Politique Internationale — Where does this Indo-Pacific concept come from?
Jean-Baptiste Jeangène Vilmer — The idea goes back a long way. The first occurrences of the term “Indo-Pacific” date back to the 19th century, to designate the ethnolinguistic continuity between the Indian Ocean, Southeast Asia and Melanesia. It was later used in the German geopolitics of the 1920s and 1930s, notably by Karl Haushofer, and by the Indian historian Kalidas Nag (1941). The general idea of this first generation was simply that the Indian and Pacific oceans were linked - by history, demography, culture and, already, by economic interdependencies - and that this meta-region should therefore be thought of as a single space. The concept of linking two oceans is therefore first and foremost a maritime one. It is in the 21st century that the strategic dimension of the Indo-Pacific will be asserted, and become the focus of a number of national strategies.
P. I. — Why is the region so strategic?
J.-B. J. V. — Because this meta-region is one of superlatives: covering almost half the surface of the globe, home to three-quarters of the world’s population, it is the world’s economic engine. It generates 60% of global GDP, concentrates the overwhelming majority of critical raw materials (lithium, copper, nickel) and virtually all technological value chains, notably those used in the manufacture of computers and smartphones (Taiwan produces 85% of the world’s semiconductors). At least three potentially nuclear crises are brewing there - China/Taiwan, North Korea/South Korea and India/Pakistan - as well as a ballistic and nuclear proliferation problem with Iran, and seven of the world’s ten largest defense budgets are concentrated there. This is also where climate change is most evident, not only because some of the world’s biggest CO2 emitters are located here, and the Indo-Pacific accounts for 45% of global emissions, but also because island states are among the most vulnerable to the consequences of climate change, as can be seen in Vanuatu, where I am.
It is also in this area that Chinese pressure on the international order and the challenge to its norms - i.e. the questioning of borders, but also of existing rules - is strongest. Beijing is advancing faster than anywhere else. In response, neighboring countries are rearming, and the major and lesser powers are reinvesting, opening embassies, increasing their development aid programs tenfold, and redoubling their influence to contain the Chinese steamroller. Against this backdrop of growing tension, with fuses lit on potentially major crises, incidents can rapidly escalate.
Symptomatic of this Indo-Pacific pivot, navies have turned more towards this area, starting with the French Navy. For a long time, our aircraft carrier was mainly in the Atlantic, but now it’s mainly in the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean.
P. I. — What is it about the Indo-Pacific that makes it so important from a maritime point of view?
J.-B. J. V. — Firstly, a general reason that’s not specific to the Indo- Pacific: the sea is more strategic than ever for communication, trade, security and resource exploitation. This has always been the case: as early as the 16th century, Britain’s sir Walter Raleigh said that “he who commands the sea commands trade (...) and consequently the world”, but it is even more true today, to such an extent that we speak of the “maritimization of the world”. Including in military terms: the naval rearmament underway is unprecedented since the end of the Cold War, and some navies are highly aggressive. Given the quantitative and qualitative growth of fleets, the development of weaponry, particularly missiles and electronic warfare capabilities, and the characteristics of this environment - global, i.e. limitless, both smooth, favoring rapid movement, and opaque, allowing submarines to hide, generating uncertainty and presenting little risk of collateral damage - the hypothesis of high-intensity combat at sea is now considered credible.
From this point of view, the Indo-Pacific is all the more strategic because - as anyone can see on a map - it’s a “blue” meta- region, i.e. essentially made up of oceans and crossed by maritime highways. It is home to 60% of the world’s maritime trade, and nine of the world’s biggest ports. And if the sea is important, it’s not only for the navigation it enables on the surface, but also for the submarine cables that line the seabed: 95% of international data in this space circulates via these cables, which themselves present strategic stakes - who builds them, who lays them, who controls them, who can potentially intercept and/or sabotage them, with what consequences.
Secondly, the Indo-Pacific is strategic because its straits are strategic: the shortest sea routes between the two oceans pass through veritable bottlenecks. The best-known of these is the Malacca Straits, the world’s busiest: this is the shortest route between Europe and Asia via the Suez Canal and, consequently, the main oil supply route for China and Japan. Vulnerable to accident and piracy, it could also be deliberately blocked. The problem this would pose for Beijing had already been identified in 2003 by Chinese President Hu Jintao, who referred to it as the “Malacca dilemma”. To get out of this dilemma, China is looking for alternative routes to the Indian Ocean via Burma (Kunming-Kyaukphyu corridor) or Thailand (Kra Canal). In Southeast Asia, the Sunda and Lombok Straits are also important. There are other strategic locks elsewhere in the Indo-Pacific: the Suez Canal, of course, as we saw when the container ship Ever Given blocked it for six days in 2021, which had a global economic impact; or the Straits of Bab el-Mandeb - which sees 30% of the world’s container traffic pass through - and Hormuz- 20 million barrels of oil a day, 20% of the world’s volume - whose blockage would also have considerable repercussions.
The world’s seas and oceans are increasingly becoming a contested space. In the Indo-Pacific, escalating tensions in the Taiwan Strait are the most obvious and most talked-about risk. If Taiwan is so strategic for Beijing, it’s also for naval reasons, because the South China Sea is a shallow sea, making Chinese submarines vulnerable because they can be spotted. In that respect, Taiwan also means access to the deep sea. At the other end of the spectrum, the Red Sea is already under strain, with Houthi attacks on ships using drones and missiles, also having an impact on international trade.
P. I. — As you’ve just mentioned, what about the military dimension of this space?
J.-B. J. V. — If the sea is so important in the Indo-Pacific, it’s also because it’s the main medium for China’s military growth and assertiveness, which the 2024-30 French Military Programming Law (LPM) presents as “our strategic competitor”: Beijing builds the equivalent of half the French navy every year, builds artificial islands (“polderization”) and also employs civilian-looking maritime militias that impede the freedom of movement of neighboring powers and are regularly involved in confrontations with vessels, particularly Filipino. China’s first overseas military base, in Djibouti, is a naval base, as the next ones are likely to be. China, which until now has only had aircraft carriers, is about to launch its first catapult-equipped aircraft carrier, the Fujian, and may soon start work on the next, which could be nuclear-powered. With the catapult enabling them to project farther and heavier, China’s use of this tool could change. They are building an ocean-going navy that will enable them to project force far and wide. Added to this is a “growing strategic convergence” between China and Russia, noted in the 2022 French National Strategic Review, which aims to challenge international bodies and oppose our interests, in the Indo- Pacific and elsewhere.
Finally, the war in Ukraine since 2022 has helped to “decontinentalize”, and therefore “maritimize”, energy flows: with land routes from Russia cut off, Europe is sourcing more from the south and west, via the Mediterranean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean. Land is no longer the preferred access route for hydrocarbons, which increases the strategic value of sea routes in the region.
P. I. — Apart from France, which other countries have adopted an Indo-Pacific strategy?
J.-B. J. V. — Japan, first of all, and more specifically Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, as part of his policy of rapprochement with India. In a speech to the Indian Parliament in 2007, he described the two oceans as forming a single strategic space. At the time, however, the official Japanese terminology was still “Asia-Pacific”. In 2015, the term “Indo-Pacific” was formally introduced in a joint declaration by the Japanese and Indian prime ministers. In 2016, Abe presented a Strategy for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific, which was included in the 2017 Diplomatic Blue Book. On the Indian side, the idea had also been launched in 2007 by Gurpreet Khurana, a former naval officer. The Indian Prime Minister used it for the first time in 2012. Modi made it a hallmark of his Act East policy and, in 2017, adopted the Japanese terminology in a Japanese-Indian declaration entitled “Towards a Free, Open and Prosperous Indo-Pacific”.
In the United States, too, the concept was infused during this period: in 2010, Hillary Clinton spoke of the “Indo-Pacific Basin”, and the following year, the Obama administration’s famous “pivot to Asia” was in fact a pivot to a meta-region presented as the “Indo- Asia-Pacific”. In 2017, the Trump administration also adopted the Japanese formulation of a “free and open Indo-Pacific”. The phrase appears in the 2017 National Security Strategy and the 2018 National Defense Strategy. In 2019, the Department of Defense and the State Department each published a strategy on the Indo- Pacific. The Biden administration in turn published an Indo-Pacific Strategy in 2022. The concept has also developed in Australia, as early as the 2013 Defense White Paper, which speaks of an “Indo- Pacific strategic arc”. For Australians, traditionally more focused on the Pacific than the Indian Ocean, the Indo-Pacific concept has the advantage of rebalancing and connecting their two spaces.
Indonesia has also played an important role in the gestation of the concept since 2013, and in particular in a joint declaration with India in 2018. Indonesia’s involvement has also had the effect of bringing on board the regional organization, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which published an Asean Indo-Pacific Outlook in 2019. Other states in the region came on board later: it wasn’t until 2021 that New Zealand’s Prime Minister announced that she had “embraced the concept of an Indo-Pacific as the enlarged perimeter of New Zealand”, and she did so in the now- agreed terms of a “free and open” Indo-Pacific - an expression only used by South Korea since 2022.
As for the other states, Germany and the Netherlands published Indo-Pacific strategies in 2020, the UK announced its “switch” to the Indo-Pacific in 2021, the European Union published its strategy in 2021, Canada and the Czech Republic in 2022, and Lithuania in 2023.
P. I. — What about France? When did it draw up its strategy for the region?
J.-B. J. V. — In 2016, a Senate report on Franco-Australian relations called, among other things, for the adoption of a French Indo- Pacific strategy. President Emmanuel Macron launched France’s Indo-Pacific strategy in 2018, during his trips to India and Australia, where he spoke of France as an Indo-Pacific power and called for the formation of a “Paris-Delhi-Canberra axis”. In May 2018, the Ministry of the Armed Forces published a document, prepared by the Directorate General of International Relations and Strategy (DGRIS), entitled La France et la sécurité en Indopacifique (France and security in the Indo-Pacific), which is the first public declination of French strategy in this area. As in the US, the first focus was on defense. The Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs prepared the document released on the sidelines of the ambassadors’ conference at the end of August 2018, entitled Stratégie française en Asie- Océanie à l’horizon 2030. This document, Vers un espace asiatique indopacifique inclusif, covers all the priority areas of France’s action in this zone, including defense. Note the wording, which uses “Indo-Pacific” without abandoning “Asia” and “Oceania”.
At this conference, President Macron asked all the French ambassadors gathered in Paris to “develop this axis from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific Ocean, via Southeast Asia, in a resolute, ambitious and precise manner”. In May 2019, the Ministry of the Armed Forces published La Stratégie de défense française en Indopacifique (French Defense Strategy in the Indo-Pacific), and in the months that followed, the President of the Republic continued to develop his vision in his speeches at the Ambassadors’ Conference, as well as in Saint-Denis de La Réunion. In 2020, the Quai d’Orsay created the post of Ambassador for the Indo-Pacific, and in 2022, the government published La Stratégie de la France dans l’Indopacifique, which, as we speak (April 2024), is currently being updated.
P. I. — What does it involve?
J.-B. J. V. — First of all, recognizing the importance of the Indo- Pacific not only in its own right, for the reasons mentioned above, but in particular for France, the only European state to have sovereign interests there. France has 1.8 million citizens living in its territories in the Indian Ocean (Reunion, Mayotte, French Southern and Antarctic Territories) and the Pacific Ocean (New Caledonia, French Polynesia, Wallis and Futuna, Clipperton), which make up over 90% of its exclusive economic zone, the second largest in the world. In addition, there are more than 200,000 French nationals living abroad in the countries of this region. France is therefore an Indo-Pacific nation in its own right, as well as a power in the Indo- Pacific, with the means to protect its sovereignty and interests, and to face up to global challenges.
Against this backdrop, France’s interests lie in defending its sovereignty and its citizens, securing the maritime flows on which its economy depends, and maintaining its standing on the international stage, i.e. its credibility as a power of and in the Indo-Pacific. France defends a free and open space, based on respect for international law and multilateralism. France also wishes to resist the current bipolarization by rejecting the logic of blocs. It does not shy away from cooperating with Beijing on certain issues - for example, the fight against climate change and the protection of biodiversity - but it does so by assuming its identity, its values and its alliances: France knows and recognizes that Washington remains its main ally, so there is no question of claiming a position of equidistance.
P. I. — And what does the European strategy consist of?
J.-B. J. V. — Largely inspired by France, the only European state to be an Indo-Pacific nation, i.e. to have territories in both oceans, the European Union’s Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific Region was presented in 2021. It is based on the same observation: the growing strategic importance of the Indo-Pacific for the EU, the leading investor and main development cooperation partner in the area. And it has the same objectives: in the face of dynamics that threaten regional stability, it is important to maintain a region that is free and open to all, based on rules and a level playing field for trade and investment, and in which the fight against climate change and connectivity with the EU are priorities. From this point of view, the protection of safe maritime communication routes is essential. To this end, the EU wishes to strengthen the naval presence of its member states in the area, and increase the number of joint exercises and operations with regional partners, notably to combat piracy and preserve freedom of navigation.
P. I. — What are France’s military resources in the Indo-Pacific?
J.-B. J. V. — More than 7,000 French military personnel are permanently deployed in this area - 4,000 in the Indian Ocean and 3,000 in the Pacific Ocean - in 5 military commands, 3 sovereignty forces (FAZSOI, FANC, FAPF) and 2 presence forces (FFEAU, FFDJ). Their equipment will be renewed in the coming years. The LPM 2024-30 provides for a budget of €13 billion to deliver 6 overseas patrol boats (the first of which, the Auguste Bénébig, has already arrived in Nouméa, and made its first voyage to Vanuatu in July 2023 for the presidential visit), a corvette, 65 Serval vehicles and 6 helicopters. In addition to this permanent force, France regularly deploys the PHA group’s annual Jeanne d’Arc mission, nuclear attack submarines and the French Air Force’s Pégase mission, which deployed 19 aircraft (10 Rafales, 5 A330 MRTTs and 4 A400Ms) in 2023, as well as conducting regular exercises with our allies and partners in the region. In December 2023, France also hosted the South Pacific Defence Ministers Meeting (SPDMM) in Nouméa.
In this area, the French Navy carries out the full spectrum of missions, from state action at sea to deterrence, including the fight against piracy, trafficking and IUU (illegal, unreported and unregulated) fishing, as well as humanitarian aid in the event of natural disasters, such as cyclones or eruptions, and the defense of freedom of movement, including in places where it is most contested, such as the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait. Alongside the United States, France is one of the few countries to send ships to the Strait, such as the frigate Prairial in 2023.
P. I. — How is this cooperation going? In particular, who are France’s allies?
J.-B. J. V. — France’s main allies in the Indo-Pacific are the United States, Australia, India and Japan, but we also work regularly with New Zealand, the United Kingdom and other European states, as well as with countries in Southeast Asia, particularly Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam and the Philippines. With its partners, France regularly organizes exercises to establish common operating standards and procedures. For example, the “Croix du Sud” 2023 exercise, which I was able to attend in New Caledonia, involved 19 nations, 3,000 military and civilian personnel, 10 ships and 15 aircraft, in a particularly realistic post-natural disaster crisis management and humanitarian assistance scenario, as the region is frequently affected by cyclones, tsunamis, earthquakes and eruptions. On the same theme, the FRANZ (France-Australia-New Zealand) format, which has been in existence since 1992, is a very active cooperative effort on behalf of Pacific island states affected by natural disasters. In 2023, for example, it was mobilized twice in Vanuatu, following cyclones Judy and Kevin in March, and Lola in October. France, Australia and New Zealand were the first to react in a coordinated fashion to help the population. Numerous operations to combat trafficking and IUU fishing are also carried out with allies and partners, including for the benefit of countries that do not themselves have the means to control their exclusive economic zones, as is often the case in the insular Pacific: in such cases, France, like some other naval powers, offers shipriding, i.e. taking local officers on board its vessels to patrol with them and enable them to carry out the appropriate controls. It is in this sense that France can be said to be a catalyst for sovereignty in the Indo- Pacific: because it helps, in practical terms, certain states that lack the means of their own to implement their sovereignty.
Finally, there’s training. France has a number of training centers in the Indo-Pacific that enable us to work with neighboring countries: the tropical training center on Reunion Island, the nautical and commando training center in New Caledonia, and the overseas and foreign training center in Tahiti. The Pacific Academy, announced by the President of the Republic in Nouméa and Port- Vila in July 2023 and since reinforced by the Minister of the Armed Forces, will enable several hundred foreign military personnel to be trained each year, not only in New Caledonia but also in rotating training courses in the region.