Ukraine: The Weapons of Victory?

Come Back Alive is one of Ukraine’s leading organizations supporting its armed forces. Founded in 2014, at the beginning of the war in Donbas, it provides military units with equipment, funds training and supports the development of new weapons. Mykola Bielieskov has been a military analyst there since 2022. A graduate of Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, he worked at the Institute of World Policy from 2016 to 2019 before joining the Defense Policy Department at the National Institute for Strategic Studies, an institution attached to the Ukrainian presidency. Today regarded as one of the country’s most influential military experts, he regularly contributes to Ukraine’s strategic debate and publishes in a number of international institutions and media outlets.

Cyrille Amoursky — Could you tell us about Come Back Alive?

Mykola Bielieskov — It is quite a unique phenomenon in Europe. Let me explain. In the traditional model, the state has a near-monopoly over security and defense capabilities. In Ukraine, however, the war has given rise to a civil society that can directly contribute to the military effort.

It all started in 2014. When Russian aggression began, our armed forces sometimes lacked even basic equipment. The foundation was created and initially began raising money from ordinary citizens, and later from businesses, to purchase equipment, including body armor. That is actually where the name comes from: the words “Come Back Alive” were written on some of those vests.

With the full-scale invasion in 2022, we grew to an entirely different scale. Since 2014, the foundation has raised more than €1.6 billion, the overwhelming majority of it since 2022.

C. A. — What proportion of that funding comes from Ukrainian citizens and businesses, and what proportion comes from foreign partners — and who are they?

M. B. — At present, around 62 percent of our funding comes from foreign partners — individuals, companies, NGOs and partner governments — and 38 percent from Ukrainian partners, including businesses, individuals and state-owned companies. These figures are approximate, though. For security reasons, both for our partners and for ourselves, we do not publish certain figures until the projects concerned have been completed.

Today, we provide drones, communications systems, vehicles and electronic-warfare capabilities, and we also invest in military training.

We can also act faster than the state and take certain risks. Public administrations are necessarily constrained by more procedures. We can, by contrast, test technologies that have not yet fully proved themselves, as we did with the interceptor drones developed under the “Dronopad” project (1), or with some of Ukraine’s first long-range strike drones, such as the “Bober” (2). We invested in these capabilities at a time when the state was still hesitant. Once their effectiveness had been demonstrated, they could be scaled up on a much larger scale.

That is a fundamental feature of the Ukrainian model: the state remains the main actor in defense, but it is not the only one. Many innovations emerge in military units, companies, foundations or volunteer networks before being adopted by state institutions.

C. A. — On the ground, the Russian offensive is continuing, but it has slowed considerably compared with last year. Can we say that Ukraine is now regaining the strategic initiative?

M. B. — I would be more cautious. To speak of “regaining the strategic initiative,” we would need to be conducting sustained offensive operations and forcing the Russians to adapt to our actions. In some areas — the Dnipropetrovsk region, for example — our counterattacks have forced the Russians to redeploy reserves. But elsewhere, particularly in the Donetsk region, we are still the ones reacting to their offensives. So we have not “regained the strategic initiative.” What we have achieved, however, is to halt the gradual deterioration of the situation that we had been experiencing since the end of 2023.

C. A. — What explains that?

M. B. — Ukraine has gone through a cycle of technological and tactical adaptations that now allow us to counter Russia’s offensive model more effectively, particularly its infiltration tactics and its attempts to cut off our forward positions from their rear areas.

We now have much greater long-range strike capabilities than we did in 2025. They allow us to hit Russian rear areas and logistics before their equipment even reaches the front. We have also developed an air-defense capability based on interceptor drones, which allow us to destroy Shaheds, Molniyas and Lancets (3) much more easily. These systems had previously caused us very serious problems. Finally, unmanned ground systems can now perform some logistics and medical-evacuation missions without directly exposing soldiers.

So the nature of the war has changed as well. This is no longer the artillery war we knew in 2022 and 2023. Two years ago, we were still comparing the number of shells fired by the two sides. That is no longer particularly relevant. The battlefield is now largely shaped by robotic systems.

C. A. — To what extent has Ukraine now become self-sufficient in this field?

M. B. — We are much more self-sufficient than we were at the beginning of the war. In 2022 and 2023, we were almost entirely dependent on the material and technical assistance provided by our partners. Uncertainty over the future of U.S. assistance forced us to accelerate this transformation, but it had already begun before Donald Trump returned to the White House. The deadlock over the U.S. aid package in late 2023 (4) pushed us to look for other solutions.

Today, roughly two-thirds of strikes are carried out by robotic systems. Our needs have therefore changed. At distances of 18 to 20 kilometers from the front, drones can now perform some of the missions that used to be assigned to artillery. Conventional shells with that kind of range have therefore become less important, especially since the guns firing them have to expose themselves more to enemy drones. We now prioritize munitions capable of striking at 35 or 40 kilometers.

Circumstances have forced us to improvise and look for unconventional solutions. Our defense industry has transformed at an extraordinary speed. It now comprises around 900 companies and 300,000 employees. Just a few years ago, this ecosystem barely existed. Before 2022, Ukraine had only about 30 defense-industry companies producing on a regular basis. Today, more than 500 companies produce drones, compared with seven before; more than 200 manufacture electronic-warfare systems, compared with two; more than 100 produce unmanned ground systems, whereas there were none before; and more than 20 produce missiles, again compared with none before 2022.

This year, the target is to produce around seven million drones and robotic systems of various types, compared with approximately 4.5 million in 2025. With the necessary funding, we could probably produce twice as many. But Ukraine cannot finance a war of this scale on its own. That is why financial support from our European partners is absolutely crucial.

C. A. — Does this transformation of warfare mean that conventional weapons — artillery, aircraft and missiles — are becoming obsolete?

M. B. — No. New technologies have become essential, but they cannot replace everything. We still need powerful air- and missile-defense systems, manned aircraft, and ballistic and cruise missiles. They perform missions that current robotic systems are still unable to carry out.

So the real transformation is not the disappearance of conventional weapons, but their integration into a battlefield in which robotic systems now play a leading role.

C. A. — You have mentioned “middle strikes” several times. They seem to have played an important role in slowing the Russian offensive. What exactly are they?

M. B. — The term “middle strike” refers to strikes conducted between the tactical and strategic depths, broadly speaking between 20 and 500 kilometers behind the front line, although most of them are concentrated within roughly 300 kilometers. The aim is to strike what we call the adversary’s “operational depth”: its logistics, command posts, ammunition depots, electronic-warfare assets and air-defense systems. In other words, everything that enables a Russian force to fight at the front.

In 2022 and 2023, in particular, we had HIMARS (5), which were extremely effective before the Russians gradually developed countermeasures. Ukraine therefore developed its own systems, especially drones capable of carrying substantial warheads and being controlled in real time. We now have these systems in very large numbers and can strike Russian rear areas on a much larger scale.

C. A. — So how do you distinguish these strikes from “deep strikes,” which reach much farther into Russian territory?

M. B. — A “middle strike” directly affects the functioning of Russian forces engaged in the theater of operations. A “deep strike,” by contrast, is part of a strategic approach: the objective is to reduce Russia’s ability to sustain the war over the long term.

These are two different but complementary approaches. By striking Russian air-defense systems in the operational depth, middle strikes can open corridors, allowing our strategic drones to penetrate much deeper.

For example, some Ukrainian drones launched against southern Russia previously had to go around Crimea. Today, we can use much more direct routes, including over the Sea of Azov.

C. A. — Ukraine is now striking refineries, oil infrastructure and companies belonging to Russia’s defense industry almost every day. What is the strategic logic behind this campaign?

M. B. — It is fairly straightforward: neither side is currently capable of achieving its political objectives solely on the front line. So both sides are trying to weaken the other’s rear areas.

The difference is that Russia is trying to destroy the critical infrastructure that allows Ukraine to function as a country, whereas we are primarily trying to destroy its war economy. The Russian economy is heavily dependent on oil. The less oil revenue Russia has, the fewer resources it has available to finance the war.

The same logic applies to its defense industry. If we can strike the production chains for Iskander missiles, for example, we are no longer simply trying to intercept the missile once it has been launched. We are trying to prevent or slow its production upstream. We began carrying out these kinds of strikes in 2023. They became more systematic in 2024, but it is only this year that we have reached a scale comparable to Russia’s campaigns, largely thanks to increased European funding.

Russia’s territory is enormous, and it is extremely difficult for Moscow to protect all potential targets simultaneously. The attacker has an advantage because it chooses where and when to strike. For the first time, we are therefore able to play a much more symmetrical version of the game that Russia has essentially been playing against us for several years.

C. A. — But drones also have limitations compared with conventional missiles…

M. B. — Absolutely. We still rely heavily on drones powered by internal-combustion engines. They can fly very long distances and are relatively inexpensive, but their payload is significantly smaller than that of a cruise or ballistic missile. There is always a trade-off between range and destructive power: the farther you want to go, the smaller the warhead has to be.

Ukraine is developing its own missiles, including Neptune and Flamingo, but we do not yet have enough of them to conduct large-scale combined strikes with effects comparable to those of a much larger missile arsenal.

C. A. — At what point could these strikes have a genuinely strategic impact on Russia?

M. B. — That is the big question. We are trying to create a cumulative effect through strikes on refineries, oil infrastructure, export capacity, transportation, logistics and the defense industry. But nobody can say exactly when this accumulation will reach a threshold capable of changing Russia’s political calculations.

The aim is to gradually increase the cost of the war for Russia until it decides that giving up some of its demands is preferable to continuing the fight.

C. A. — In recent months, Ukraine has significantly intensified its strikes against Crimea, which Russia has occupied since 2014. Is the objective to gradually isolate the peninsula?

M. B. — Yes. The south presents a particular vulnerability for Russia. Its defensive depth there is shallower, and there are far fewer logistical routes than in Donbas.

So we are exploiting that geography. The idea is to strike communications, logistics and infrastructure, and force the adversary to devote more resources to protecting them. We are already seeing Russia redeploy some of its capabilities.

C. A. — Could we go so far as to imagine the military liberation of Crimea or the south?

M. B. — Not at this stage. For the time being, our objectives regarding de-occupation remain limited. In reality, we are conducting an unprecedented military experiment.

Traditionally, you shape the battlefield first by striking targets in depth and then commit ground forces to an offensive. Today, however, we are not in a position to conduct large-scale offensive operations. And to de-occupy the south, it would not be enough to cut Russian logistics. We would also have to destroy the stocks of weapons, ammunition and fuel available to the Russian forces fighting there.

So we are trying to answer a question: can you achieve major political objectives exclusively through non-contact operations, without committing large numbers of troops on the ground?

C. A. — But Russia can adapt to this strategy…

M. B. — Exactly. This is an extremely dynamic war. We can strike military targets, including mobile ones, but the Russians can respond by attacking fixed infrastructure that is vital to Ukraine.

That is what they are doing today with a systematic campaign of strikes against infrastructure in the Odesa region. In response to our efforts to isolate Crimea, Russia is trying to impose an economic cost on us. These attacks cause casualties, but they also threaten our export capacity. Maritime insurance costs are rising, and the question is how many ships will still be willing to enter Ukrainian ports.

In a sense, the Russian leadership is therefore confronting us with a dilemma: are we prepared to put our ability to export grain and other agricultural products at risk in order to continue isolating Crimea?

C. A. — So there is a trade-off between continuing this campaign and protecting Ukraine’s economic interests?

M. B. — Yes. The question is whether we continue the strikes aimed at isolating Crimea, particularly against Russian maritime transshipment capabilities in the Sea of Azov, or whether we put greater emphasis on protecting our own infrastructure, which could require a degree of restraint.

I do not know which answer the Ukrainian leadership will choose. But we should certainly not assume that because we have an advantage in certain technologies, we can impose our terms unilaterally and that the adversary has no way of responding.

That is precisely what the current Russian campaign demonstrates: every Ukrainian advantage prompts a Russian adaptation, which in turn forces Ukraine to make new strategic choices.

C. A. — How do you assess the record of former Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov (6), who was recently dismissed?

M. B. — Without exaggerating, Fedorov is one of the architects of Ukraine’s technological revolution. He was not constrained by past experience and helped build an ecosystem around new military technologies.

I am thinking in particular of the Brave Market platform (7), which allows military units to accumulate points based on their performance and then exchange those points for weapons and equipment. There is also the Diia.City legal framework (8), which provides defense manufacturers with preferential tax conditions.

Fedorov played an important role in creating these structures, including when he was still Minister of Digital Transformation, from 2019 to early 2026, and was effectively performing certain functions that would normally have fallen under the Defense Ministry.

C. A. — Fedorov and former Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrsky (9), who was dismissed shortly after him, have often been portrayed as representing two opposing approaches to warfare: on the one hand, technology and innovation; on the other, a much more traditional military approach…

M. B. — That is a media-driven simplification. I worked with and spoke to Syrsky, and I never saw any rejection of robotic systems on his part. He fully understood that drones and other robotic platforms had become an essential component of modern warfare.

The criticism directed at him was more about the way he exercised command, particularly his tendency to intervene directly at corps and brigade level, and the fact that assault units were placed under his direct authority.

His conflict with Fedorov was, in fact, primarily institutional.

C. A. — What do you mean?

M. B. — The Defense Minister refused to be reduced to a kind of procurement service whose job was simply to buy whatever the general staff requested. Fedorov began asking questions: Why are we buying this piece of equipment rather than another one? How does this procurement fit into our overall strategy?

Those questions were legitimate, but they were not necessarily welcomed by the military.

At a deeper level, though, this problem goes beyond the two men. Ukraine has spent twenty years trying to establish a NATO-inspired model, with a clear separation between the Defense Ministry and military command. We have to acknowledge that we still have not fully defined their respective responsibilities.

Our national security law nevertheless provides for the political and administrative primacy of the Defense Minister. Yet part of our military culture still regards it as inappropriate for civilians to ask senior officers why they are conducting the war in one way rather than another.

So the conflict between Fedorov and Syrsky was not simply a clash between a modern technocrat and an old-school general. It was also about the relationship between civilian authority and military command.

C. A. — Syrsky was eventually replaced by Mykhailo Drapaty (10), and Fedorov by Yevhenii Khmara (11). Should we expect a major change in the way Ukraine conducts the war?

M. B. — Above all, we should not believe that Drapaty can solve the Ukrainian army’s problems on his own. He is competent, open-minded and communicative, and he has a great deal of trust behind him.

But the problems we face — mobilization, training and the command structure — go far beyond the abilities of any one man. So I fear that in six months or a year, the same people who are now expressing absolute admiration for Drapaty will turn to equally absolute condemnation.

That is convenient for part of society, because it allows people to project their dissatisfaction with the conduct of the war onto a single general. It is also convenient for politicians, who can find a scapegoat within the military.

I believe we need to move away from this excessive personalization. Ukraine’s ability to transform its armed forces does not depend on a savior figure. It depends on establishing effective coordination between the political authorities, military command, industry and civil society.

C. A. — Let’s turn to the Russian army. What are the main problems it is facing today?

M. B. — Its central problem remains manpower. Its losses are now comparable to, or even greater than, the number of men it is able to recruit through financial incentives.

The offensive model used in 2024 and 2025 has reached something of a ceiling. It still allows the Russians to advance, but at an increasingly slower pace and at an increasingly high cost.

That is why I do not think Russia currently has the means to radically turn the military situation in its favor, even if it continues to make localized gains here and there. Ukrainian defenses can give way in places, but they are not collapsing.

C. A. — Could another mobilization radically change the balance?

M. B. — It would undoubtedly allow Russia to continue the war for longer. But it would not necessarily reverse the situation on the battlefield.

The battlefield, as I keep saying, is now shaped by systems that detect, strike and prevent concentrations of forces.

C. A. — But with more manpower, Russia could expand its infiltration tactics and increase the pressure on Ukrainian lines…

M. B. — To truly regain the initiative, Russia needs to find an answer to Ukraine’s technological adaptations and have the systems and operators needed to deploy them.

Sending in more infantry without solving that problem might prolong the war, but it would not necessarily win it.

C. A. — The Russians are nevertheless continuing to advance in Donbas. Could Sloviansk, Kramatorsk or Kostiantynivka eventually fall?

M. B. — Of course. These are important cities, and we cannot rule out that scenario. But at the current rate of advance, it would probably take Russia at least another two years to conquer the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk urban area.

And even if Russia ultimately managed to push us out of the Donetsk region, that would not mean it had defeated Ukraine.

C. A. — Does Russia have a sufficient manpower reserve to sustain this war for several more years?

M. B. — On paper, yes. But this is not simply a mathematical question. You have to be able to turn those men into actual military capability.

At the moment, Ukraine has enough means to inflict very heavy losses on the Russian army on a regular basis — around 30,000 to 35,000 killed and wounded per month.

If Russia substantially increases the number of troops it commits, we will have to increase our strike capacity accordingly. Perhaps by then we will have, for example, drone swarms allowing a much smaller number of operators to control a large number of systems simultaneously.

It is a constant race of adaptation.

C. A. — So, if I understand you correctly, you believe that even another mobilization would not allow Moscow to achieve a decisive victory…

M. B. — Not under the current conditions. Russia has neither the technological means nor the manpower potential needed to radically reverse the course of the war in its favor.

The price it is paying for its advances today is much higher than it was before, even as the pace of those advances is slowing. That is precisely why Moscow is not relying solely on the battlefield. It is also seeking to destroy our critical infrastructure and hoping that political developments in Europe will eventually reduce Western support for Ukraine.

C. A. — Which means that the outcome of the war will not necessarily be decided on the front…

M. B. — The front remains obviously crucial. We need to keep Russian forces as far away as possible from Zaporizhzhia, Dnipro and Kharkiv, and make them pay the maximum price for every advance in the Donetsk region.

But yes, the outcome of this war will not be decided solely on the battlefield. That is the real difficulty of the current situation: Russia can continue advancing without being able to win, while Ukraine can succeed in containing Russia without being able to turn that military result into a political settlement.

C. A. — Looking ahead, what might the Ukrainian military look like in a few years’ time? You have said that in 2022 the war still relied heavily on tanks and artillery, and that drones then took on an increasingly important role. What comes next?

M. B. — Automation, drone swarms and reducing the human factor.

Today, we still essentially operate according to the principle of one operator, one system. But the number of missions that have to be carried out keeps increasing.

If we can master truly autonomous systems, and especially swarms, a much smaller number of people could carry out many more missions. For Ukraine, that would be particularly important because we face a shortage of personnel.

Automation would free up operators for other tasks and allow us to use our limited human resources much more efficiently.

If Ukraine manages to master swarms before Russia does, it would give us a considerable advantage. But, as you can imagine, the adversary is working on these capabilities too.

C. A. — Could we eventually see a battlefield in which human beings become almost secondary?

M. B. — The human factor is not going to disappear. Even the most automated systems have to be programmed, maintained, prepared and integrated into an operation.

And it is extremely difficult to predict what warfare will look like a few years from now. But the broad trends are already visible: strike capabilities are becoming cheaper and more numerous, their range is increasing, and the depth of the battlefield continues to expand.

C. A. — In your view, what is the main mistake Western policymakers and analysts are making when they assess this war today? What should they have understood after more than four years of conflict?

M. B. — One mistake keeps coming back: underestimating Ukrainians and their capacity for innovation.

For a very long time, the dominant assumption was that Russia would inevitably prevail because of its sheer mass. We have shown that we can counter that mass with our speed of adaptation and, in certain areas, with technological capabilities that Russia either does not possess or that are more effective than its own — thereby neutralizing part of Russia’s quantitative advantage.

C. A. — What lesson should European armed forces draw from this?

M. B. — First of all, they should avoid believing that any single technology will replace all the others. Technologies are constantly evolving, and the adversary adapts as well. Something that works today may be far less effective six months from now.

The real lesson of this war is therefore not simply that we need to buy more drones. It is that an army must be capable of learning, experimenting and turning battlefield lessons into new capabilities extremely quickly.

C. A. — If the battlefield alone cannot determine the outcome of the war, what is Ukraine’s realistic political objective today?

M. B. — Let me repeat: the overall objective is to prevent Russia from dictating the terms of the future settlement.

Unfortunately, given the current realities, it is not possible in the short term to militarily liberate all the occupied Ukrainian territories, even though they remain Ukrainian under international law.

We want to reach a ceasefire that would involve neither our withdrawal from territories claimed by Russia but not conquered by it, nor concessions that would undermine our sovereignty.

We will not accept permanent neutrality, giving up our NATO aspirations, or restricting our defense capabilities to the point where the country would be vulnerable to another Russian aggression.

C. A. — Would Ukraine be prepared to freeze the front line today?

M. B. — Yes. We are prepared to freeze the front line and cease hostilities.

The president has already said as much when he explained that the line of demarcation should serve as the basis for negotiations. To reach a settlement, Moscow therefore needs to scale back its demands until the positions of the two sides can meet.

Today, the only realistic basis is a freeze of the front line.

C. A. — What would you like to say to European leaders?

M. B. — Europe is now our main partner. It is financing a large part of our war effort and the development of our defense industry.

The key message to send to Putin — who is hoping that political changes in Europe will eventually weaken that support — is that whatever happens, Europe will remain at Ukraine’s side for the long term.

C. A. — And France in particular?

M. B. — Ukraine appreciates the particular role played by France, especially within the Coalition of the Willing, as well as its political, diplomatic and military support.

The CAESARs have performed extremely well, as have the AASM Hammers and Storm Shadows (12). France’s willingness to transfer certain production licenses is also extremely important.

We must stay the course, and there is a risk that this could change depending on the outcome of the 2027 presidential election.

C. A. — Why is integration into the European Union so important for Ukraine’s post-war future?

M. B. — Because Ukraine’s reconstruction and what our country will become depend to a large extent on how quickly that integration takes place.

Of course, the process also involves obligations and reforms that we will have to undertake. You can win the war and lose the peace.

I am convinced that we will hold out in this war. The question is at what cost, and how long it will take before Putin is forced to acknowledge that he cannot achieve his objectives.

It is in this battle for peace that EU membership will be fundamental.

C. A. — Is there a risk that, after a ceasefire, a Russia that has rebuilt its forces could directly test NATO, for example in the Baltic states?

M. B. — Hypothetically, yes. We cannot rule it out if Russia retains significant military potential and subsequently manages to rebuild it.

But as long as it is waging this war against us, suffering heavy losses and losing large quantities of equipment, it does not have the potential to directly challenge NATO on a large scale.

That is also, once again, why Europeans are supporting Ukraine. It is not simply a matter of altruism. They have a rational interest in ensuring that the Russian threat is contained in Ukraine and that Moscow does not have the means to launch a direct military challenge to the Alliance.

C. A. — In other words, the stakes for Europe go beyond Ukraine’s survival alone…

M. B. — Absolutely. Our partners have an interest not only in reaching a settlement, but also in ensuring that Russia emerges from this war sufficiently weakened that it does not pose a direct military threat to NATO countries for at least five to seven years.

That is why the fundamental question is not simply how this war will end, but what comes next.

What kind of Russia will emerge from this war? What kind of Ukraine will emerge from it? And as for Europe, will it have used all this time to build a security architecture capable of protecting it against the risk of another war?