Grégory Rayko — In 2022, the German Marshall Fund marked its 50th anniversary. Can you recall the circumstances of its birth in 1972? Why was its creation deemed necessary at that moment in the eyes of its founders, starting with Willy Brandt?
Alexandra de Hoop Scheffer — 1972 marked the 25th anniversary of the Marshall Plan in Europe. At that time, the interest in ‘European Studies’ in American universities and think tank community was beginning to decline. It was the time of détente and America was already starting to shift its attention away from Europe to the benefit of other regions in the world. As a result, the future of European Studies in the United States seemed uncertain.
This is what the American political scientist Stanley Hoffmann, who created the Center for European Studies at Harvard in 1968, noted when the Center found itself, three or four years later, short of funding. It was then that Hoffmann’s assistant, a young American academic of Swiss origin, Guido Goldman, had the idea of turning to the West German government to mark the 25t anniversary of the Marshall Plan. Goldman – the future first president of the German Marshall Fund – suggested to the Germans they could carry on the spirit of the Marshall Plan by supporting European studies – with a strong emphasis on German studies – in the United States to ensure that the American intellectual community continued to work on Europe.
The idea was to be an immediate success, and well beyond what Hoffmann and Goldman had hoped for in terms of funding. Willy Brandt, the West German chancellor at the time, welcomed this initiative. On 5 June 1972, Brandt made an inaugural speech at Harvard University – echoing the speech made by George Marshall in the same venue 25 years earlier – where he announced the creation of the German Marshall Fund. He expressed the wish to perpetuate the spirit of the Marshall Plan and to strengthen trans- Atlantic cooperation on all the global issues facing the United States and the Europeans.
Brandt also said – and it is very important to recall this – that Europe must, in his view, become an equal partner to America so as to share the responsibility for the world’s affairs. This was the articulation of his two-pillared vision for the transatlantic partnership: friendship and parity.
Finally, the full name of the foundation – The German Marshall Fund of the United States – took several elements into account: German, because the Fund was financed by Germany; Marshall because it kept alive the spirit of the Marshall Plan; of the United States because the headquarters was in the United States.
G. R. — So the impetus for the creation of the GMF came from the United States whereas the financing came from Germany. Did the Germans impose their agenda and did they lobby to promote their interests through the GMF?
A. H. S. — The foundation is totally independent. It is written in the statutes that no lobbying for the German State can be carried out through the GMF. The president is American. As far as the staff is concerned (about 200 employees to date), two thirds are European and one third American. Regarding our funding, at the beginning, in 1972, the German government invested 150 million Deutsche Marks to create this fund. Since then, the funding of the German government has always been significant, but it is balanced by other contributions coming from many public and private actors, European as well as American. This balance in our funding model gives us intellectual independence which is very rare for a thinktank.
G. R. — Since it was founded, the GMF has opened offices in Paris, Berlin, Brussels, Ankara, Belgrade, Bucharest and Warsaw. Why these countries in particular?
A. H. S. — The GMF was established as a permanent and enduring institution on the one hand, but also very dynamic and reactive on the other. Originally, we had only one office in Washington DC. But very quickly, successive presidents decided that, in order to perpetuate the spirit of transatlantic cooperation of the Marshall Plan, it was essential to be established in Europe. The desire to open offices in Central and Eastern European countries dates back to the 1980s, but it was not until the fall of the Berlin Wall that it became a reality: the Berlin office was opened in December 1990. GMF was keen to support the countries of Eastern Europe in their post-communist transition. We also supported local civil society by providing scholarships and grants to enable young professionals to start up their businesses after the end of communism.
As for the Western European offices, why Paris rather than London? The ‘special’ American-British relationship is ‘taken for granted,’ with London aligning itself with the main priorities of American foreign policy, while relations between France and the United States ‘have been, are and always will be conflicting and excellent,’ as former French president Jacques Chirac said in 1995. This is no doubt because the two allies have historically been in competition with each other, bearers of a universal message, but also because diverging views have never prevented France and the United States from cooperating. Having an office in Paris is extremely relevant in times of disagreement, because we play a role of behind- the-scenes diplomacy in close collaboration with governments, to defuse tensions and facilitate dialogue. From the war in Iraq (2003) to the Inflation Reduction Act (2022) to AUKUS (2021), each time GMF’s Paris office has played a central role in Franco-American dialogue.
Finally, we are strengthening our presence in Madrid to consolidate our presence in Southern Europe and to boost our programs on the Mediterranean, Africa and the entire southern European neighbourhood. It’s also about strengthening transatlantic dialogue and cooperation on and in this region.
We work in synergy with all the offices, allowing us to have a multi-layered approach (national, regional and global) to political, strategic and economic issues. GMF also has a global network of fellows, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region (Japan, Taiwan, India). Since September 2022, I have taken the position of Senior Vice President for Geostrategy and joined the Executive Committee of GMF, having under my supervision all the European offices and Ankara, as well as the geopolitical programs in Washington and our network of fellows in Asia. This represents more than 80 international experts. With the other members of the executive committee, I am contributing to the restructuring of the GMF, the objective being to encourage experts to work in synergy and in a crossregional manner on major issues, such as the war in Ukraine and its long-term implications for European security; the competition between the United States and China; the challenges of industrial competitiveness and energy transition.
G. R. — In 50 years of existence, what in your opinion has the GMF brought? What are the organisation’s main accomplishments?
A. H. S. — Our added value in the think tank landscape is our transatlantic geographic footprint, which gives us unparalleled knowledge of the national and regional political, societal and strategic dynamics. Over the past fifty years, we have demonstrated our ability to anticipate emerging issues and risks and to impact the public and political debate on both sides of the Atlantic, often several steps ahead of the curve. Here are some concrete examples: GMF was the first think tank to design trilateral strategic dialogues between American, European and Asian policymakers, experts and business leaders, our well-known ‘Trilateral Forums’ with China, India, Japan and more recently Taiwan, as early as the late 1990s. We were also among the first think tanks to have created a Climate Program with the objective of strengthening transatlantic cooperation on climate and environmental issues, an aspect of our work that we are reinforcing in the context of the GMF’s restructuring; finally, as early as 2012, we anticipated the assertion of regional powers, the so-called Global Swing States (Turkey, India, Indonesia, Brazil) in global affairs, calling on the United States and Europe to redefine their relations and cooperation with these countries. The war in Ukraine and the Sino-American competition are accelerating the reconfiguration of alliances and GMF’s work on the Global Swing States is now being taken up by governments and think tanks as a reference work on the topic. An updated and expanded version (including Saudi Arabia and South Africa) of this study, conducted under my direction, was published on May 2, 2023.
G. R. — Would you say that the war in Ukraine has given a welcome boost to American-European relations given that, in the preceding years, Washington seemed to be progressively losing interest in Europe to concentrate on China?
A. H. S. — With the war in Ukraine, the United States has re- engaged massively in Europe and in the medium term, the war in Ukraine increases Europe’s military and energy dependence on the United States.
In the longer term, the main threat to the United States, as it perceives it, remains China. The debate in Washington is increasingly about the need to ‘share the burden’ of the assistance to Ukraine and especially the reconstruction with Europe, in order to be able to allocate more U.S. resources, including military resources, to the Indo-Pacific region. American aid to Ukraine is becoming politicized in the context of the presidential campaign, and the arrival in the White House in January 2025 of a president other than Biden, a fortiori a Republican, could lead to a scaling-down of the American commitment in and with Europe and to additional pressure from Washington on its European allies to take greater responsibility for the security of their continent. The French position, which consists of encouraging its European partners to anticipate this scenario and to strengthen their defence capabilities by investing in their own industries, remains inaudible at a time when European capitals have rushed to Washington and NATO.
G. R. — How far does Sino-American rivalry spill over on to the trans-Atlantic relation?
A. H. S. — The United States views its partners, regional and global issues through the prism of its rivalry with China. This is a structuring factor of American foreign policy. In this respect, Washington sees the European continent as a vulnerable space, as it is increasingly permeable to Chinese influence and investments in European critical infrastructures. The Chinese offensive on European ports is of particular concern to Washington.
Successive American administrations, whether under Biden, Trump or Obama, expect Europe to align itself with their positions vis-à-vis China. But Europe rejects a logic of blocs and wants to avoid an escalation of tensions with China over Taiwan. If Europeans are committed to a policy of decoupling with Russia, they cannot and do not want to replicate the same policy with China. The choice of the term ‘de-risking’ (which consists of identifying and strengthening strategic sectors in which the EU is too dependent on China) instead of ‘decoupling’ brings an important nuance, which is shared and taken up by Washington. Nevertheless, American pressure on its European partners will continue to increase with regard to technological export restrictions, impacting European industries. The transatlantic dialogue on these issues must be strengthened and the GMF will actively contribute to this.
G. R. — Let’s imagine a scenario in which Donald Trump were to return in the United States at a time when most big European countries were run by hard-right parties, as is already the case in Italy and Poland and as could eventually happen in France, or in Spain and Germany. In such a case, would trans-Atlantic relations be in danger? Or would they survive all political contingencies?
A. H. S. — The Trump presidency has shown the extent to which domestic politics impacts U.S. foreign policy and Washington’s ability to cooperate with its closest allies. The partial retreat of U.S. leadership in multilateral forums, and even the withdrawal of the United States from several multilateral agreements, have generated a sense of great uncertainty among its partners and a loss of U.S. credibility in global affairs. In Europe, ultraconservative or far-right parties do not have the same view of the link with Washington: Meloni’s Italy and Duda’s Poland have a very Atlanticist policy, while the AfD in Germany, the Rassemblement National in France and Viktor Orban in Hungary want a break with this mainstream Atlanticist policy. GMF, as a non-partisan think tank, has managed throughout the fifty years of its existence to maintain a strong connection with all US administrations, including the Trump administration. Maintaining ‘working level’ relationships in all circumstances with those who produce and implement policy, is essential and at the heart of GMF’s work.
G. R. — When we speak of American-European relations, what do we mean precisely? Diplomatic, military, commercial, cultural and scientific, or all of these together? How do you manage differences when they arise, as in 2021 with regard to the AUKUS agreement?
A. H. S. — Transatlantic relations are built and shaped around all of the areas of cooperation you mentioned: the European Union and the United States are connected by the largest and most integrated economic relationship in the world. Diplomatic relations and security and defence cooperation have been routinized and institutionalized since the end of World War II into a well-oiled mechanism. This institutionalization of transatlantic relations at all levels allows the United States and Europe to withstand turbulence and disagreements (e.g. 2033 Iraq War). With Trump, the transatlantic dialogue has been freed from a form of hypocrisy. Under Biden, the Franco- American dispute over the AUKUS dossier contributed to making bilateral relations much more straightforward.
I was part of the post-AUKUS diplomatic process. For Washington, AUKUS was portrayed as an American faux-pas and the Biden team wanted to get back to normal as quick as possible, whereas for France, it was a profound crisis in the bilateral and transatlantic relationship and required a serious overhaul of the relationship and of consultation modalities between allies. For me, AUKUS confirms that France and its European partners are progressively relegated to a secondary position in American strategic thinking, and integrated late into decision-making process, or not at all. The Biden administration does not hesitate to present France (and its European partners) with a fait accompli when there are diverging interests or objectives. In this context, it is therefore more than ever up to the Europeans to define the transatlantic agenda, by clarifying their own interests. This is notably the case with the Inflation Reduction Act, but the European response must still be strengthened.
G. R. — Can we now say that the page has been turned?
A. H. S. — Yes, we can say that there is a relative appeasement. Emmanuel Macron’s visit to Washington in December 2022 was a way to reset the bilateral relationship, and the war in Ukraine has led Washington to redouble its efforts to strengthen consultations and coordination (sanctions against Russia, military aid to Ukraine) with its European partners. However, in many ways, Trump’s ‘America First’ has rubbed off on Biden’s ‘America is Back’, with a persistence of transactionalism and circumventing European partners when they are not fully aligned with US positions. On China, the transatlantic relationship is perceived as just an alliance among others for Washington. The EU is mainly perceived as a lever against Beijing. The Euro-Atlantic Quad formed by the United States, France, Germany and Great Britain is losing influence to the Trans-Pacific Quad, which links the United States with Japan, India and Australia.
G. R. — Nearly 20 years earlier, in 2003, the Franco-American relationship was shaken, perhaps even more seriously, by differences over the war in Iraq. How did the GMF react then?
A. H. S. — You are right, the war in Iraq has deeply shaken the Franco-American (but also German-American) relationship. In this context, GMF launched in 2003 a new project aimed at facilitating an annual visit to Paris of a Congressional delegation composed of 8 to 9 senators and representatives of the Democratic and Republican parties. I wrote my PhD thesis on the war in Iraq, and I immediately understood the need for this initiative, which aims to maintain political dialogue in times of crisis. The project was co-organized with the French ministry of foreign affairs. When I was advisor to the Policy Planning staff, one of my responsibilities was precisely to organize the trip of the American delegation to France. After high-level meetings in Paris, we always spent the last day on the beaches of D-Day in Normandy, as a reminder of our historic relationship. For our American guests, it was always a moment of intense emotion. Many of them had never travelled to Europe before. Now they discovered that here, in France, there was a piece of American territory. These meetings organized around the D-Day, in May- June, have existed for almost 20 years. They allow our countries to strengthen the Franco-American through other channels and to make France better known to members of Congress who may be called upon to take on important political responsibilities in the years to come.
G. R. — To be strong, does the trans-Atlantic relationship need to have a strong adversary – be it Russia, China or the international jihad?
A. H. S. — This is a very American vision! Today, China is designated as the number one adversary of the United States. But we Europeans do not have the same approach. This way of seeing things makes us uncomfortable: we do not need a common adversary to work well with our American partners. There are a lot of transnational issues – primarily climate – on which we should be working together much more. In fact, our annual flagship study, Transatlantic trends, clearly shows that American and European public opinion is very much in favour of deepening this cooperation.
G. R. — The conflict in Ukraine has helped move the centre of gravity of the European Union towards the East, towards the countries that see Washington as an indispensable and irreplaceable protector. For you, does this move have a positive or negative effect on the trans-Atlantic relationship?
A. H. S. — I do not share the analysis according to which the centre of gravity of Europe has moved to the East. Of course, one can only recognize the assertion of leadership by countries such as Poland and the Baltic States, which had anticipated the scenario of a Russian invasion of Ukraine. Under the impetus of Washington, NATO has durably reinforced its presence on the Eastern flank. On the other hand, the EU’s political weight remains in Paris and Berlin, and Washington sees these two capitals as its two privileged interlocutors, often in association with Great Britain (Quad) and Italy (Quint). However, Berlin and Paris have not been able to orchestrate a European response to the war in Ukraine, with President Macron perceived as too complacent with Putin, and Scholz as too hesitant. The French discourse on strategic autonomy quickly became inaudible, and even counterproductive, while it was the ‘American reflex’ that prevailed in European capitals, with a NATOization of the military response. I regret the dissymmetry that has become more pronounced in the transatlantic relationship, with the return of an America that dictates and a Europe that follows. Our powerlessness, exacerbated in the context of the war in Ukraine, confines us to this role. To rally its European partners to the objective of an EU more capable of acting and formulating its own strategic interests, France must completely revise its method, creating alliances with other countries, in the East, in the South and in the North, as it has begun to do with the Netherlands and Spain for example.
G. R. — Here is no doubt a fear among some American leaders that a stronger and more autonomous Europe might free itself from the United States and end up distancing itself …
A. H. S. — For me, this is a false debate. On the contrary, a stronger and better equipped Europe will be a more credible partner for the United States. But, yes, you are right, this is a message that Washington do not want to hear. For my part, I believe that Europeans must be lucid and realize that their dependencies cost them enormously. We have seen this in recent crises: Covid, Ukraine ... One thing is certain: the dynamics of the transatlantic relationship will no longer come from Washington but from Europe. To achieve this, we must return to a ‘project-driven Europe’, with priority given to defence and energy. The United States must also change its position and recognize the advantages, including for itself, of a Europe that is not always aligned with its policies, particularly with regard to China –i.e. a strategic complementarity that would allow the transatlantic partners to diversify their diplomatic and economic relations and to be able to weigh more effectively on the challenges of tomorrow.