that the military threat has been considerably reduced and that we are in a better position than we were on October 6, 2023. But it is true that this outcome has come at an enormous cost: the diplomatic isolation of our country. We will have to rebuild our relations with part of Europe, which have suffered a serious setback. I think that if the Palestinian question is so important in Europe, it is not because Europeans are passionately fond of the Palestinians. It is mainly because Europe's Muslim populations are growing and governments fear their reaction. They believe that by putting pressure on Israel and laying the blame for the war in the Middle East at Israel's door, they will appease their populations. That is not the case at all. We will also have to rebuild ties with other non-European countries, such as South Africa and several South American states. In fact, the Israeli population is weary. These three years of war have left 30,000 people wounded. That does not mean that if our enemies attacked us again, we would be unable to defend ourselves; quite the contrary, we might be less patient in our response. But it does mean that we are tired.

I. L. — Let us take the threats facing Israel one by one. First, Iran's nuclear programme. You say it no longer constitutes an immediate existential threat. Why? And for how long?

J. Z. — Several years. Before the 12-day war, in June 2025, we believed that Iran was capable of conducting a nuclear test in the desert within a few months. Of course, it would still have needed about another year and a half to put a nuclear bomb on a missile and directly threaten Israel. But the danger was imminent because the Iranian regime had decided to acquire nuclear weapons. Today, the process of carrying out a nuclear test has been delayed. And it would take the Iranians several years to mount a nuclear warhead on a missile.

I. L. — Even if the Iranians still have the 450 kg of enriched uranium they buried and which neither the Americans nor the Israelis managed to seize?

J. Z. — Let us not forget that this 450 kg of enriched uranium is not metal but gas, contained in very specific barrels. A particular process is required to transform it and turn it into a bomb. The Iranians no longer have this expertise, because all the people involved in developing nuclear weapons, in what is known as the “weaponisation” phase, have been eliminated. Or at least the vast majority of them.

I. L. — People always say that the one thing that cannot be eliminated in the nuclear field is know-how…

J. Z. — Well, that is false, because this know-how resides in people's minds, and if you eliminate them, those minds can no longer be used! That is what we did during the first war with Iran: we eliminated around sixteen scientists who were involved in producing nuclear weapons. Others were eliminated later. This is expertise that is not transmitted publicly and is very difficult to acquire; it is not something you learn in university lectures. Today, no country, not even Russia or China, which in the past helped Pakistan acquire nuclear weapons, would be willing to help the Iranians obtain nuclear weapons.

I. L. — And if the nuclear threat resurfaces in five years, will Israel use military force again to eliminate it?

J. Z. — It is clear that if the Iranians resume their nuclear programme and it once again becomes an immediate threat, then yes, Israel will respond. We will not allow this regime to develop military nuclear capabilities that could endanger our existence. There is a genuine consensus on this issue in Israel. From left to right, everyone agrees on this principle. Whoever the prime minister may be, whatever the government, we will prevent the Iranians from rapidly developing a nuclear bomb. And I believe the Iranians have understood that very well.

I. L. — Can we sincerely hope that the region will return to calm, particularly in Gaza and Lebanon, if the mullahs remain in power in Tehran?

J. Z. — That is the hundred-million-dollar question! And unfortunately, my answer is quite clear. No. As long as this regime remains in power, there will be neither peace nor stability in the Middle East. Not only because Iran wants to destroy Israel, but also because this revolutionary state wants to change the regimes around it. It wants the Saudis and the Emiratis to become Shia. This regime wants to revolutionise the Middle East.

I. L. — How long can it survive?

J. Z. — It is much weaker today than it was a year and a half ago. Will it manage to survive in the long term? I do not think so. I believe it is on an increasingly slippery slope and is nearing its end. The Iranians, despite the fact that tens of thousands of them were massacred in two days in January 2026 and hundreds of thousands more were sent to prison during the crackdown, will eventually rise again and overthrow the Iranian regime. This people is too advanced, too intelligent and too open to the world to accept being kept under the yoke of a group of revolutionary barbarians.

I. L. — What can Israel do to accelerate the downfall of this regime?

J. Z. — The war against the Iranian regime is not only military; it is also diplomatic, economic and regional. We have been waging it for many years and will continue to do so. Some actions are carried out discreetly. The latest sanctions imposed on Iran by the United States and Europe were largely based on intelligence we provided. For years, our intelligence services have been supplying information to those who have both the capabilities and the influence needed to sanction the Iranians and maintain the pressure. The economic pressure exerted by the Americans is slowing Iran's regional destabilisation efforts. By blocking Iranian exports, it prevents the regime from obtaining the revenue it needs. How long can the regime hold out under these conditions before it gives in? Probably many more months, or a few more years.

I. L. — Should ground troops have been sent in to overthrow the regime?

J. Z. — But we were on the ground during the war! The presence of Israeli special forces in various parts of the country is no longer a secret. However, I believe a ground invasion of Iran was never seriously considered. Sending tens of thousands of soldiers into the field is not part of Israeli military culture. Nor do I believe the Americans were ever keen on such a solution. An invasion of Iran does not strike me as a particularly realistic prospect. It is true that such an operation would probably have brought down the regime quickly. Under pressure from tens of thousands of American soldiers, the regime would not have lasted more than a few weeks. But the cost to the United States would have been enormous. That does not mean the mullahs' regime will not fall. It simply means that its downfall will be slower. Sadly, in the meantime, it is the Iranian people who are suffering…

I. L. — Let us turn to the two main proxies, Hamas and Hezbollah. Can you give us an overview of their military and ideological strength after three years of war?

J. Z. — Hamas still controls the part of the Gaza Strip that is not in Israeli hands, but it no longer poses a threat to us. Could it become one again if it were rearmed by Iran and other countries such as North Korea? Could it recover within a few years? Yes, of course, because its ideology has not changed. It remains an organisation willing to sacrifice its own people in an attempt to destroy Israel. Hamas's leaders sacrificed the well-being of their population to wage a war they knew would not succeed. Its ideology, therefore, has not changed, and if it were ever to change—if a new Palestinian leadership were one day to accept the idea of living in peace with Israel, which is not the case at present—it would take years, perhaps even several generations.

I. L. — How can this process be encouraged?

J. Z. — It could have been initiated by the international community, particularly the Europeans. Unfortunately, the French initiative to recognise a Palestinian state sidelined France's influence and erased the role it could have played in helping us make peace with our Palestinian neighbours.

After September 11, 2001, the Gulf countries embarked on a process of deradicalisation. In Israel, we studied this process, which we believed could have been implemented among the Palestinians. As in the Gulf countries, the Palestinian Authority should have taken back control of its education system and its mosques and reformed these two extremely important sectors, particularly in order to regulate the messages delivered by imams on Fridays and monitor school textbooks… But we do not see any willingness to reform on the part of the current Palestinian leaders. We have recently seen that they have no intention of calling elections…

I. L. — What will you do with the Palestinians, then?

J. Z. — I think the most realistic course of action in the coming years would be to try to calm the situation and ensure that there is no violence for one, two, three or four years, so that life can begin to return to normal on both sides. The Palestinians should be able to live normal lives, and the Israelis should also be able to live normal lives without fear of Palestinian infiltration. I think that is the most we can hope for at the moment. And if we succeed in doing that, we will be able to begin a process that will create an atmosphere of peace.

I. L. — And what needs to be done for this first step to become a reality?

J. Z. — There needs to be a willingness to do so. A willingness on both sides that could eventually develop into a diplomatic process. But trying to push the process forward artificially, as Emmanuel Macron has attempted to do, is entirely counterproductive.

I. L. — In Lebanon, by contrast, society has itself begun to deradicalise. What are the implications for Hezbollah?

J. Z. — We have seen in Lebanon the direct result of Iran's weakening. On October 7, 2023, Hezbollah had 150,000 missiles aimed at Israel. Today, it has only a few hundred missiles left, and it knows that using them would be suicidal. Moreover, Iran no longer has the means to continue funding Hezbollah. We have struck all their military installations in southern Lebanon. During the war, we discovered that Iran had invested billions of dollars in underground infrastructure in Lebanon. All that money has vanished as a result of our actions. On the other hand, Lebanon has clearly shown that it has had enough. Let us not forget that we had peaceful relations with Lebanon at the time of the establishment of the State of Israel. A peace agreement was even signed after the war against the PLO (1). This is a people with whom we have no territorial dispute. We could once again live in peace with the Lebanese tomorrow. But the Lebanese government must confront Hezbollah, which, even though it is no longer what it once was, still has the means to trigger a civil war. How can we move towards peace without a civil war breaking out? That is the whole question. The process, to which we are contributing (2), will inevitably take some time, because forcing things too quickly could instead lead to a resumption of the war. In short, the Lebanese Armed Forces must be given time to strengthen themselves and regain control of southern Lebanon without this leading to a civil war. And I believe that, at that point, we will be able to live in complete peace with Lebanon.

The way to speed things up would be to increase the pressure on Tehran. Instead of limiting itself to fine speeches, the international community could have helped us in practical terms to weaken Iran and hasten the fall of the regime by strengthening its diplomatic, economic and regional isolation.

I. L. — Isn't Iran already diplomatically isolated?

J. Z. — No! The Iranians can attend any UN meeting they wish. They continue to chair certain committees. And the Europeans, who could oppose them, let them do so. I am talking about Iran's total isolation, one that would make any destabilisation of the region impossible. The international community must unite in this effort, which does not necessarily have to be military but can be diplomatic. There must be a sufficiently strong united front to make the Iranians understand that they cannot win.

I. L. — Admittedly, but they will always have China and Russia to help them…

J. Z. — Indeed, but I do not think that either China or Russia aims to create chaos in the Middle East. Russia currently has an interest in destabilising the region because, as long as American forces are committed to the Middle East, they cannot turn their attention to Ukraine! In the medium term, however, I do not see any desire on the part of Russia or China to perpetuate disorder in the region.

I. L. — Who are Israel's strongest and most reliable allies today?

J. Z. — The United States, the United Arab Emirates and Morocco.

I. L. — How would you describe Europe?

J. Z. — Like a close relative who is old and ill.

I. L. — How do you see France?

J. Z. — It is a very important country with which we need to maintain good relations. When I arrived in Paris, my aim was to restore bilateral relations to the high level they had reached in the 1950s and 1960s. But there is clearly no such willingness on the French side, at least under Emmanuel Macron's presidency.

I. L. — How do you explain that?

J. Z. — It is not for me to answer that question, but I think France is experiencing such a profound economic, social and financial crisis that it probably has other things to worry about than its relations with Israel. Perhaps that will change.

I. L. — Of all the decisions taken by Emmanuel Macron, was recognition of the Palestinian state the one that caused the greatest difficulty for you?

J. Z. — It is the whole package.

I. L. — And what does that package consist of?

J. Z. — The ban on Israeli industries participating in various arms exhibitions (3). The fact that Israeli policy was described as “barbaric”. The call to boycott arms destined for Israel. The ban on our aircraft, which needed an air bridge during the war against Iran, from flying through French airspace. The decision to recognise a Palestinian state at a time when we still had hostages in Hamas tunnels.

On this point, French statements claiming that the decision would bring the war to an end were ridiculous. On the contrary, we know, because we were aware of everything being said within Hamas, that this gave the terrorist group breathing room, enabling it to continue the war with the feeling that its actions were finally paying off. It is not recognition itself that I criticise, but its timing and the fact that it was unconditional. This gesture served no purpose other than to make a grand display.

I. L. — You said that October 7 also had consequences for Western societies. What were they?

J. Z. — In the West, there are groups seeking to destabilise societies. They are led by an alliance of certain European political forces and the Muslim Brotherhood. Their aim is to carry out a revolution in France. But not only in France, since destabilisation campaigns originating in Russia and Iran, or funded by Qatar, are also at work. Among the populations supporting these actors, there are a great many violent individuals whom these destabilising forces exploit. I think what happened on October 7 gave these forces the impression that if they could kill so many Jews and win a battle against Israel, they could also bring the conflict to France, onto the streets of Paris, and win the war against the West. And I believe that the violence we are seeing on Western streets stems from this sense of success now felt by Islamist forces across the continent.

I. L. — Is it easy to work with Trump?

J. Z. — You know, I worked with his administration during his first term. I think that if we took all his statements and analysed them using a mathematical function, we could make sense of them. The path to the result would sometimes be a little complicated, but it would trace a relatively clear line. With Trump, you really have to follow the overall direction rather than each individual statement. I think that, in this way, we would see exactly where he wants to go, what his goal is and what results he is achieving.