Laure Mandeville — In political and strategic circles, the idea that the military relationship between the United States and France has always been excellent – better than the political relationship – is a constant leitmotiv. I would like to know what each of you thinks about this.
Jim Mattis — It isabsolutelytrueconcerningthemilitaryrelationship. The political relationship is much more fraught with volatility, sometimes adversarial, which is understandable, although we share political concepts about democracy or freedom of the individual … but in the military realm, the most fundamental political foundations allow us to move quickly beyond that. There is an unspoken bond, a natural fit between our military, almost throughout our history, despite the occasional arguments such as Suez yesterday and AUKUS today. Why is it better than the political realm? The explanation is probably the shared sacrifices on the battlefield: we both defend democracies, we have that in common, and the French role has been key. The French military role has been key too many times in the most salient points of our history. It started with the American Revolution, but surely it doesn’t end there. When the Americans arrived in France in 1917, late to the ball I might add, the first words we pronounced were ‘La Fayette, here we are!’ It’s in our mother’s milk, we grow up with it. I mean we have U.S. navy ships named for Rochambeau and La Fayette. This is an example to the military. Nothing probably greater, my fellow naval officers would agree. We have a ship named for you, that’s respect, that’s historic respect. Édouard, am I missing something here?
Édouard Guillaud — I don’t think you’re missing anything at all. Even if politicians are professionals on both sides, it’s not the same type of politics. Getting elected is very different in the U.S. than in France. Whereas soldiering is exactly the same, with the same techniques, even if we don’t have the same equipment. And we have the same basic values. Contrary to the politicians, we in the military have to think simultaneously in the very short term, medium term and long term. We are not incumbents for reelection. We are the armed wing of our country. And at certain times, the government sends us to war. Jim was speaking about the volatility of politics. It’s exactly the term. We have to think in a full scope from the next second to the coming years. And when we forget it, and it happens sometimes, generally, the end state is not what we wanted. I can give you two examples, one American one, and one French: the intervention in Iraq in 2003 and Operation Barkhane in Mali. We in France thought that with the help of neighboring countries we could have a complete success. The trouble was, it was not the aim of the Malians. What they wanted was a stable and affluent state. In both cases, the military had warned the politicians and told them ‘be careful: what are your aims?’
L. M. — Jim, do you also think that, unlike the politicians, the military have to look at the long term?
J. M. — The military, American or French, have a shared sense that we are the guardians of these strange experiments we call democracies. And it causes us to keep an eye on the horizon, on what can go wrong. There are so many lessons in history. As President Truman, as a soldier in World War I, said ‘the only thing new in history is what you don’t know yet’. In a country as young as ours, we don’t pay a lot of attention to history, but the U.S. military study it carefully. Because, if you don’t know your history, it’s like trying to plant cut flowers. Pretty flowers, but they die.
E. G. — You will probably notice that the higher you are in the military structure, the more excited you are about studying history. And for us, Western world military leaders, studying history begins with Xenophon, and goes on with Alexander the Great, Caesar, and so on, and includes General MacArthur, Charles de Gaulle and others. All of us are really more than fond of history. We’re impregnated with history.
L. M. — When you went to your respective military academies, what did you learn that was important in shaping your view of your ally, American or French? You, Jim, what did you learn of France, its part in American history? And vice versa for you, Édouard, how were you taught about the relationship with the United States?
J. M. — When you get into military schools, you study enemies, allies and all strategy, you don’t reject a tactic or an operational art because an enemy used it, in history or even against us. As for our service in NATO, I cannot over-emphasise what it has done to the
U.S. military. Hundreds of thousands of Americans have served in NATO. And there is nothing better for learning than living inside the Alliance. When you travel all over Europe, you become aware that people have different interests, that values are largely shared but often employed differently. But also, in the Marines, for example, you have required reading, for all new Marines. When you are a corporal, you read a number of authors. When you are a captain, there’s a new set and so on up to the rank of general. And you cannot read about our nation’s diplomatic or military history without coming across France. My case is a bit special because my mother was a French Canadian who immigrated to the United States. The military has always understood the importance of the Franco-American relationship better than civilians because it knows the subject. In the naval service, you sail around the world. They don’t limit themselves to planting an American flag over a base in Germany. And this gives them the chance to respect the professionalism and the capability of the French Navy. For example the Charles de Gaulle came in and plugged the carrier gap that we could not fill in the Middle East in the fight against ISIS. You are forced to come to an understanding, because you must make it work. All the military are ultimately pragmatic.
E. G. — We in the French military, and not only in the Navy, have always been very interested in what happens in the American armed forces. If I remember well, the first service was the Marine Corps. We studied how the insurgents acted on the ground and with their short, small boats, before the French fleet arrived. We also took an interest in how the war was won, in the War of Secession, the First World War, World War II, the Korean War, the war in Vietnam and everything since. We studied successes and, sometimes, mistakes. We all remember the Desert One episode, just after the election of Ronald Reagan, before he took office. And I have been studying Desert One. They had everything to succeed and it failed several times. Why? We discussed this with our American counterparts. Then, a few years later, we launched some complex operations, hostage rescues, more or less successfully. And all of us, on both sides, have always taken into account what our friends on the other side were doing. All that goes back to history, to our shared view which is linked to democracy. And for both of us, this comes from the Siècle des Lumières, from the intellectual turmoil of the 18th century, which fed the American Revolution. We share this. It works for both of us.
L. M. — You both say that your brotherhood in arms is founded on the same conception of democratic values. But did not France’s withdrawal from NATO erode for a long time the reciprocal trust between the two nations?
E. G. — We left the military structure in 1966 for two main reasons. One was we were becoming a nuclear power and because of the scientific and financial efforts we had been making, it was impossible for us to imagine that French nuclear weapons would be in a pool. The second stemmed from the way the organization functioned, putting on the same level great powers such as the United States and the United Kingdom and small countries like Luxembourg. The decision was criticized for not expressing this point of view diplomatically, but that was the reason. Then, things started to change at the beginning of the 1990s when the USSR collapsed and NATO was striving to find an enemy. From the first Gulf War in 1990, the French military kept on saying it was necessary to return to standards compatible with NATO. Imagine a French fighter plane that could not refuel on an American carrier!
L. M. — Was that the case when France was outside the military organisation?
E. G. — Yes. French Air force fighters were not able to refuel. French Navy fighters could. There were different systems. That was why we decided times had changed. We understood that French nuclear forces were accepted by NATO, by the Americans and the U.K.
We said that if the United States agreed, the rest of NATO would too. Then, Chirac was elected. And in 1995, he made a first approach to President Clinton. And Clinton, for no reason, said no. Six months later, Clinton called Chirac to say that his advisers and the American military ‘finally think that it’s a very good idea.’ But Chirac, who had not digested the refusal, replied that it was too late. For that reason, we lost several years. Which did not stop us collaborating on the ground in ex-Yugoslavia.
Then, Sarkozy was elected after campaigning for a return to NATO. I was one of his advisers. For him, it was very simple. Firstly, we were spending quite a lot of money – France was providing 11% of the NATO budget – and we had no place at the table. Secondly, while France and the United Kingdom maintained their financial share, other countries were lowering theirs. To make up for this, the United States kept on reaching into its pockets. The moment had come to share the burden.
What I am going to say is not politically correct for the French: I could understand the American position. Then, Sarkozy said France was going to rejoin all structures, except the nuclear planning group which is actually a sort of teaching course designed to convey an understanding of dissuasion mechanisms to countries that do not have nuclear arms. We did not need that.
L. M. — Jim, does France’s departure from the integrated military structure remain etched in the memory of American military leaders?
J. M. — I have to admit that we did not understand this decision at a time when we were ready to lose millions of Americans and go as far as nuclear war to protect democracy in Europe. But for the officers who continued to go to French military schools, there is no longer any trace of that period. When I arrived at Central Command I realized that, decades after World War II, the two Supreme Allied commanders were still Americans, I suggested to the president that it was time that one of these two posts should go to a European. And I recommended that it go to France because the French army is known for its professionalism: it inspires respect and trust. That is how General Abrial was appointed.
As for the U.S. military view of Charles de Gaulle, he is part of what we look at as our greatest generation. And across the chaos of politics and policy, we could see that. He fought, he stood and fought when the chips were down for France. He was not someone to sit safely in an office. This means something to military people. He was in two wars. Remember that it was Eisenhower who insisted at the time of the Liberation that Leclerc’s Second Armoured Division should enter Paris. He had understood and recalled that ‘a nation with allies prospers whereas nations without allies perish.’ If, today, Russia is shaky, it is because it is isolated. Churchill said that the only thing that was more difficult than fighting alongside allies was fighting without allies. Sometimes, events set us apart. I am thinking of the Suez crisis during which the Americans opposed the British, the French and the Israelis despite NATO. All that said, the departure from NATO is no longer a sensitive subject, even if it had practical consequences at the time. Standardisation accords were broken and, as I recalled, we were in a situation which no longer allowed us to refuel French aircraft. But the good side to a crisis is that it is an opportunity to make an assessment. And this showed that the French and the Americans maintained their trust and mutual respect.
L. M. — Despite this trust, one sees again and again in the French political discourse the idea of leaving NATO to become autonomous and balance relations between America and Russia. Is this the reason that France was kept out of the ‘Five Eyes’ intelligence alliance linking several English-speaking countries?
E. G. — Generally speaking, military leaders are very pragmatic people. And one of the things for which we have to be pragmatic is that we are not going to change places. Neither France nor Russia will move. This is the reason why some military leaders say, all right, someday, we will have to deal with Russia. Not with this regime obviously, not next week or next year, but in 10, 15 years.
Now, for the Five Eyes, this is slightly different. It has a lot to do with the fact that the U.K. brought into the original basket three countries that were dominions: New Zealand, which can only be a junior partner, that’s obvious; Australia, as huge, comparatively, as Russia, and with a very small population; and Canada, which is just next door to the United States. Churchill, from 1941-1942 decided, and it was his own strategic vision, that he had to be America’s best friend, and he invented the special relationship. This is the reason why the Five Eyes were set up. Another reason was that at one time, in French politics, the left and the communist left were very powerful. Of course, it would be better to have a Six Eyes. But we have found ways to overcome this.
J. M. — The British had better intelligence in World War II than the Americans about German intentions. So for us it was a great boon to have it. And it grew out of those days to include the Commonwealth countries. But we also have very trustful and close cooperation in the intelligence community with France, with Israel and Japan.
L. M. — The Americans all the same chose to exclude France from the AUKUS alliance (1) that they put in place to counter China’s influence …
J. M. — Frankly, our military was caught by surprise … I won’t go into the details here. But this is not something that had military input, I’ll leave it at that. What is good about a relationship built on trust is that it can withstand these things, it can withstand AUKUS, it can withstand France not coming into Iraq in 2003. I think you’re aware that many high-ranking people in the U.S. military also did not recommend, for strategic reasons, to go into Iraq. We were obedient to the Constitution, obedient to the elected commander-in- chief and this why I say that when people think that crises are going to somehow shake the foundation of the trust between our military organisations… This is not going to happen. One day, we will drink a toast to the AUKUS crisis. In the future, if things go wrong, we still will find ourselves alongside each other, fighting together.
E. G. — The Australian government dealt itself a self-inflicted wound. Australia is going to get submarines, whatever the type, 10 to 15 years later than initially planned. One of the reasons for supplying submarines – French or not, never mind – was to close a window of opportunity against the Chinese Navy. The reason it was a self-inflicted wound was because it added 15 more years.
L. M. — Before 2003, the French and Americans were fighting together in Afghanistan. And this partnership continued after the Iraq crisis …
E. G. — At first, French Special Forces were sent to Afghanistan in December 2001 to support the American Special Forces.
J. M. — And right after 2003 too, when France went into the Sahara, we went with France there. You can see there were no consequences from the Iraq crisis, whether in Afghanistan, North Africa or Djibouti. When we needed an outpost, Camp Lemonnier (2), the French Foreign Legion camp, was immediately opened to us.
L. M. — Jim, I should like to come back to your common experience of combat, especially in Afghanistan where you worked with the French army. Would you say that the military culture of our two countries is similar?
J. M. — The big difference is that the French military eat better than the Americans! To be more serious, I’ve seen your officers at the highest level, I’ve seen them operational. There is a known quantity in terms of military competence, plus a very mature view of how to employ military force, especially when you’re working amongst innocent civilian people, non-combatants – something that Mr. Putin might want to teach his army someday. The bottom line is there is no surprise with the French. When French officers show up, they figure out what has to be done, what the mission is and they get on with it. It’s also why we put so much stock in the French because the Americans can be intimidating or brash, they’re like a great big friendly dog that comes to your cocktail party, but its tail knocks all the glasses off the table. Also, the French still have all the capabilities, they just don’t have the same scale as the
U.S. army or air force. Operation Barkhane would be for the U.S. military an economy-of-force size operation; to the French, it was a major operation that we supported we had no problem putting our troops there. So you see all this coming together. A pattern of accommodation and most of all a spirit of collaboration between us. You put one and one together, the French and the Americans, and you get five!
E. G. — I concur. Because of the size of their armed forces, the Americans can be seen as a big dog, but also sometimes as a somewhat bullying dog. We are smaller, so things are easier for us. We are agile and very reactive but we don’t have the same feeling for logistics.
L. M. — As for security in Europe and the war in Ukraine, do you think that the American and French militaries are on the same page? How can you manage a war that you are not directly taking part in?
E. G. — Difficult to say because they are fighting for their land. We can only be reactive, not proactive. I don’t know what Jim thinks about that.
J. M. — I would agree with you. Our presidents have a challenging situation where Putin must lose. He declared war virtually on Europe. On its prosperity, its values and its security. He must lose, and yet we do not want the war to extend, we do not want this to expand to the chemical or nuclear. How do you give all the tools necessary to the Ukrainians? Fortunately, our intelligence services have revealed Russian plans and we saw them penetrate the Kremlin, it’s all like a piece of Swiss cheese in terms of its security, of what’s going on.
L. M. — Édouard, when the President keeps reaffirming his attachment to European strategic autonomy, is this the right goal at this very moment?
E. G. — It depends on what you call autonomy. Obviously, if we have a look at the stockpiles of the European armies, they have never been very high. And when you have no more stockpiles, you lose your autonomy. I would say that it is much more a question of finding a way to wake up Europeans. I am not in our President’s head, so I can’t say. What I’m sure of is that we need a global effort on the European side. Of course, if this effort is coordinated, so much the better. And it must first be coordinated through NATO channels.
L. M. — Jim, the Republican strategist Elbridge Colby has developed an interesting thesis: for him, if the Americans want to convince their allies to take on a greater part of their own defence, they must agree to share the cake of the defence industry to the Europeans’ benefit. What do you think?
J. M. — Ever since John F. Kennedy, I think he was the first, said we need Europe to step up and do more, we have had the same demand. You see, this goes back a long way. I’ve heard the Supreme Allied Commander, Secretaries of Defence, Presidents, say Europe has to do more. I myself tell my European friends: you cannot expect American parents to care more about your children’s freedom than you do. We have to recognize that China is a global challenge and we have to ally in defence of our values here. That doesn’t mean there’s strategic autonomy, for any of us democracies right now. We can’t go off and say to hell with all of the international organisations, NATO being the primary military alliance. There is nothing the Americans are doing that is stopping the European military from opening up new factories and making vehicles. Look at the Nordic countries, the way they now build one truck for all of them, for example. They’re not buying American trucks. They’re buying their own trucks. And the fact that some nations want to buy certain fighters that we build – well, we build them for us, and if they’re good enough, it’s a free market, they choose, so be it.
E. G. — The Europeans’ problem is that they have 10 different models of tanks, six kinds of frigates, 10 or 15 models of submarine and at least five automatic rifles. That gives a considerable advantage to American industry which offers very good equipment at very good prices.
L. M. — To conclude, I want to ask you, Jim, if there is something you remember that struck you as important in your contacts with the French military? And vice versa, Édouard?
J. M. — I wish I could remember his name. My family had a house on the Columbia river. A friend of a friend, a French paratrooper, visited and I was I think 16-17 years old; the draft was coming that would eventually motivate me to join the Marines. And he gave me, in probably two and a half hours, a very different view of history: what happened in World War II, what happened in Indochina, what happened in Algeria. I had never heard it through the eyes of an French officer who had also jumped on Suez. And I just remember learning very young something that has stuck with me ever since: that I could learn more. It was absolutely stunning, that he gave me a very different picture about trust and breakdown of trust in political circles and all. And it started me on the study of everything, from Jules Roy about Dien Bien Phu to the novel Street without Joy of Bernard Fall. It showed me what can happen to a democracy’s military, and it armed me for things I never would have foreseen, with which I would someday be confronted. So there it is, in my earliest formative years. And since then, all French officers from the NATO Supreme Allied Command, to the ones I met in the field have been first-rate comrades in arms, and they’re very willing to speak openly, bluntly and honestly. It’s been a delightful experience.
L. M. — And you, Édouard, what is your greatest memory?
E. G. — It’s a kind of mosaic, and it began in Annapolis, in 1974, when I spent two months in the U.S. Navy and the U.S. naval academy. One of my teachers was a lieutenant at the time, Mike Mullen. And then a few years ago, he was chairman and I was Chief of Defence Staff, so I had the feeling that I had gone full circle. In between, you can add encounters at sea and in Afghanistan… My main meeting was with a guy called Jim Mattis when he was flying over to Afghanistan and stopping in Paris at Le Bourget, and we had quick meetings, talking a lot about history and grand strategy to understand what we were both doing on this Earth …
(1) AUKUS is a new trilateral security pact concluded by the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia to face the Chinese threat in the Indo-Pacific region. It led to the abrogation of an accord for France to sell submarines to Australia. The United States and the U.K. decided to help Australia acquire nuclear-powered submarines. This led at the time to a diplomatic crisis with Paris.
(2) Camp Lemmonier in Djibouti, where France has an important military base, originally housed a Foreign Legion garrison. Today it is the site of an American base. American and French forces cooperate actively in Djibouti, whose geostrategic situation is capital for projection into the Indian Ocean and the Indo-Pacific region.